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Chapter 1: Introduction
Hurricane Katrina struck south-eastern Louisiana early on the morning of 
Monday, 29 August 2005.1 While a majority of the city’s population had fled the 
city before landfall, as many as 100,000 local residents still remained, huddled in 
private homes or the few local shelters that were open. Over the coming hours 
storm surge would overwhelm several key levees that had protected the city from 
flooding for decades. Over 80 per cent of central New Orleans was flooded by 
a toxic mix of water, fuel, sewage and debris as a result. The situation was only 
marginally better in affected communities elsewhere along the Gulf Coast from 
Texas in the west to Florida in the east. All told, at least 1,800 individuals would 
perish as a result of the storm. Some bodies have yet to be recovered.
According to Richard T. Sylves, ‘Hurricanes are perhaps the type of disaster 
most familiar to Americans’.2 Indeed, Waugh suggests that ‘for many Americans, 
great hurricane disasters have helped shape the public perception of what disasters 
[…] are’ and how they should be managed.3 However, what most Americans 
witnessed after Katrina far exceeded the ‘usual’ destruction that they had grown 
accustomed to seeing in their local communities or on television. The question 
on the minds of journalists, elected officials and citizens alike was how this could 
have been allowed to happen?4 How was it possible that so many people could 
lose their lives? Where was the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
immediately after landfall? And what was one to make of the seemingly anaemic 
response that the agency orchestrated once staff in FEMA shirts finally began 
appearing on the scene? The Katrina disaster was all the more puzzling given the 
sweeping reforms to the nation’s emergency management system in the wake 
1 Knabb, et al., 2006.
2 Sylves, 2007: 143.
3 Waugh, 1990, in Sylves, 2007: 143.
4 Senate Homeland Defense and Governmental Affairs Committee, 2006.
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of the 9/11 attacks just four years earlier. In their wake, members of Congress 
success fully pushed through the creation of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS), what would be the single largest reorganization of the Federal Government 
since the Department of Defense (DoD) after World War II. Proponents of the 
move argued that by joining over 20 federal agencies, including FEMA (at the 
time responsible for emergency management coordination at the federal level), 
within DHS, the Federal Government’s efforts in managing all manner of threats, 
natural or antagonistic, would be better coordinated and more effective.5
As Claire Rubin points out, Hurricane Katrina constituted one of the first 
opportunities to evaluate the effects of these and other post-9/11 reforms.6 
One could reasonably expect that given the amount of political capital, human 
resources and money that had been expended in ‘securing the homeland’ after 
the 9/11 attacks, foreseeable threats like hurricanes would be managed just as 
effectively as they had been in the past. Instead, the Katrina response seemed to 
suggest that the Federal Government’s ability to manage large-scale disasters had 
in fact deteriorated.7 According to Donald Kettl, the 9/11 attacks constituted 
a ‘stress test’ that ‘revealed serious weaknesses in the nation’s homeland security 
fabric’.8 The Katrina response suggested that there was remained much work to 
do before the homeland could be said to be fully secured.
According to Kettl, ‘Democracies don’t prepare well for things that have 
never happened before’.9 What democracies are much better at managing are 
regularly recurring events that are familiar and predictable, what I refer to in 
this study as foreseeable complex problems. These include major meteorological 
events like Katrina. According to Graham Allison’s organizational process model 
of government action in Essence of Decision, bureaucracies tend to maintain 
readily available sets of ‘standard’ answers to the ‘standard’ problems that they 
encounter on a regular basis.10 Despite the fact that FEMA did prioritize efforts 
aimed at preparing for a major hurricane striking New Orleans (‘the big one’ in 
the parlance of FEMA planners and locals alike) in the years preceding Katrina, 
the federal response to the storm suggests that the answers that were available to 
the agency in 2005 were inadequate and/or ill-suited to the problem that they 
were faced with.11 Why was this? Was Katrina in fact so big that the standard 
answers available to FEMA and its partners were simply inadequate? Or had 
the post-9/11 reforms and general elite attentiveness of terrorism writ large 
5 Kettl, 2007: viii.
6 Morris, 2006: 291; Rubin, 2007: 1.
7 Rubin, 2007: 1.
8 Kettl, 2007: 12.
9 Kettl, 2007: 100.
10 Allison, 1971. 
11 Berger, 2001; Irons, 2005.
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changed the nature of the available answers such that they no longer applied to 
the hurricane threat? Or was there some other explanation?
The dominant interpretation of the Katrina response tends to place blame 
at the feet of individual decision-makers (President George W. Bush, the DHS 
secretary, the FEMA director, the mayor of New Orleans, to name a few) or 
entire government agencies (usually FEMA). The argument goes that had these 
actors been more attuned to the hurricane threat facing New Orleans and/or 
more engaged as Katrina approached the Louisiana coast, the resulting response 
would have been much more robust and many more lives would have been 
saved.12 While this interpretation certainly goes some way in explaining the 
outcomes of the Katrina response, it arguably neglects other, less obvious factors 
that influenced the ability of the relevant actors to coordinate their activities 
long before, immediately prior to, and then after landfall such that ‘the right 
tools [were] available in the right place at the right time’.13 Indeed, Vicki Bier 
argues that ‘many of the problems observed [during the response to Katrina] 
were not due to any one person or organization, but rather were problems of 
coordination at the interfaces between multiple organizations and multiple 
levels of government’.14 The many public inquiries launched in the wake of the 
storm came to the same conclusion – if government agencies had just been able 
to coordinate their activities better, the fiasco that Katrina evolved into could 
most likely have been avoided.15
In 2008, just three years after Katrina, New Orleans was again threatened by 
a major hurricane, Hurricane Gustav. The response to Gustav suggested that the 
relevant government actors had dramatically improved their ability to coordinate 
with one another since 2005.16 Indeed, state and local authorities, supported 
by FEMA and other federal agencies, oversaw the near-total evacuation of New 
Orleans by the time the storm made landfall – only the National Guard and a 
few hundred stubborn hold-outs remained.17 As it was, Gustav veered westward at 
the last moment, leaving the city largely unscathed. For its part, FEMA received 
praise for its work in the years after Katrina that served to strengthen state and 
local capabilities generally and contributed to effective multi-level and interagency 
coordination as Gustav drew closer. While it is impossible to know how FEMA 
would have performed in the event that Gustav actually struck New Orleans 
head-on, it is clear that far fewer people would have lost their lives as a result 
12 Kettl, 2007: 76; Preston, 2008: 51-52; Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Prepa-
ration for and Response to Hurricane Katrina, 2006; US Senate Homeland Defense and 
Governmental Affairs Committee, 2006.
13 Boin and Bynander, forthcoming. See also Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009.
14 Bier, 2006: 243.
15 Boin and Bynander, forthcoming.
16 Goodnough, 2006; Williams, 2006.
17 Brown and Johansson, 2008.
16
The 2005 Hurricane Katrina response failure
(given that the city was almost totally emptied prior to landfall.) If the Gustav 
response would appear to indicate a high level of government preparedness for 
hurricanes and their possible consequences, the response to Katrina three years 
earlier arguably suggests just the opposite – a comparatively low level of pre-
storm preparedness at all levels, not least on the part of the Federal Government 
and FEMA in particular.
The literature on policy fiascoes tells us that seeing FEMA’s response to 
Katrina as a failure is hardly unproblematic. As Bovens and ‘t Hart point out, 
‘The absence of fixed criteria for success and failure, which apply regardless of 
time and place, is a serious problem for anyone who wants to do a comparative 
study of major policy failures’.18 In the absence of a set of agreed-upon criteria, 
events tend to be judged either on the basis of objective metrics or on the basis 
of the observer’s own unique values and experiences.19 One of the central themes 
of this study is that federal systems of government generate interdependencies 
between actors on both a multi-level and an interagency basis. When agents at 
one level are overwhelmed, agents at the level above should be prepared to assist 
as appropriate. However, the overall effectiveness of the ensuing multi-level 
interagency response is likely to be reduced where they are ill-prepared to do 
so. Such was arguably the case in the Katrina example – FEMA was perceived 
as slow to respond to the storm and ineffectual when it did finally arrive on the 
scene in meaningful numbers. While it is important to recognize that decisions 
made by state and local government officials undeniably contributed to the dire 
situation that emerged in and around New Orleans, many significant elements 
of FEMA’s performance failed to meet the agency’s own standards, let alone the 
expectations (realistic or not) of the relevant stakeholders.
While the literature on Katrina certainly goes a good way toward explaining 
the government’s flawed response to the storm, it does only so much to depict the 
broader context in which FEMA and its partners operated in the years leading 
up to the storm. With a better understanding of the institutional environment 
in which FEMA operated, we might be able to identify those forces/pressures 
that compelled the agency to behave in certain ways and how these shifts affected 
its ability to manage different complex problems (like hurricanes). In this study, 
I argue that the 9/11 attacks in particular created immense pressures on policy-
makers to act to prevent future such attacks on American soil, and that the flurry 
of legislation that came as a result prompted major change in the institutional 
environment that FEMA operated within.20 This shift in elite priorities generated 
expectations that FEMA (alongside many other actors at every level of government) 
behave in ways that served to enhance the nation’s preparedness for terrorism. 
18 Bovens and ‘t Hart, 1996: 4.
19 McConnell, 2010. See also Bovens and ‘t Hart, 1996: 5.
20 Kettl, 2007: 10.
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In practical terms, this shift meant being relocated to a new department (DHS), 
being compelled to deemphasize its so-called all-hazards approach to preparedness 
and response, and suffering major cuts in funding for certain disaster mitigation 
and disaster preparedness programmes. At the same time, the agency’s terrorism 
preparedness efforts received more resources and elite attention. Taken together, 
these changes arguably created conditions that served to reduce the agency’s 
readiness to effectively manage a large-scale natural disaster while at the same 
presumably enhancing its readiness to manage a major terror event.
It is one thing to identify the effects of institutional change. It is quite another 
to actually understand the conditions under which actors are compelled to alter 
their behaviour and how this affects states of readiness to manage different prob-
lems. It is here, in comprehending the nature of the pressures that FEMA was 
under and that led to changes in the agency’s behaviour, that neo-institutionalism 
plays an important role in this study. While the different streams that make up 
this expanding body of theory have different theoretical pedigrees, they share 
the original neo-institutionalists’ view that norms, rules, routines, and values 
that make up the institutional environment that actors operate within serve to 
constrain and enable the behaviour of actors in all that they do. In other words, 
the neo-institutionalists are interested less in the behaviour of actors than they are 
in the different forces in the institutional environment that constrain and enable 
their behaviour in different ways. This study provides us with an opportunity to 
test the usefulness of at least three of these neo-institutional streams as we go about 
trying to better understand the 2005 Katrina response. These include normative 
institutionalism, historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism.
While the existing literature on the post-9/11 reforms and Hurricane Katrina 
offers strong evidence of dramatic change in the institutional environment in 
the years between September 2001 and August 2005, it says far less as to what 
implications they had for FEMA’s ability to respond to different types of threats, 
including terrorism and natural disasters like hurricanes. It is only when we 
fully understand the conditions under which FEMA operated after 9/11 that 
we can confidently explain the Federal Government’s unsatisfactory response to 
Hurricane Katrina in what was otherwise a time of heightened elite sensitivity 
to issues related to homeland security.
In the process of delving into the case, I also aim to develop a small set of 
indicators of preparedness that may prove to be vital inputs to the development 
of what I refer to as a diagnostic model for gauging organizational preparedness. 
This model is intended as a practical tool for use by academics and practitioners 
seeking to quickly and inexpensively measure actual levels of preparedness in 
organizations.
In the sections that follow, I will present the central research question to be 
answered in this study, the chosen research methodology, as well as the theoretical 
and societal relevance of the study and its likely outcomes.
18
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1.1 Central question
The role of the Federal Government during times of emergency has evolved 
significantly over time. Where it was once disinclined to provide any emergency 
assistance to state and local authorities on a combination of legal and philosoph-
ical grounds, the Federal Government is today a central player in a standardized 
multi-level interagency emergency management system that is reflected in sets 
of highly refined plans, routines and protocols that promote what Roberta 
Sbragia describes as ‘more national uniformity and less diversity’. The result is 
that government authorities around the country are able to respond to different 
disruptive events in similar fashion.21 It is in part for this reason that we would 
expect government bureaucracies like FEMA to be particularly well-suited to 
manage threats22 that occur on a regular basis and that are predictable. Equally 
so, we would expect that the standardized responses that these bureaucracies 
generate will yield similar results.
Such was arguably not the case after Katrina. Here, the relevant federal, 
state and local authorities failed to meet the emerging needs that arose in New 
Orleans and countless other communities along the Gulf Coast. One of the 
central themes informing this study is that federal systems of government like 
that in the United States are made up of interdependencies between actors on 
a multi-level and an interagency basis. In such systems, functions like that pro-
vided by FEMA should exist to coordinate the efforts of other actors so that, 
as Fredrik Bynander and Arjen Boin put it, ‘the right tools are available in the 
right place at the right time’.23 It follows that where such functions are ill-suited 
to the task, the overall effectiveness of the multi-level interagency response as a 
whole is likely to suffer. This, I argue, is exactly what happened in the Katrina 
example – FEMA was slow to respond to the storm and ineffectual in the first 
days after it finally arrived on the scene. As a result, the totality of the federal 
response suffered.
As with any organization, FEMA’s preparedness was not something that 
remained constant over time, but instead rose and fell over time due to different 
factors, many of which were influenced by shifting conditions in the institutional 
environment. In other words, we need to identify those institutional conditions 
that constrained and enabled the agency’s behaviour in ways that explain why 
the agency was as prepared as it was at different points in its organizationa life, 
21 Sbragia, 2006: 240.
22 I make a distinction between threats and risks in this study. A threat is defined as something 
dangerous that has yet to happen. A risk, meanwhile, describes the likelihood that a threat 
will become reality. According to Eriksson, which term one decides to use depends on which 
research discipline one is writing within. In the field of political science, for instance, the term 
threat tends to be preferred over risk (Eriksson, 2004: 25-27).
23 Boin and Bynander, forthcoming.
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but also, ultimately, why it performed as it did in response to Katrina. In other 
words, we need to answer the following research question:
What are the conditions that promoted change in FEMA so as to generate (or prevent 
the generation of ) high levels of preparedness in managing hurricanes?
As noted above, the three streams of neo-institutionalism considered in this study 
may be helpful in depicting how individual organizations and their leaders are 
influenced by major institutional change of the kind dealt with here. They may 
also provide at least some indication as to how useful neo-institutionalism can 
be in helping researchers understand cases such as this.
1.2 Research method and relevance
In order to fully answer the questions posed in the previous section, we will need 
to examine FEMA’s activities over several decades in preparing for a single type 
of foreseeable complex problem, namely the hurricane threat facing the southern 
and eastern seaboards of the United States. This is accomplished using a slightly 
modified version of process tracing borrowing from cognitive institutionalism.
In essence, we are interested here in understanding how one government 
bureaucracy prepared for one kind of foreseeable complex problem over time. 
For this reason, we can expect that many findings will be applicable to other 
cases involving government agencies dealing with foreseeable complex problems 
of their own, and not just ones that fit squarely within the field of emergency 
management/homeland security. As the discussion in Chapter 2 will make clear, 
while the nature of the problems themselves may differ, the challenges that fore-
seeable complex problems pose are universal.
This study makes a number of contributions of scientific relevance, and 
nowhere more so than to the fields of preparedness, emergency management, 
crisis studies, political science, public administration, inter-governmental relations, 
and neo-institutionalism. According to Thomas Drabek, ‘Disaster preparedness 
[is] a complex black box that few investigators have sought to explore empiri-
cally’.24 Relatively few studies have been carried out that approach the subject 
from a neo-institutional standpoint specifically.25 Presumably, the decision to do 
so here should give us insights into any number of issues that have long vexed 
researchers, not least how preparedness should be defined and how, if at all, it 
is possible to confidently detect indications of preparedness in organizations. In 
its current state, the preparedness literature struggles to articulate a definitive 
set of factors that promote preparedness, let alone indicators that suggest to 
what extent organizations are prepared for different eventualities. The fields of 
24 Drabek, 1986: 21.
25 See Wendling, 2009, which employs neo-institutionalism to understand different EU emer-
gency management arrangements.
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emergency management and crisis studies also stand to gain where we achieve a 
better understanding of the conditions promoting preparedness. After all, it is 
my view that it is impossible to fully explain organizational behaviour in man-
aging problems without first comprehending just how prepared they were (and 
for what). This study draws on and will provide new insights that contribute to 
the fields of political science and public administration. Among other things, 
this study conceives of preparedness in government organizations as something 
that is determined in part by the outcomes of security politics and the interplay 
between policy elites and senior administrators. The case at hand promises to 
provide us with multiple observations that shed light on these and other related 
claims. We should also be able to gain insights into how different bureaucratic 
traits influence preparedness. This issue tends to be neglected, not least by members 
of the disaster research community. Finally, as noted above, the body of work on 
neo-institutionalism continues to expand as it incorporates perspectives from 
other fields of theory.26 This study provides an opportunity to assess the utility 
of three of these streams as they related to the case at hand.27
This study has obvious practical implications for anyone working in emer-
gency management or public administration, as well as policy elites charged with 
overseeing those government bureaucracies that look for, prepare ahead of and 
manage disruptive events like hurricanes. Given the fact that major disruptive 
events occur on a relatively infrequent basis, it is vital that workable tools are 
available to researchers and practitioners hoping to ascertain actual levels of 
organizational preparedness. (As Lee Clarke points out, there may well be some 
discrepancy between how prepared organizations appear to be on paper and their 
actual state of preparedness.28) Among other things, this study aims to develop a 
small set of primary indicators of preparedness that can be used to gauge organ-
izational preparedness for different contingencies. Furthermore, I propose that 
levels of organizational preparedness are also dependent on conditions in two 
distinct dimensions, one technical and the other political-administrative. The 
assumption is that individual leaders with different types of education, training 
and professional experience will be more or less suited to operate effectively in 
the different dimensions. Finally, this study is certain to generate useful insights 
concerning both how emergency preparedness and management agencies (EPMAs) 
operate and go about preparing to manage different problems/threats.
26 Peters, 2011: 19.
27 Research on the Katrina response has been carried out by d’Almeida and Klingner, 2008; 
Chappell, et al., 2007; Congleton, 2005; Ewing and Sutter, 2007; Foyou and Worsham, 2012; 
Guion, et al., 2007; Holcombe, 2007; Jung, 2005; Kettl, 2007; Shughart, 2005; and Sobel 
and Leeson, 2005, among others.
28 Clarke, 1999.
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Taken together, these findings should allow us to develop what I refer to as a 
diagnostic model for gauging organizational preparedness. As I argue repeatedly 
throughout this study, it is not always easy for policymakers and senior adminis-
trators to maintain a realistic idea as to just how prepared the bureaucracies that 
they are responsible for in fact are. While organizations are apt to use high-visibility 
and nominally high-fidelity large-scale exercises to validate their capabilities, the 
literature and my own professional experience suggest that their value as tools by 
which to accurately assess states of preparedness is limited. In my view, organiza-
tions would do well to embrace other, cheaper and less labour-intensive assessment 
strategies that may actually do a better job of indicating just how prepared they 
actually are. The diagnostic model that is proposed here is intended as just such 
an alternative that organizations might use to quickly and inexpensively evaluate 
their own preparedness to manage different kinds of problems, including those 
that manifest themselves only very rarely.
Finally, this study contributes to the body of knowledge regarding the 
long-standing hurricane threat facing New Orleans, the response to Hurricane 
Katrina, and the development of American emergency management policy and 
practice in recent decades.29
1.3 Thesis structure
In Chapter 2, I will present an institutional perspective on preparedness, which 
forms the basis for the four research hypotheses that are presented at the end of 
the chapter. The research methodology that is used to test these hypotheses is 
described in Chapter 3. The case at hand, FEMA’s preparedness for hurricanes 
between 1979 and 22 August 2005, is presented in Chapter 4 and then ana-
lysed in Chapter 5 on the basis of the research hypotheses. The outcomes of the 
study, including a presentation of the diagnostic model mentioned above, are 
presented in Chapter 6.
29 Alexander, 2006; American Red Cross, 2006; Arnold, 2006; Banipal, 2006; Bankoff, 2006; 
Barnshaw, 2006; Barsky, 2006; Birch and Wachter, 2006; Boin, et al., 2010; Bourque, et al., 
2006; Brodie, et al., Brookings Institution, 2005; Brunsma, et al., 2007; Burby, 2006; Burns 
and Thomas, 2006; Campanella, 2006; Childs, 2006; Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics 
in Washington, 2006; Clarke, 2006; Coates, 2006; Comfort and Haase, 2006; Cutter and 
Emrich, 2006; Daniels, et al., 2006; FEMA, 2006a; Government Accountability Office, 2006a; 
Government Accountability Office, 2006b; Government Accountability Office, 2006c; Gov-
ernment Accountability Office, 2006d; Hassett and Handley, 2006; Kapucu, 2006; Lakoff, 
2006; Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness, 2006; Office of 
the White House Homeland Security Adviser, 2006; Olshansky, 2006; Quarantelli, 2006a; 
Rodríguez, et al., 2006; Rose, 2007; Scanlon, 2006; Schneider, 2005; Takeda and Helms, 
2006; Tierney, et al., 2006; Trainor, 2006; United States Conference of Mayors, 2006; US 
Senate and House of Representatives Democrats, 2006; Wachtendorf and Kendra, 2006; 
Waugh, 2006; Waugh and Streib, 2006.
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2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I will draw on insights from the fields of preparedness, emergency 
management, crisis studies, political science, and public administration in order 
to situate the foreseeable complex problems that organizations are expected to 
prepare for and manage in relation to other terms that routinely appear in the 
literature. I will then describe how and for what organizations prepare in fed-
eral systems of government (like the one FEMA found itself operating within). 
This is followed by the presentation of a set of indicators that might be used to 
suggest just how prepared organizations are for different types of eventualities. 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, various so-called streams of neo-insti-
tutionalism that have emerged in recent decades offer different perspectives on 
the mechanisms that serve to constrain and enable the behaviour of actors. In 
this study three particularly well-developed streams, normative institutionalism, 
historical institutionalism, and rational choice institutionalism, will be applied to 
the case at hand. These streams are presented in section 2.5, followed by a brief 
presentation of the hypotheses that these streams inspire and that this study sets 
out to confirm or reject.
2.2 Foreseeable complex problems
Hurricanes – large-scale meteorological events that occur on a seasonal basis 
and affect large geographical areas administered by multiple local, state and 
even national actors – constitute but one form of foreseeable complex problem 
that government is expected to if not prevent then at least effectively manage. 
The foreseeability of problems like these should allow responsible government 
authorities to build up the capabilities necessary to manage them if and when 
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they inevitably occur. That being said, the Katrina example suggests that this 
is not always the case – just because a threat is foreseeable does not necessarily 
guarantee that government capabilities will exist so as to ensure an effective 
response.1 In this section, I will define foreseeable complex problems and then 
situate them in relation to other terms that routinely appear in the literature 
to describe major disruptive events. This is followed by a discussion of general 
methods by which governments at every level may opt to prepare themselves 
and constituents in the face of such problems.
2.2.1 Defining foreseeable complex problems
The emergency management and crisis management literature is awash with 
different terms that can be used to describe events like Katrina. These include 
disaster, emergency, catastrophe, crisis and, most recently, mega-crisis, to name a 
few. Unsurprisingly, there is considerable debate in the literature over how these 
related terms should be defined and in which situations they are most applicable.2 
While this is certainly an interesting question, it is in my view primarily a semantic 
one that this study does not actively engage with. So as to distance this study 
from this debate, I will refer throughout this study to Katrina and other events 
like it as major disruptive events, defined as events, small- or large-scale, that 
deviate from the norm and interrupt the normal functioning of organizations, 
specific societal mechanisms and/or whole societies. My view is that every major 
disruptive event has the potential to become a crisis, what Eric Stern defines as 
‘a situation, deriving from a change in the external or internal environment of 
a collectivity, characterized by three necessary and sufficient perceptions on the 
part of the responsible decision-makers’, namely: threats to basic values; urgency; 
and, uncertainty.3 No matter where they might be, constituents arguably expect 
certain levels of service from their governments both in times of normalcy and 
in times of disruption. Where gaps emerge between constituents’ expectations 
and the services that government actually delivers, the responsible actors may 
feel that they are in a state of crisis.4 No matter how long they last, crises may 
create pressures for change, not least on the part of responsible government actors, 
many of which are seen in the literature as ‘slow and deliberative’ bureaucratic 
1 Effectiveness can be measured in at least two ways, either based on objectively measurable 
technical standards, or on the basis of stakeholder satisfaction. See Adamski, et al., 2006: 13 
for an example of how to measure response effectiveness from a technical standpoint.
2 Beck, 1992; Boin, et al., 2005: 6; Boin, et al., 2008a: 312-313; Birkland, 2006: 2-3l; Dynes, 
1983; Faulkner, 2001: 137; Lagadec, 2009; Quarantelli, 1998; Quarantelli, 2006b; Reason, 
2006: 247.
3 Stern, 2003: 8. See also Faulkner, 2001: 137, in Birkland, 2006: 2-3.
4 Birkland, 2006: 6; Stern and Sundelius, 2002: 73-74; Ullberg, 2005: 7. See also Platt, 1999: 
44.
25
Chapter 2: An institutional perspective on preparedness
organizations.5 In some cases, crises bring about change in entire policy domains 
or the very framework within which organizations operate and all manner of 
policy domains are organized.6
As noted above, the literature offers us many different ways to conceive of 
major disruptive events, most of which tend to emphasize their negative conse-
quences. The literature is particularly attentive to ‘everyday’ emergencies and novel, 
difficult-to-predict crises, not the relatively large class of disruptive events whose 
origins are easily grasped and whose onset is largely foreseeable, but which are 
complicated to manage.7 I refer to such events as foreseeable complex problems.8 
This term emphasizes the various challenges associated with preparing for and 
managing problems, not what consequences they are likely to have. Foreseeable 
complex problems are understood to be problems that are predictable, involve 
actors from multiple jurisdictions and different levels of government, and have 
potentially adverse consequences (for health and human life, the environment, 
the economy, etc.) if not managed effectively. Hurricanes, major winter storms, 
spring flood events, and seasonal power outages are examples of foreseeable 
complex problems. Finally, by focusing on a large class of what some would view 
to be mundane or run-of-the-mill events, I hope to avoid the risk for hindsight 
bias – that simply because an event has occurred (like, say, 9/11), it should have 
been easily foreseeable.9 Foreseeable complex problems are widely recognized 
problems that authorities and citizens alike are cognizant of and tend to maintain 
strategies for dealing with.
Before going any further, it is necessary to recognize the growing body of 
literature on mega-crises. According to Lagodec, this literature emphasizes ‘the 
embedded engine of a chaotic world that evolves and mutates through global 
dynamics whose texture is made up of complex, unstable webs of constant, global, 
major dislocations’. The advocates of mega-crises worry that existing emergency 
management systems are ill-suited to address and manage the problems that 
stem from these dynamics.10 In my view, the primary strength of the mega- crisis 
literature lies in its ability to illustrate the interconnected nature of systems and 
actors in an ever more globalized world, and how crises in one sector may have 
immediate, potentially serious effects in others. However, I am not entirely 
convinced that existing systems are always ill-suited to manage ‘modern’ crises. 
The notion of foreseeable complex problems proposed here is much less pessimistic 
5 Boin, et al., 2008a: 285.
6 Birkland, 2006: 4-5, 168.
7 Taleb, 2001.
8 Baubion, 2013.
9 Dekker, 2006: 23.
10 Lagadec, 2009. See also Boin, et al., 2005: 6; and Helsloot, et al., 2012.
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than the mega-crisis literature insofar as it implicitly suggests that though they 
certainly pose difficult challenges, organizations can and in fact have no option 
but to deal with those problems that arise.
Insights from the cognitive-institutional and warning response literature 
suggest that just because a disruptive event is foreseeable does not mean that it 
will necessarily be foreseen. Any number of factors, including individuals’ beliefs, 
past experiences, tendencies toward attentiveness to specific issues/sets of issues, 
limits in information processing capacity, and stress may prevent individuals and 
groups of individuals within organizations from identifying salient threats early 
enough such that they can be effectively managed.11 According to Charles Parker 
and Eric Stern, the task of foreseeing problems is further complicated by a broad 
range of bureau-organizational and agenda-political factors that exist in any set-
ting where ‘a large number of organizations and often competitively interacting 
individuals’ exist and interact.12 Even where the salient threats have in fact been 
identified, individuals and organizations alike may nevertheless struggle to see 
the entire spectrum of possible consequences that they entail.13 In other words, 
foreseeable complex problems are just that – complex. The hurricane example 
aptly illustrates this. While authorities in the United States certainly recognize 
the likelihood of hurricane activity during the Atlantic hurricane season (1 June 
to 30 November every year), they cannot possibly foresee with any degree of 
certainty how many hurricanes will develop during this period, how intense each 
storm will be, where they will make landfall, or how prepared authorities in the 
affected areas will be when they come ashore. 
Generally speaking, the larger and more complex the nature of the problem, 
the more actors will be involved in working to resolve it. The greater the number of 
actors involved, the more important it to becomes that they are able to coordinate 
their activities effectively between levels and across organizational boundaries.14 
(Works like Snowden and Boone’s from the emerging field of complexity science 
serve to demonstrate just how complex complex systems of actors in fact are, 
and what implications this has for our ability to predict outcomes.15) However, 
the nature of federal systems in particular complicates matters. According to 
Peter Eisinger, for instance, such systems are ‘highly decentralized’ and consist of 
‘loosely coupled’ actors.16 Obviously, the prospects for getting everyone to sing 
11 Brändström, et al., 2004; Parker, et al., 2009; Stern, 2003: 36-39; Stern and Sundelius, 2002.
12 Parker and Stern, 2005: 312. See also Posner, 2004.
13 Kettl, 2007: 82.
14 Boin and Bynander, forthcoming; Seidman, 1998. For a thorough discussion of the promises 
and pitfalls associated with organizational cooperation in the context of problem-solving, see 
Svedin, 2009.
15 Snowden and Boone, 2007.
16 Eisinger, 2006. See also Boin and Bynander, forthcoming; Kettl, 2007: 26, 39; and March 
and Olsen, 2006b: 693.
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from the same proverbial hymn sheet are not great. Nevertheless, many of the 
problems associated with complex multi-level coordination in a multi-layered 
federal context can be reduced where different mechanisms/structures (common 
emergency management principles, plans, routines, protocols) are put in place to 
facilitate interactions over organizational/jurisdictional boundaries.17 However, 
it is important to recognize that the simple fact that organizations successfully 
coordinate with one another does not necessarily guarantee successful response 
outcomes. This issue is discussed in more detail in section 2.3.2.
2.2.2 Preparing for foreseeable complex problems
Having described what foreseeable problems are and what challenges they pose, 
I will now describe how organizations may go about preparing for them. Before 
going any further, we will need to define what exactly organizational prepared-
ness is. Insights from the fields of political science, crisis management, disaster 
studies, public administration, and business studies offer a number of different 
views on this question.18 According to David A. McEntire, it is nevertheless pos-
sible to discern three general strains of thinking on the subject of preparedness 
in the literature. The first strain conceptualizes preparedness in terms of sets of 
specific activities (‘planning, resource identification, warning systems, [and] 
training and simulations’) intended to enhance organizational capabilities. The 
second strain, meanwhile, emphasizes the importance of problem anticipation 
and threat monitoring, while the third strain is primarily concerned with the 
spectrum of activities that organizations pursue in order to enhance different 
generic capabilities that are useful in managing different problems.19
For the purposes of this study, preparedness is defined as the ability of an 
organization to effectively respond to a given problem or problems. (Organizational 
preparedness should not be confused with organizational readiness, which appears 
in the public administration literature and describes the extent to which organiza-
tions are prepared to respond to institutional change, not their ability to respond 
to emerging problems.20) My view is that organizational preparedness is something 
that exists to one degree or another at any given point in time. Organizations 
achieve a certain state of preparedness by, among other things, engaging in activities 
that are intended to enhance organizational capabilities to manage a given prob-
lem or set of problems. Activities of this kind might include planning, exercises, 
17 Boin and Bynander, forthcoming; Faraj and Xiao, 2006; Fayol, 1949; FEMA, 2007: 3-4; 
Kettl, 2006: 375; Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009.
18 Eriksson, 2010: 12; Gillespie and Streeter, 1987: 156-157.
19 McEntire, 2007: 414. See also Gillespie and Streeter, 1987: 155; Godschalk 1991: 136; Kreps, 
1991: 34; McEntire and Myers, 2004: 141; Mileti, 1999: 215; Perry and Lindell, 2003: 338; 
and Tierney, et al., 2001: 27.
20 Blackman, et al., 2013; Weiner, 2009.
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trainings and courses, and regular reviews of routines and protocols, for instance. 
Activities such as these are seen to be purposive in nature, i.e. carried out with the 
explicit aim of enhancing organizational preparedness in one way or another.21 
(It may be the case that these activities enhance organizational preparedness in 
dealing with other problems as well. It is fair to suggest that the more general the 
capability being developed, the greater number of problems and problem types 
the organization should conceivably be prepared to manage effectively.22) My 
view, inspired by work by Clarke and Enrico Quarantelli, is that organizations 
that take purposive steps aimed at achieving higher levels of preparedness are at 
least more likely to effectively manage all manner of problems than those that do 
not engage in explicit preparedness activities at all.23
The argument made throughout this study is that members of the policy 
elite, including the president and members of the Congress, play a central role in 
determining which threats the federal bureaucracy is expected to prepare for, but 
also just how prepared they are expected to be for them. In other words, simply 
because a given threat is foreseen does not mean that the relevant organization 
or organizations will be provided the means to prepare for it. Instead, I argue 
that elites are forced to select which foreseeable threats are most salient and thus 
worthy of additional spending. Of course, we see in the case of the United States 
that policymakers have during certain periods embraced the all-hazards approach 
to preparedness long championed by emergency management professionals. 
Doing so arguably removes at least some of the expectation that elites choose 
between different foreseeable threats.
In the section that follows, I will describe the relationship between policy-
makers and the bureaucracy, as well as the process by which bureaucracies go 
about preparing for the threats that are prioritized on the policy agenda.
2.3 Preparedness in a federal setting
2.3.1 The shared governance model of preparedness in federal systems
Federalism describes a system of government where sovereignty is apportioned 
between a central governing authority (a federal government, for instance) and 
authorities at the regional (state) and local (municipal) levels. In other words, 
federal systems consist of multiple institutional layers with different mandates 
and responsibilities. Just as in all but the most centralized systems of government, 
original sovereignty in the United States is not readily transferred from one level 
to another, be it ‘upward’ or ‘downward’. This is important to keep in mind in 
21 Gillespie and Streeter, 1987: 156; Kettl, 2006: 375.
22 Kettl, 2007: 77-78.
23 Clarke, 1999: 57; Quarantelli, 2000: 19.
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the context of emergency management. Here, disruptive events have the potential 
to overwhelm the capabilities of actors at one level, meaning that actors at the 
next level up are obligated (or at least expected) to step in to help while at the 
same time not violating the sovereignty of the overwhelmed actors in the process.
At each level of sovereignty in the United States, three separate and distinct 
branches of government exist, namely the executive, legislative and judicial 
branches. The separation of powers that exists between these branches makes for 
a system of checks and balances that ensures that no one branch of government 
acquires a disproportionate amount of power in relation to the other two. Of the 
three branches, the executive and legislative branches are particularly relevant to 
the study at hand. While the legislative branch is vested with powers to create and 
authorize, fund, and oversee the government departments and agencies charged 
with turning policy into practice, the executive is responsible for providing 
direction to and the conduct of said departments and agencies.24 The priorities of 
government bureaucracies are a result of the interplay between the bureaucracy’s 
leadership and, on the one hand, the executive and, on the other, the legislature.25 
Agency heads typically report to and receive direction from secretaries/ministers 
who in turn are accountable to the executive (the president, a state governor, a 
mayor). However, these same agencies also report to different legislative bodies 
vested with the power to authorize, fund and oversee their operations. In other 
words, the legislature controls much of the funding that agencies require to 
finance their operations.26 According to Kettl, it is for this reason that government 
agencies may ‘find themselves pulled in different directions by the fragmented 
institutions – especially Congress – that oversee them’.27
But what of the interplay between levels of government as it relates to emer-
gency management specifically? From the outset in the late 1700s, the Federal 
Government resisted calls to provide emergency management assistance to state 
and local authorities.28 In the following decades, however, some exceptions were 
made on a case-by-case basis that at times could seem arbitrary.29 The creation of 
a federal emergency management authority charged with administering federal 
aid on the basis of relatively standardized criteria in the mid-1940s marked a 
major turning point in federal-state relations insofar as emergency management 
was concerned.30 Over the coming decades, the Federal Government would go 
on to take on an ever larger role in emergency management, not least by taking 
24 Shepsle and Bonchek, 1997: 359.
25 Zegart, 1999.
26 Boin, et al., 2008b: 5; Genschel, 1997, in Peters, 1999; Goldstein, 1988; Hall and Taylor, 
1996.
27 Kettl, 2007: 47.
28 Farber and Chen, 2006: 20; Schneider, 2005: 19.
29 Barry, 1998: 369-370; Cooper and Block, 2006: 47; McQuaid and Schleifstein, 2006: 50; 
Schneider, 2005: 19; Schroeder, et al., 2001: 361-362.
30 FEMA, 2005; Schroeder, et al., 2001: 361.
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the lead in carrying out work aimed at developing a standardized, interoperable 
emergency management model that would be applicable at every level of govern-
ment across the country.
The contemporary model of emergency management that emerged out of 
these efforts is centred on the subsidiarity principle, which states that disruptive 
events should be managed at the nearest possible level of government to the 
event itself.31 In practice, this means that state and local authorities have ‘lead’ 
responsibility for responding to and recovering from events that occur in their 
jurisdictions. When authorities on one level of government are or foresee them-
selves being overwhelmed by disruptive events, the nation’s emergency manage-
ment system creates expectations that authorities at the next level of government 
will be prepared to step in and fill emerging capability gaps. Just as mayors can 
request assistance from the state government where municipal resources are 
inadequate, so too can state governors ask the Federal Government for help 
in similar such situations.32 In this, what Saundra K. Schneider refers to as the 
shared governance model of emergency management, responsibility for dealing 
with problems ‘percolates’ upward from one administrative level to the next in a 
relatively organized fashion.33 However, as organized as this arrangement would 
appear to be, federal systems of government tend to create dense, multi-layered 
organizational environments that pose various types of coordination challenges 
to the actors involved. For this reason, the Federal Government works to ensure 
that national-level frameworks, plans, guidelines, etc. exist so as to guide the 
various stakeholders in their interactions with one another. These structures are 
intended to ensure that multi-level and interagency coordination takes place 
such that threats are managed to the expectations of the relevant stakeholders.34
In the United States, the emergency management cycle, first developed during 
the 1970s, helps to structure work within the field of emergency management 
at every level of government. Generally speaking, this cycle consists of four 
sequential phases, namely: 1) preparedness; 2) response; 3) recovery; and 4) mit-
igation.35 The focus in this study is primarily on the preparedness phase, which 
itself can be divided into different phases. According to the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA), for instance, the preparedness phase consists of six 
distinct sub-phases, namely: 1) identify and assess threats; 2) estimate capability 
requirements; 3) build and sustain capabilities; 4) plan to deliver capabilities; 5) 
validate capabilities; and 6) review and update frameworks, guidelines, plans, 
routines, etc.36 This phased view on preparedness provides a basis for discussion 
31 Morris, 2006: 291.
32 NRF, 2008: 5-6.
33 Schneider, 1990: 101-102, in Morris, 2006: 290-291. See also Sylves, 2006; and Warner, 
2006.
34 NRF, 2008: 5-6.
35 Heath, 2000.
36 FEMA, 2014.
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in the sections that follow on how different actors go about identifying, assessing 
and prioritizing threats, building capabilities to manage them, and then accouting 
for and learning from them in multi-level interagency systems of government, 
but especially federal systems like that in the United States.37
Identifying, assessing and prioritizing threats
The first phase in the preparedness cycle entails identifying existing threats and then 
making determinations as to which are worthy of further attention. Assuming the 
shared governance model is correct, work to these ends should begin at the local 
level, where authorities conduct their own assessments of which threats are most 
pressing from their unique perspectives. These are then passed on to officials at 
the state level, who carry out assessments of their own, this time with a regional 
perspective. The outcomes of the states’ threat identification and prioritization 
exercise are eventually made available to their federal counterparts tasked with 
national-level preparedness. Unlike their state and local counterparts, actors at 
the federal level are looking to identify those ‘low-probability, high-consequence’ 
threats that state and local authorities around the country are unlikely to cope 
with on their own.38 The outcomes of this highly formalized multi-tiered pro-
cess provide the Federal Government with an idea as to which threats are facing 
the nation at any given point in time, what work needs to be done in order to 
enhance the federal bureaucracy’s preparedness, and what, if any, federal support 
is required so as to ensure that at-risk regions and/or local communities are as 
prepared as possible.39
Clearly, the shared governance model serves to portray this process as a tidy 
and organized one. In fact, the threat identification/prioritization process has 
the potential to be highly disorganized where it becomes politicized, or, as Barry 
Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde put it, when it falls within the realm of 
security politics. In this realm, contestants (political elites, senior administrators, 
members of the public, the media, scholars, think tanks and interest/lobby groups) 
fight over which issues, or policy domains (national defence policy, public health 
policy, environmental policy, emergency management, homeland security, etc.), 
should be elevated on the policy agenda, making them central matters of security 
that government departments and agencies are expected to act on. Put another 
way, it is the elite contestants who determine who or what should be protected, 
what they should be protected from, and to what extent they should be protected, 
37 There are numerous other conceptualizations of what preparedness consists of. In Stern’s view, 
for instance, preparedness is a staged process that includes: organizing and selecting; planning, 
educating, training and exercising; cultivating vigilance; and protecting preparedness (Stern, 
2013).
38 FEMA, 2014. See also Kettl, 2007: 39; Schneider, 1995: 59; DHS, 2011; and NRF, 2008: 
5-6.
39 DHS, 2011.
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not the professionals involved in the nominally objective threat identification/
prioritization process described above.40 It is worth keeping in mind that the 
contestants who engage in a given policy debate come to the table with varying 
degrees of resources and authority. This in turn determines how much influence 
they have over the outcomes of the game.41 Besides having won the privilege 
to choose which policy domains are elevated on the policy agenda, the winners 
of the policy debate are well-positioned to decide which departments/agencies 
should be responsible for managing what, and how much resources should be 
available to them in doing so.42 Wittingly or not, the policy choices that elites 
make are likely to leave government bureaucracies particularly well-suited to 
manage certain problems, and less so in managing others.
The intensity of debates over policy is likely to increase in the wake of what 
Thomas Birkland refers to as focusing events, or ‘events that cause members of 
the public as well as elite decision makers to become aware of a potential policy 
failure’.43 In his view, events such as these have the potential to ‘change the 
dominant issues on the agenda in a policy domain’.44 The different streams of 
neo-institutionalism hold different views concerning any correlation that might 
exist between focusing events and institutional change. This subject is revisited 
later in the chapter. Regardless of just how useful policy failures are in explaining 
shifts in the overarching policy agenda and other forms of institutional change, 
they present windows of opportunity for actors to realize their own individual 
goals, which might include translating their own beliefs, preferences and interests 
into policy.45
Building and maintaining capabilities
Once the policy agenda is set (on the basis of the bureaucracies’ own assessments, 
the outcomes of contests in the realm of security politics, or some combination 
thereof ), the task then becomes one of building organizational capabilities so 
as to ensure that any threats that have been prioritized can be managed to the 
satisfaction of the relevant stakeholders. In essence, we have reached the policy 
implementation phase. Given the interdependencies that exist between the 
different levels of government in federal systems, we might expect that changes 
in behaviour on the part of departments and agencies at one level will generate 
40 Buzan, et al., 1998: 23; Kingdon, 1995.
41 George and Bennett, 2005: 100; Kingdon, 1984, in Majone, 2006: 234-235; Parker and Stern, 
2005: 318; Peters, 2011: 18; Powell and Colyvas, 2008; Rubin, 2007: 6; Susskind, 2006: 270.
42 Stern and Sundelius, 2002.
43 Birkland, 1994, in McCarthy, 2004: 84. See also Cobb and Elder, 1972: 83, in McCarthy, 
2004: 84; Downs, 1972: 39; and Kingdon, 1995, in McCarthy, 2004: 84.
44 Birkland, 1998: 53.
45 Jenkins-Smith and St. Clair, 1993: 152, in McCarthy, 2004: 84; Kingdon, 1995, in McCarthy, 
2004: 84.
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pressures for corresponding shifts at others. The only problem is that preparedness 
activities can be costly and their benefits not always immediately (if ever) appar-
ent. While from a federal perspective it might make sense to dedicate billions of 
dollars to prepare for low-probability, high-consequence scenarios, state and local 
officials may not be equally keen on spending what little resources they have at 
their disposal on, say, terrorism preparedness when their communities grapple 
on a daily basis with chronic problems, like failing schools, aging infrastructure, 
endemic crime and poverty, to name but a few.46 Even if they could defend 
major expenditures for worst-case preparedness, it is unlikely that constituents 
would reward them for it.47 For this reason, state governments may seek to ‘push’ 
responsibility for preparedness for low-probability, high-consequence threats 
either downward onto local officials or upward, onto the Federal Government.48 
Local officials who find themselves in this situation may feel that they have no 
choice but to push upward, in some rare cases bypassing the state level entirely. 
For instance, by arguing that existing threats/vulnerabilities have strategic impli-
cations, local officials may be able to convince federal authorities to bear at least 
some responsibility for funding the necessary preparedness measures.49
In some instances, the Federal Government may find reason to exert pressure 
on state and local governments to prioritize certain threats that they themselves 
have not prioritized. Such pressure can take numerous forms. For instance, the 
Federal Government may choose to alter federal laws that state and local officials 
are obliged to comply with, or issue new federal guidelines that they are expected 
to adhere to. Another particularly effective method is to make available federal 
grants that can only be used to fund specific forms of preparedness activities.50 
It is worth noting that these grants are sometimes offered on a competitive basis, 
something which has the potential to create or exacerbate preexisting tensions 
between state and local authorities who end up competing against one another. 
In extreme cases, these tensions can influence their ability to work with one 
another on a day-to-day basis and, crucially, in responding to and managing 
disruptive events.51
This discussion demonstrates the complexity of the shared governance model 
as it relates to preparedness, but particularly in instances where different actors 
on different levels in federal systems have different ideas concerning what should 
be securitized. In the next section, we will theorize as to how these same actors 
are likely to behave during the accountability phase that typically comes in the 
aftermath of a major disruptive event.
46 National Academy of Public Administration, 1993: vii-viii; Parker and Stern, 2005: 312; 
Sbragia, 2006: 243, 255.
47 Frederickson and LaPorte, 2002: 33-43, in Kettl, 2007: 85.
48 Sapat, 2001: 351.
49 Schneider, 1995: 59.
50 Sbragia, 2006: 239, 243; Zegart, 1999.
51 Sbragia, 2006: 243, 240, 255.
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Before going any further, it is important to recognize that while this study is 
primarily interested in the interplay between different government actors and the 
preparedness that comes as a result, the spectrum of actors involved in building 
up preparedness is in fact much broader than this. For instance, different private 
and non-governmental actors have key roles to play in determining priorities on 
the policy agenda and in providing capabilities that are complementary to those 
of the government that serve to strengthen overall levels of preparedness. We 
should also recognize the role that private citizens play in building up their own 
preparedness for different threats. In many instances, there would seem to be a 
correlation between how prepared individuals are for different eventualities and 
the burden that government authorities are obligated to shoulder in responding 
to problems when they appear.
Accountability (and learning?)
Emergency management organizations and other types of organizations involved 
in managing emergencies and other types of disruptive events tend to assess 
their performance, if not on a regular basis, then certainly in the wake of major 
disruptive events. The stated aim of these activities (lessons learned processes, 
hotwashes, after-action reviews, etc.) is to learn from past experience and iden-
tify areas for improvement.52 However, the literature paints a rather gloomy 
picture of the ability of organizations to actually learn from these exercises, let 
alone implement any of the prescribed changes.53 According to Arjen Boin, 
Allen McConnell and Paul ‘t Hart, this is due to ‘the deep institutionalization 
of rules, practices, budgets and communities of stakeholders’ that in different 
ways preclude organizations from implementing meaningful change in a timely 
manner.54 Instead, the learning process in the absence of significant outside scru-
tiny tends to result in fine-tuning, where actors make relatively minor changes to 
their routines, protocols, procedures, etc.55 Organizations hope that these minor 
changes will be sufficient to head off criticism that might compel them to make 
deeper changes that promise to be disruptive, time-consuming and require that 
they collaborate with other actors.56
The nature of federal systems is such that the same policymakers who provide 
the bureaucracy with policy direction may also assess the bureacracy’s performance 
in managing disruptive events. However, Parker and Stern remind us that major 
policy failures in particular also tend to prompt questions concerning the wisdom 
52 March and Olsen, 2006b: 699; Norges offentlige utredninger, 2012; Parker and Stern, 2005: 
318; Peters, 1998:10; La Porte and Consolini, 1991; Marone and Woodhouse, 1986; Sagan, 
1993: 14-17; Wildavsky, 1988.
53 Bovens and ‘t Hart, 1996: 3.
54 Boin, et al., 2008b: 5. See also March and Olsen, 2006b: 697-698.
55 Boin, et al., 2008a: 295.
56 Boin, et al., 2008b: 5. See also Kettl, 2007: 39, 41.
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of previous policymaking, which in turn threatens the credibility of policymakers 
themselves.57 It is for this reason perhaps understandable then that policy failures 
sometimes spark intense contests involving a broad spectrum of actors over ‘the 
nature and depth (severity) of a crisis, its causes (agency), [and] the assignment 
of blame for its occurrence or escalation (responsibility)’.58 The outcomes of 
these contests have significant implications for what lessons are learned and what 
reforms are tabled.59 Ironically, the more attention a policy failure attracts and the 
more politicized it becomes, the less likely it becomes that organizations and their 
members will actually learn and improve on past performance. So argues Philipp 
Genschel, who reminds us that policy failures threaten careers, reputations and, 
in some instances, the continued existence of organizations.60 As such, actors will 
be incentivized to ‘learn’ in ways that satisfy policy elites, but do not necessarily 
enhance actual organizational capabilities in future.61
2.3.2 Organizations, bureaucracies and EPMAs
An organization is defined as an entity that has a stated purpose, formalized 
boundaries to and relations with the external environment, and requirements 
for membership.62 Besides meeting the criteria necessary to be viewed as organ-
izations, the federal departments and agencies that figure prominently in this 
study also possess archetypical bureaucratic characteristics. According to Kettl, 
these include: 
– A mission defined by top officials;
– Fixed jurisdictions within the organization, with the scope of work defined 
by rules;
– Authority graded from top to bottom, with higher-level officials having more 
authority than those at the bottom;
– Management by written documents, which create an institutional record of 
work;
– Management by career experts, who embody the organization’s capacity to 
do work; and,
– Management by rules, which govern the discretion exercised by administrators.63
57 Parker and Stern, 2005: 318.
58 Boin, et al., 2008a: 286, 287.
59 Boin, et al., 2005: 109, 111-113; Boin, et al., 2008a: 286-287; Boin, et al., 2008b: 9.
60 Genschel, 1997, in Peters, 1999.
61 Baumgartner and Jones, 1993; Birkland, 2006: 10; Boin, et al., 2008b: 5; Goldstein, 1988; 
Hall and Taylor, 1996.
62 Selznick, 1949.
63 Kettl, 2006: 371.
36
The 2005 Hurricane Katrina response failure
Bureaucracies are relatively hierarchal entities where areas of responsibility, the 
scope of work within each area, and the methods by which this work is carried 
out are clearly defined by, among other things, rules and routines.64 That being 
said, John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan argue that ‘a sharp distinction should 
be made between the formal structure [and activity] of an organization and its 
actual day-to-day work activities’. In many instances, the rules and routines that 
supposedly explain how organizations are to behave represent instead the ‘myths 
of the institutional environment’, for instance other actors’ expectations of them.65 
Bureaucracies are also typified by the tendency to seek as much autonomy as 
possible. This has obvious implications for principals’ ability to exercise effective 
control over organizations, but especially where they seek to bring about major 
change in organizational behaviour.66 Bureaucracies are also resistant to change, 
both because it encroaches on their preference to be autonomous, and because 
change typically necessitates renegotiating the relationships and interdepend-
encies that exist between different bureaucracies. This is something that most 
bureaucracies would prefer to avoid. According to Peters:
[P]ublic institutions once created tend to have structural relationships with 
society and with powerful social actors so that changing the institutions becomes 
politically more difficult. They also have relationships with other institutions, so 
that change becomes threatening to a number of actors.67
These bureaucratic characteristics influence how government agencies receive, 
interpret and implement elite policy direction. According to Michael Lipsky, 
bureaucratic organizations rely on routines and protocols to ‘cope with uncer-
tainties and work pressures’. These structures are likely to play a key role in 
determining how and to what extent the bureaucracy implements elite policy.68 
In other words, the ‘baseline goals’ that elites set out for the bureaucracy may 
be ‘resculpted at the very scene of implementation’.69 These insights from the 
literature on implementation are complemented by one of the central tenets of 
neo-institutionalism, namely that how organizations react to policy shifts and 
their willingness to change as a result is influenced by the norms, rules, routines, 
and ideas that guide bureaucratic behaviour.70 According to Boin, McConnell 
and ‘t Hart, ‘The deep institutionalization of rules, practices, budgets and com-
munities of stakeholders’ prevents organizations from making significant changes, 
64 Kettl, 2007: 47.
65 Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 341-342.
66 Emmerich, 1971: 17, in Kettl, 2007: 40. See also Scott: 2008: 178, in Deverell, 81.
67 Peters, 1998: 4.
68 Lipsky, 1980: xii.
69 Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973: 256. See also Laws and Hajer, 2006: 410-411; Lipsky, 1980; 
Immergut, 2006: 565; Majone, 2006: 235; March and Olsen, 2006b: 698; Meyer and Rowan, 
1977; and Pressman and Wildavsky, 1984.
70 Edelman, 1992.
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especially where they share interdependences with one another.71 This topic is 
discussed later in the chapter.
In the United States, responsibility for coordinating emergency manage-
ment and preparedness activities at different levels is assigned to what I refer 
to as emergency preparedness and management agencies (EPMAs).72 Generally 
speaking, these are comparatively small bureaucratic organizations that are 
charged with coordinating the efforts of other government, private sector and 
non-governmental actors in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from 
different types of disruptive events.73 Depending on their mandate, EPMAs may 
maintain some technical capabilities and tools that few other actors maintain - 
urban search and rescue (USAR), mortuary affairs expertise, highly survivable 
mobile communications suites, etc. Where EPMAs are organized within the 
government architecture varies by jurisdiction. For instance, EPMAs can be found 
within the executive branch or as part of another department or ministry. In 
some rare instances, EPMAs are their own ministries, like the Russian Ministry 
for Emergency Situations (EMERCOM).
In the United States at least, officials have long grappled with the question 
of where EPMAs are best situated. In a report issued after Hurricane Andrew, 
for instance, the National Academy of Public Administration found that ‘the 
location and relationship of an emergency management agency to the institu-
tional presidency and the President have always been variable and problematic’.74 
On the one hand, the president benefits from knowing exactly as quickly as 
possible that something has occurred and then acting accordingly. On the other 
hand, though, there are obvious advantages to an arrangement whereby other 
departments of government bear responsibility for emergency management (but 
especially where things do not go to plan). However, what is clear, Bea argues, is 
that the president needs to ‘be involved in emergency management functions, 
[given that] catastrophic disasters should involve decisions by, and with the 
support of, the president’.75
Regardless of where they are organized within the government bureaucracy, 
EPMAs may find themselves in the thankless position of coordinating the activities 
of other actors who may resist being coordinated, or who are willing to be coor-
dinated but are ill-prepared and thus unable to perform to others’ expectations. 
Sylves has written extensively on the relationship between FEMA and the states 
and local government in the context of hurricane preparedness and response. In 
71 Boin, et al., 2008b: 5.
72 Klintz, 2011.
73 Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Boin and Bynander, forthcoming; Fink, 2013; Kettl, 2007: 
78-79; Seidman, 1998.
74 National Academy of Public Administration, 1993: 22.
75 Bea, 2007: 95. The report is National Academy of Public Administration, 1993: 22.
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his description, FEMA is left to deal with the consequences of decisions made at 
other levels of government long before the onset of a hurricane, some of which 
serve to mitigate the impact of hurricanes and others that do not:
Pre-disaster hurricane politics [at the local level] involves decisions about zon-
ing and setback regulations, code enforcement, beach preservation and dune 
protection, open space requirements, and a host of other concerns that affect a 
community’s protection from or vulnerability to hurricanes.76
The same is true in the immediate pre-storm period, when ‘it is local govern-
ments […] that have primary responsibility for preparing for disasters and the 
evacuation of residents’.77
Circumstances such as these, which are for the most part out of the EPMA’s 
control, may dramatically reduce the effectiveness of government’s collective 
response to a given problem. However, the historical record suggests that EPMAs, 
and not weaker members in the emergency management system, risk being 
blamed where response outcomes are not to the satisfaction of stakeholders, 
not least elite policymakers. It follows then that EPMAs are particularly likely 
to encounter pressures to change their behaviour in the wake of major policy 
failures, even in instances where they were not actually at fault.
2.3.3 Technical and political-administrative dimensions of preparedness
The discussion above suggests that policymakers and government bureaucracies 
have different roles to play in the realm of preparedness – policy elites formu-
late government policy while the government bureaucracy carries out the work 
required so as to ensure that their policy preferences are implemented as intended. 
According to W. Richard Scott and John W. Meyer, these actors operate in dif-
ferent organizational environments, one technical and the other institutional, 
which overlap in ways that influence organizational preparedness. The technical 
environment is one ‘in which a product or service is produced and exchanged in 
a market such that organizations are rewarded for effective and efficient control 
of their production systems’. The institutional environment, meanwhile, is one 
‘characterized by the elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual 
organizations must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy’. To 
paraphrase Scott and Meyer, organizational success is based more on the appro-
priateness of the form (the ‘social fitness’) of the organizations involved than on 
the quality of their outputs.78
These insights give rise to the notion that organizational preparedness is 
dependent on and determined by conditions in two distinct dimensions, one 
76 Sylves, 2007: 144.
77 Sylves, 2007: 115.
78 Scott and Meyer, 1991: 123. See also Meyer and Rowan, 1991: 53.
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technical and the other political-administrative. The technical dimension of 
preparedness concerns the methods, tools, and practices that are employed by 
organizations, both independently and in coordination with others, in order to 
achieve a certain level of preparedness. Put another way, the technical dimension 
concerns how and by what means organizations go about executing policy insofar 
as it relates to preparedness.79 The political-administrative dimension, meanwhile, 
is a space inhabited by policy elites (the executive and members of the legislature, 
department heads, senior advisers, and other unofficial policy entrepreneurs) 
and senior agency administrators.80 Here, we are concerned with the interplay 
that exists between elite policymakers, who make determinations as to what the 
bureaucracy should expend its energy and resources preparing for, and agency 
heads, who are expected to provide direction to the organizations under them 
so that elite policy is implemented as intended.81 According to Beryl Radin, how 
successful leaders are in implementing elite policy is in part determined by their 
ability to identify the different factors that constrain and enable their leadership 
and the organizations under them.82 Seen through an ideal type lens, it is typically 
the prerogative of the bureaucracies to determine how best to execute the technical 
work necessary if elite expectations are to be met. For this reason, the technical 
dimension of preparedness is seen as being subordinate to and dependent on the 
policy direction that emerges out of the policymaking process and subsequent 
interplay between actors in the political-administrative dimension.
In this section, we have discussed the complicated process by which policy-
makers set the agenda concerning what threats the bureaucracy should address. 
In the section that follows, we will identify a set of primary indicators of pre-
paredness that help us gauge just how prepared organizations are to deal with 
these and other threats.
2.4 Primary indicators of preparedness
While the emergency management literature is largely optimistic that preparedness 
can be observed and measured in organizations, relatively little research has been 
carried out with the aim of explaining how exactly this can be accomplished in 
a systematic fashion, let alone identifying those indicators of preparedness that 
researchers should be looking for.83 In this section, I will elaborate on what I 
argue are three primary indicators of preparedness that, when examined on a 
case-by-case basis, may reveal just how prepared organizations are to manage 
79 Birkland, 2006: 126-127; Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009: 485.
80 Domhoff, 1992; Skrentny, 2006; Svara, 1998.
81 Cook, et al., 2002; Fischer, 1991.
82 Radin, 2002: 70.
83 Gillespie and Streeter, 1987: 157, 159, 163-165.
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different threats.84 These indicators, namely inter-organizational relations, threat 
identification/prioritization, and routines and protocols, are inspired by findings 
in the existing body of literature on preparedness, organizations, bureaucracies 
and neo-institutionalism. Assuming these indicators are shown to be relevant 
when applied to the case at hand, they will be included in the diagnostic model 
for gauging organizational preparedness that is presented in Chapter 6.
2.4.1 Inter-organizational relations
One of the main assumptions underpinning this study is that the larger and 
more complex the problem, the more actors will be involved in managing it.85 
Policymakers expect that the responsible bureaucracies will coordinate their 
activities so as to ensure a seamless multi-level interagency response.86 Though 
effective multi-level interagency coordination is hardly a guarantee of success, 
actors who enjoy good working relations with others are more likely to solve 
problems on a collaborative basis than those who do not. That being said, it is 
important to be aware of the possibility that bureaucracies will be seen to coor-
dinate with one another for the sake of appearances (because others expect them 
to do so), and that the actual relations that exist between the actors involved 
may in fact be quite poor.87
2.4.2  Threat identification/prioritization
Bureaucracies may possess mechanisms intended to facilitate the work of iden-
tifying external threats and internal vulnerabilities that have the potential to 
weaken their ability to effectively respond to externalities.88 Ideally, the threats 
and/or vulnerabilities that they identify through this process are weighed against 
one another in a systematic fashion, allowing organizations to decide which are 
most pressing and, thus, worthy of closer attention. However, where discrepancies 
exist between the bureaucracy’s own threat/vulnerability assessments and elite 
priorities, they may find themselves compelled to favour the interests of policy-
makers over their own. They otherwise risk losing elite support and legitimacy.
84 von Schirnding, 2002: 19.
85 Eisinger, 2006. See also Boin and Bynander, forthcoming; Kettl, 2007: 26, 39; and March 
and Olsen, 2006b: 693.
86 Boin and Bynander, forthcoming; Clarke, 1999: 2; Dynes, 1983; Fayol, 1949; Faraj and Xiao, 
2006; Gillespie and Streeter, 1987: 157; Harmon and Mayer, 1986; McEntire, 2007: 414; 
Okhuysen and Bechky, 2009; Parker, et al., 2009; Perry, 2004: 66; Perry and Lindell, 2003: 
338; Perry and Lindell, 2007: 8; Quarantelli, 1980: 50-51; and Quarantelli, 2000: 19.
87 Jones, 2006.
88 Gillespie and Streeter, 1987: 155; Reason, 2006: 247, 249.
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2.4.3 Routines and protocols
Bureaucracies are dependent on routines and protocols in order to function both 
under normal conditions and in times of crisis. Plans, guidelines, frameworks, 
standard operating procedures (SOPs), mutual aid agreements, partnership 
arrangements, etc. are important tools that are intended to facilitate effective 
multi-level interagency coordination of effort in the event that problems arise. 
By explaining who should do what, routines and protocols serve to reduce trans-
action costs and the uncertainty that actors might otherwise feel when they are 
required to interact with one another. That being said, it is important to recall 
Meyer and Rowan, who assert that ‘a sharp distinction should be made between 
the formal structure of an organization and its actual day-to-day work activities’.89 
According to Clarke, routines and protocols may constitute ‘fantasy documents’ 
that reflect stakeholders’ expectation of them, and not how organizations actually 
intend to behave in different circumstances.90
2.5 A neo-institutional view on preparedness in federal systems
The preceding sections help us to better understand the process by which organ-
izations work to prepare for threats that are prioritized on the policy agenda in 
federal systems of government. Neo-institutionalism, which is primarily concerned 
with the effects that institutional pressures have on the behaviour of actors, 
provides an additional lens through which to see and understand this process. 
Up until the early 1950s, the field of political science was largely a normative 
one that sought to promote good governance in political institutions.91 In the 
original institutionalists’ view at the time, the behaviour of actors was constrained 
solely by things like formal rules, frameworks of law, and organizational design. 
However, the appearance of behaviouralism and rational choice theory in the 
1960s brought these assumptions into question.92 Over the decades that followed, 
some scholars would grow increasingly worried that the institutional environ-
ment’s role in generating, among other things, norms, rules and routines that 
constrained and enabled behaviour was no longer being taken into account.93 
It was out of these concerns that neo-institutionalism (otherwise referred to as 
new institutionalism) was born in the late 1970s.94 According to the original 
neo-institutionalists, James G. March and Richard P. Olsen, this new body of 
theory provided:
89 Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 341-342.
90 Clarke, 1999.
91 Commons, 1910; Cooley, 1930; Krier, 2009: 395-397; Mitchell, 1935; Veblen, 1948.
92 Campbell, et al., 1960; Franklin, 1985; Peters, 1999: 8, 11, 12-14.
93 DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Hay, 2002: 10-11; Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Zucker, 1977.
94 March and Olsen, 1989; North, 1990; Peters, 1999: 18; Pierson, 1994; Skocpol, 1979; 
Steinmo, et al., 1992.
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[…] a set of theoretical ideas and hypotheses concerning the relations between 
institutional characteristics and political agency, performance and change [that] 
emphasizes the endogenous nature and social construction of political institutions. 
Institutions are not simply equilibrium contracts among self-seeking, calculating 
individual actors or arenas for contending social forces. They are collections of 
structures, rules and standard operating procedures that have a partly autono-
mous role in political life.95
The field of neo-institutionalism would grow in the years that followed as other 
bodies of theory were combined with or incorporated into March and Olsen’s 
original conceptualization, creating different ‘streams’ of neo-institutionalism.96 
That these streams have sometimes very different theoretical pedigrees has 
prompted considerable debate as to just how broadly the field of neo-institution-
alism should be defined. While some scholars argue that the streams have few 
commonalities bar their rejection of behaviouralism and rational choice theory, 
Peters instead advocates a ‘big tent’ approach, given that ‘[the streams] consider 
institutions the central component of political life’. If nothing else, he argues, 
the ‘discussion of one of the approaches naturally [leads] to a discussion of some 
aspect of another’.97 While I find the question of how broadly or narrowly to 
define neo-institutionalism an interesting one, I choose not to engage in it at this 
stage. That being said, key claims from different sides of the debate have served to 
inform the process by which I have selected the streams of neo-institutionalism 
that will be applied to the case at hand. For instance, it is important that the 
chosen streams are sufficiently specified and have similar views on what insti-
tutions are and how actors interact with one another within them. Otherwise, 
it might be difficult to make general claims concerning the utility of neo-insti-
tutionalism in studying cases like this.98 It is with these considerations in mind 
that I have chosen normative institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and 
rational choice institutionalism for use in this study. Besides being comparatively 
well-developed, they share the view that ‘institutions matter’ and ‘history matters’ 
in constraining and enabling actors’ behaviour.99 Institutions matter insofar as 
they have a ‘mediating’ effect on otherwise unbounded political processes (either 
by creating expectations as to what is appropriate or by putting in place sanctions 
(consequentiality) that serve to punish certain forms of behaviour and reward 
others. Meanwhile, history matters to the extent that the legacy of the past sets 
95 March and Olsen, 2006a: 4.
96 Garrett and Weingast, 1993; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Krasner, 1984; Kreps, D., 1990; Peters, 
1999: 19.
97 Peters, 1999: 19. See also Garrett and Weingast, 1993; Hall and Taylor, 1996; Krasner, 1984; 
and Kreps, D., 1990.
98 Campbell, 1998; George and Bennett, 2005: 77, 116, 182; Hall and Taylor, 1996: 14-15, 
20; Pedersen, 1991; Peters, 1998; Peters, 1999: 90-91, 128.
99 Hay, 2002: 46.
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organizations on paths that limit the range of available policy options available 
to them at later points in time. In the parlance of the historical institutionalists, 
this is referred to as path dependency.100
In the discussion below, we shall explore the unique perspectives that the 
different streams of neo-institutionalism provide us concerning how different 
actors will behave, especially in the event of major institutional change, defined 
here as significant and lasting change across the spectrum of institutions that 
constrain and enable the behaviour of actors. This is followed by a brief discus-
sion of what I refer to as the actor-centric institutional environment that each 
individual actor exists within and is constrained and enabled by. It is only once 
we understand this environment that we can begin to identify those institutional 
forces that influence how actors behave, as well as the sources of and/or impetuses 
for institutional change of the kind that we are concerned with here.
2.5.1 Three streams of neo-institutionalism
In this section the three streams of neo-institutionalism that are considered in 
this study are discussed. These include normative institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism, and rational choice institutionalism.
Normative institutionalism
Normative institutionalism, the ‘original’ neo-institutionalism first articulated by 
March and Olsen, sees institutions consisting of norms, values, rules and routines 
that serve to ‘define appropriate actions in terms of relations between roles and 
situations’, what is otherwise referred to as the logic of appropriateness.101 The 
individuals who belong to these institutions are motivated to participate not by 
the prospect of personal gain, but because they are committed ‘to the goals of 
the organization, or at least [accept] the legitimate claims of the organization (or 
institution) for individual commitment’.102 Here, individual behaviour is seen 
to be ‘intentional but not wilful’ insofar as it is strongly influenced by prevailing 
institutional values and norms.103 That being said, the literature on normative 
institutionalism is somewhat vague as to when exactly individual interests and 
organizational goals coincide. Are individuals attracted to like-minded organi-
zations, or do organizations and other forms of socializing mechanisms have the 
power to shift the interests and preferences of individuals such that they come to 
share the same goals as the organization that they are members of?104
100 Hay, 2002: 14, 46; Peters, 1999: 174-175.
101 March and Olsen, 1989: 21-26. See also Barnard, 1938; Downs, 1957; Khademian, 2002; 
March and Olsen, 1984; March and Olsen; 1996; Peters, 1999: 25-46; and Selznick, 1949.
102 Peters, 1999: 27.
103 March and Olsen, 1989: 161.
104 Dowding, 1994; Jordan, 1990; March and Olsen, 1996; Mills, 1940: 908; Pedersen, 1991; 
Peters, 1999: 26-27; Sened, 1991; Searing, 1991; Wildavsky, 1987.
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March and Olsen argue that policy failures in particular are likely to create 
opportunities for institutional change. These are ‘transformative periods where 
established orders are delegitimized, are challenged, or collapse’.105 Peters suggests 
that in such instances, institutions have ‘the option either of reinforcing com-
mitment to the old values or finding some way of making effective changes’.106 
Where institutions choose the latter option, normative institutionalism would 
have us expect that they will prefer to draw on pre-existing sets of standard 
responses. In this, the so-called garbage can model of change, organizations are 
only forced to develop new sets of responses where all readily available policy 
responses in the garbage can have been exhausted or are otherwise ill-suited to 
the situation at hand.107
Normative institutionalism is not without its critics, who primarily adhere 
to the rational choice school of political science.108 For instance, Keith Dowding 
argues that individuals have considerably more autonomy than normative insti-
tutionalism is prepared to acknowledge.109 Meanwhile, Kjell Goldman worries 
that the notion of appropriateness is vague, thereby making it difficult to falsify.110 
According to Tom Christensen and Kjell Arne Røvik, this problem becomes 
particularly obvious in studying multi-level organizations, where the notion of 
what is ‘appropriate’ is likely to be different at different organizational levels.111
Historical institutionalism 
A central theme of historical institutionalism is that policy choices made at the 
point of institutional inception continue to influence patterns of institutional 
behaviour over time.112 This notion (that history matters) is otherwise referred 
to as path dependency.113 According to Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, 
path dependency is a ‘type of causal process [that] occurs in cases that consist 
of a sequence of events, some of which foreclose certain paths in the develop-
ment and steer the outcome in other directions’.114 In other words, historical 
institutionalism emphasizes continuity of behaviour over time. At the same 
time, though, historical institutionalism does allow for institutions to over-
come persisting, historically determined patterns of behaviour in the event of 
105 March and Olsen, 2006b: 700.
106 Peters, 1998: 10.
107 Cohen, March and Olsen, 1972. See also Peters, 1999: 37.
108 Jordan, 1990; Pedersen, 1991; Sened, 1991; Searing, 1991.
109 Dowding, 1994, in Peters, 1999: 43.
110 Goldman, 2005.
111 Christensen and Røvik, 1999.
112 Hall and Taylor, 1996: 7.
113 Hall, 1986; King, 1995; Krasner, 1984; Pierson, 2000; Pierson and Skocpol, 2002; Skocpol, 
1992; Steinmo and Longstreth, 1992; Peters, 1999: 72.
114 George and Bennett, 2005: 213.
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a focusing event (otherwise referred to in the literature as an ‘external shock’ or 
‘frame-breaking’ event).115 In such instances, Frank K. Baumgartner and Bryan 
Jones suggest, ‘Forces tend to build and then to erupt explosively in large, funda-
mental change’. Here, ‘important political questions’ suddenly come into focus 
and are elevated on the policy agenda, thereby increasing the likelihood for policy 
change.116 However, critics argue that the notion of punctuated equilibrium fails 
to satisfactorily explain major institutional change that occurs in the absence 
of a major disruptive event.117 Punctuated equilibrium has also been criticized 
for its apparent reliance on exogenous factors to create conditions for change. 
In other words, few allowances are made for institutional members themselves 
to create pressures for change from within.118 In an attempt to address these 
criticisms, Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen have proposed that gradual 
institutional change takes place in four different ways, namely: displacement 
(shifts in rules); layering (new rules as complements to/on top of existing rules); 
drift (rule changes due to environmental changes); and conversion (utilizing 
existing rules in unintended ways).119
No matter what prompts it, historical institutionalism stipulates that a 
necessary precondition for institutional change is shifts in the ideas that guide 
patterns of institutional behaviour. For instance, Ellen M. Immergut’s research 
on implementation of health care policy showed that making significant changes 
to medical policy in the United States necessitated shifts in doctors’ notions 
concerning what good medical practice was. In Immergut’s view, the doctors 
constituted so-called veto points in the process of revising national health care 
policy. Without their consent, policy change would have been impossible. 
Immergut’s argument is that the more veto points exist within a given policy area, 
the less likely institutional change is to occur.120 Meanwhile, Tsebelis suggests that 
institutional change is particularly unlikely where the veto players lack common 
political aims and interests.121 Even where they may have common aims, Peter 
Hall and Rosemary Taylor remind us that asymmetries of power are nevertheless 
likely to exist, ‘[giving] some groups or interests disproportionate access to the 
decision-making process’.122
115 Boin and ‘t Hart, 2003; Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007; Gould, 1996; Hay, 2002: 15; Raddatz, 
2007. 
116 Baumgartner and Jones, 1993: 20-21, in Kettl, 2007: 130-131. See also Lindblom, 1959.
117 Peters, 1999: 78.
118 Hall and Taylor, 1996: 17; Krasner, 1984; Peters, 1998: 20; Peters, 1999; 82.
119 Streeck and Thelen, 2005. See also Thelen, 2009.
120 Immergut, 1990; Immergut, 1992a; Immergut, 1992b; Immergut, 2006: 567. See also Hall, 
1986; Hall, 1989; Hall, 1992; Peters, 1999: 74; Reich, 1990.
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Rational choice institutionalism
In Helen V. Milner’s view, ‘much of the “new institutionalism” […] has focused 
on institutions to explain political outcomes while disregarding actors’ interests’.123 
Rational choice institutionalism, which sees individuals as rational actors who 
voluntarily choose to join institutions in the hope of increasing the likelihood 
that they will be able to achieve their own interests and preferences, would seem 
to address this issue.124 Rational choice institutionalism differs from the body of 
rational choice theory that emerged in the 1960s in its recognition of the various 
constraints (primarily in the form of rules) that institutions impose on the self-in-
terested behaviour of individuals.125 Deviations from these institutional rules are 
discouraged by the threat of sanctions. From this perspective, individuals rely on 
the so-called logic of consequentiality in order to avoid being sanctioned while 
at the same time maximizing their utility as institutional members.126 Though 
institutions might impose constraints on individuals’ behaviour, the rational 
choice institutionalists hold that they nevertheless provide ‘more benefits […] 
than alternate institutional forms’.127
Before proceeding to discuss different strains of rational choice institutional-
ism, it is necessary to define the interests that individuals seek to achieve through 
membership in institutions. In her discussion of economic and political actors 
in Interests, Institutions, and Information, Milner equates the interests of actors 
with ‘their fundamental goals, which change little’ over time. In her example:
The interests of economic actors involve maximizing income, whereas those of 
political actors largely concern maximizing the chances of retaining political 
office. On any issue, these generic interests do not distinguish among political 
actors or economic ones.128
A given actor’s preferences, meanwhile, ‘derive from their interests’:
Preferences refer to the specific policy choice that actors believe will maximize 
either their income or changes of reelection on a particular issue. Although all 
political actors may share the same interest, their policy preferences will vary 
according to their political situation, for example, their party affiliation, con-
stituency characteristics, and so on. […] Interests are the stable foundation on 
which actors’ preferences over policy shift as their situation and the policy area 
vary. Preferences are a variable; interests are not.129
123 Milner, 1997: 15.
124 Hall and Taylor, 1996: 13, 20.
125 Duquech, 2001; Peters, 1999: 48, 49.
126 Christensen, 2011.
127 Hall and Taylor, 1996: 13, 20.
128 Milner, 1997: 15.
129 Milner, 1997: 15.
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The three main strains of rational choice institutionalism provide different ways 
of understanding the behaviour of individuals and any change that can be wit-
nessed in organizations. The first strain, principal-agent theory, emphasizes efforts 
by organizational elites and elected officials (principals) to exert control over 
the bureaucracies (agents) that are responsible for implementing elite policy.130 
However, like principals, agents too have goals that they hope to achieve. In some 
instances, the aims of principals and agents run counter to one another.131 Where 
this is the case, principals need to develop structures that allow them to ensure that 
policy is actually implemented as intended.132 However, principal-agent theory 
suggests that this is a difficult balancing act, where principals must be prepared 
to cede just enough power to bureaucracies such that they can be permitted to 
implement elite policy, but not so much that bureaucracies are able to threaten 
policymakers’ sovereignty.133 Principals have at their disposal different forms of 
control over their agents, including ‘oversight – monitoring, hearings, investiga-
tions, budgetary reviews, sanctions – and procedural constraints’.134 Their control 
over bureaucracies may also be enhanced through the selection of so-called good 
agents who they can trust to implement policy to the satisfaction of elites.135
Game theory, meanwhile, sees principals and agents locked in long-running 
competition with one another.136 Regardless of the specific context in which such 
competition takes place, the behaviour of principals and agents is determined 
by expectations as to how the other will act (Tucker’s prisoners’ dilemma). 
Disincentives exist for the various parties to defect early on for fear that this 
may result in sanctions at a later stage. In Hall and Taylor’s view, games like this 
prevent actors from acting in ways that promote collectively superior outcomes. 
Instead, outcomes tend to be ‘collectively sub-optimal’.137
The final strain of rational choice institutionalism is rules-based. Here, 
institutions are seen to be aggregations of rules that serve to ‘prescribe, proscribe 
and permit’ behaviour by institutional members.138 In exchange for following 
the rules, individuals gain access to any benefits that institutional membership 
might entail. As Peters points out, this strain shares some similarities with nor-
mative institutionalism insofar as they both rely on ‘standards of behaviour to 
establish the nature of the structures’.139 That being said, sanctions feature more 
prominently in the rules-based perspective.
130 Banks and Weingast, 1992; Hall and Taylor, 1996: 12; Peters, 1999: 56-57.
131 Krause, 1999; Krause and Meier, 2005.
132 Peters, 1999: 56-57.
133 Kettl, 2006: 374.
134 Majone, 2006: 235.
135 Kettl, 2006: 369.
136 Peters, 1999: 58-59.
137 Hall and Taylor, 1996: 12.
138 Peters, 1998: 17. See also Ostrom, 1986; and Ostrom, 1990.
139 Peters, 1999: 53.
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Like many other streams of neo-institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism 
has been criticized for failing to adequately explain where exactly institutions 
stem from.140 This stream of theory is intentionalist insofar as sets of rational 
actors are in control of the process of creating and then running institutions in 
ways that allow them to achieve their goals.141 To the critics, however, it is not at 
all clear that actors are in fact capable of exerting the necessary levels of control, 
let alone having access to all the information required, to make the decisions 
necessary to create institutions like this.142
2.5.2 The actor-centric institutional environment
The streams of neo-institutionalism discussed above provide different albeit 
related views on the institutional environment in which actors operate. For the 
purposes of this study, institutions are seen as collections of norms, rules, rou-
tines, and values that create pressures on actors to behave in certain ways, either 
out of respect for what is appropriate so as to avoid being sanctioned, or some 
combination thereof.143 It is for this reason that institutions are seen to contribute 
to behavioural predictability where they promote ‘patterned interactions that are 
[…] based upon specified relationships among [relevant] actors’.144 According to 
Scott and Meyer, institutional environments are characterized by:
the elaboration of rules and requirements to which individual organizations 
must conform if they are to receive support and legitimacy. The requirements may 
stem from regulatory agencies authorized by the nation-state, from professional 
or trade associations, from generalized belief systems that define how specific types 
of organizations are to conduct themselves, and similar sources. […] Whatever 
their source, organizations are rewarded for conforming to these rules or beliefs.145
According to Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell, the institutional environ-
ment ‘[penetrates every given] organization, creating the lenses through which 
actors view the world and the very categories of structure, action, and thought’.146 
While I share DiMaggio and Powell’s view concerning the function that the insti-
tutional environment plays in determining how different actors see and relate to 
the world around them, I would argue that it is important to emphasize that no 
two actors operate within one and the same institutional environment. In other 
140 Peters, 1999: 60.
141 Goodin, 1995; Kliemt, 1990.
142 Hall and Taylor, 1996: 19. See also Goodin, 1995; and Weimer, 1995.
143 March and Olsen, 1989: 21-26, in Peters, 2011: 30.
144 Peters, 2011: 19-20. See also Hall, 1986; Ikenberry, 1988: 222-223; Jung, 2005; and Thelen 
and Steinmo, 1992: 2-4.
145 Scott and Meyer, 1991: 123.
146 DiMaggio and Powell, 1991: 13. See also: Selznick, 1949; Gouldner, 1954; Dalton, 1959; 
Clark, 1960; Scott and Meyer, 1991.
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words, there are as many institutional environments as there are actors, as Michael 
Howlett and M. Ramesh suggest.147 For instance, while FEMA and the Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) work together in preparing for major 
public health emergencies, the CDC has little contact with FEMA in meeting its 
responsibilities in other policy domains. In other words, the two agencies exist 
within different institutional environments, albeit ones that overlap in different 
ways. It follows that major institutional change is likely to influence individual 
actors with their own unique sets of interests and preferences operating within 
their own unique institutional environments differently.
Actors and the unique institutional environments that they operate within 
are influenced by developments in the wider political sphere, what I refer to in 
this study as the political-administrative dimension. According to Manning and 
Westreicher, institutions ‘are the substance of which politics is constructed and – 
by underpinning power structures, patterns of interests and patronage systems – a 
vehicle through which the practice of politics is transmitted’.148 In other words, 
understanding the institutional environment in which a given actor operates 
requires taking into account the wider political sphere. It is equally important to 
take into account the type of government system in which the actors exist. This 
is likely to influence the norms, rules, routines and values in the institutional 
environment that constrain and enable the behaviour of actors. For instance, 
actors responding to complex problems in federal systems will be expected to 
coordinate their activities over agency boundaries and between administrative 
levels. The contacts that take place between actors as a result may shape the 
norms, rules, routines and values that they are all guided by. On the other hand, 
these contacts are just as likely to reveal that actors have completely different 
motivations, ideas about how things are done, and levels of engagement, making 
it all the more difficult to achieve effective coordination of effort.
In the figure below, the institutional environments unique to three different 
actors (Actor X, Actor Y and Actor Z) are shown to exist within a single politi-
cal-administrative dimension. Each actor is seen to be guided by a set of norms, 
rules, routines and values unique to that actor. Where overlap exists between 
the institutional environments of the different actors, we are likely to see the 
development of common sets of norms, rules, routines and values, or, at the very 
least, pressures for actors to adhere and/or adapt to the norms, rules, routines 
and values of one another.
147 Howlett and Ramesh, 2009: 43-44.
148 Manning and Westreicher, 146.
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Figure 1. The actor-centric institutional environment
Obviously, actors operating in a complex multi-level interagency environment 
are likely to come into contact with far more actors than those depicted here. The 
figure above is merely intended to illustrate the overlapping nature of different 
actors’ institutional environments.
2.6 Research hypotheses
The different streams of neo-institutionalism described above provide us with 
different views as to what motivates individuals to join organizations, what 
constraints institutions place on individuals and organizations, how change 
in institutions can be explained, and then how institutional change influences 
individual and organizational behaviour and, thus, their preparedness to deal 
with different types of problems.
This section aims to briefly set out four research hypotheses that relate in 
different ways to the different streams of neo-institutionalism. Each hypothesis 
supposes how actors (FEMA in this case) will behave in the event of major 
institutional change (which I argue came in the wake of the 9/11 attacks), and 
what effects this change will have on their preparedness to manage different 
problems. Furthermore, each research hypothesis relates in one way or another 
to the primary indicators of preparedness (inter-organizational relations, threat 
identification/prioritization, and routines and protocols) that were presented 
in section 2.4. In testing the various hypotheses in the chapters that follow, we 
should be able to see evidence to suggest just how useful the different indicators 
actually are as gauges of organizational preparedness.
The question of how these four hypotheses will be confirmed or rejected is 
revisited in the discussion on methodology in Chapter 3.
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2.6.1 Hypothesis I
The normative institutionalists’ view is that the behaviour of actors is deter-
mined by the norms, rules, routines, and values that exist in the institutional 
environment relevant to them. Assuming that this is in fact the case, one could 
hypothesize on a general basis that:
The more organizations are defined by deeply entrenched sets of norms, rules, routines, 
and values, and the deeper the structural relations between one another, the more 
difficult it is for them to make adjustments to commitments, values and aims in the 
event that priorities change in the overarching policy arena.
The case-specific research hypothesis follows:
The more deeply entrenched the norms, rules, routines and values that constrain and 
enable FEMA’s behaviour, the less likely the agency will be to alter its mission and 
the focus of its activities in the event that priorities change on the policy agenda.
2.6.2 Hypothesis II
Historical institutionalism holds that policy choices made at the point of institu-
tional inception will continue to influence patterns of behaviour over time (path 
dependency). Seen from this perspective, organizations are only able to overcome 
these patterns of behaviour where major focusing events punctuate the existing 
equilibrium through the creation of forces for change that are stronger than those 
that keep actors on a given policy path and compel them to behave in a certain 
historically determined ways. Seen through the historical institutionalists’ lens, 
then, one might assume that:
The greater and more sudden the emergence of pressures for change in the institu-
tional environment, the more likely an organization is to deviate from its current 
path determined by earlier policy choices, and the more likely the organization’s 
behaviour is to change.
The hypothesis as it relates to the case at hand follows:
The greater and more sudden the emergence of pressures for change in the institutional 
environment, the more likely FEMA will be to alter its priorities concerning what 
threats it prepares for.
2.6.3 Hypothesis IIIa
Whereas normative institutionalism and historical institutionalism are primarily 
interested in factors that influence overall organizational behaviour, rational choice 
institutionalism is most interested in explaining why utility-maximizing individ-
uals choose to join institutions, how they go about leveraging them in pursuit 
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of their own interests, and how institutions are nevertheless able to constrain 
their behaviour. As such, rational choice institutionalism is particularly useful 
in hypothesizing about how individuals, especially those in leadership positions, 
are likely to behave in the face of major change in the institutional environment. 
The assumption here, which borrows heavily from the principal-agent and rules-
based strains of theory, is that: 
The more individual leaders work to ensure that the priorities of the organizations 
that they lead are aligned with those on the overarching policy agenda (by acting as 
(or at least being perceived to be) ‘good agents’), the more likely they are to achieve 
their own interests.
More specifically:
The more individual leaders at FEMA work to ensure that the agency is prepared 
to manage threats that are prioritized on the policy agenda (by acting as (or at least 
being perceived to be) ‘good agents’), the more likely they will be to achieve their own 
interests.
2.6.4 Hypothesis IIIb
The notion that organizational preparedness is determined by developments in 
two separate dimensions, one technical and the other political-administrative, 
was introduced in section 2.3.3. Conceiving of preparedness in this way gives 
rise to the idea that the professional background, competences, and work-related 
experience that leaders possess, what I refer to here as their professional profile, 
will influence how they perceive and respond to major change in the institutional 
environment. We might assume that individuals with a political or administrative 
(managerial) background are likely to be particularly sensitive to developments 
in the political-administrative context, but especially in times of change. In the 
same way, leaders with a technical background are likely to be more interested 
in the operations of the organizations that they lead and the tools that they use 
to carry them out than in the concerns of policy elites. As a result, developments 
in the institutional environment, not least shifts in elite attention, may be 
neglected. Of course, we should also allow for situations where individuals with 
a political-administrative background are interested in and have a good working 
knowledge of technical issues, and vice versa, where ‘technician’-style leaders 
follow and are responsive to shifts in elite policy and/or other forms of change 
in the institutional environment. According to Manning and Westreicher, ‘Being 
aware of the “nature of the [political] game” is likely to enhance performance’.149 
The assumption here is that individuals who are sensitive to and understand the 
149 Manning and Westreicher, 146.
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implications of change in the political-administrative dimension will be more 
effective agents than those who do not.
The hypothesis below depicts the relationship between the individual’s profes-
sional profile and his or her behaviour in the event of major institutional change:
If an organizational leader has an administrative or political background, his or 
her motives will be informed by various administrative and political considerations. 
On the other hand, if an organizational leader has a technical background, he or 
she will be primarily motivated by the technical standards of his or her profession.
The hypothesis as it relates to this study is stated below:
If members of the FEMA leadership have a political or administrative background, 
they will be more likely to act (and direct the agency they lead to act) in accordance 
with change in the institutional environment. Meanwhile, individuals with a 
technical background are less likely to be responsive to institutional change unless it 
corresponds with what they believe to be appropriate based on the technical standards 
of their profession.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have presented an institutional perspective on preparedness 
that draws on insights from a wide range of disciplines, including preparedness, 
emergency management, public administration, security studies, and political 
science. Using the institutional perspective, we are able to frame different disrup-
tive events as foreseeable complex problems, which entail a number of different 
challenges that actors must face. Furthermore, the institutional perspective depicts 
both the process by which different threats (problems) achieve (and lose) promi-
nence on the policy agenda, and the interplay that exists between principals and 
their agents, in this case a small set of actors within the federal bureaucracy. This 
chapter also builds on the existing literature on preparedness where it seeks to 
identify a small number of primary indicators of preparedness that can be used 
to show just how prepared different organizations are for different eventualities. 
Besides being useful in structuring the analysis in Chapter 5, the indicators are 
vital to the task of developing the diagnostic model for gauging organizational 
preparedness that is presented at the end of the study.
At its core, the institutional perspective on preparedness relies on insights 
from neo-institutionalism, which sees actors operating in an institutional envi-
ronment that consists of norms, rules, routines and values that serve to constrain 
and enable their behaviour in different ways. When viewed through different 
neo-institutional lenses, it is possible to discern different explanations as to where 
institutional change comes from and why organizations behave as they do in 
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different contexts. Insights from the different streams of neo-institutionalism 
described in section 2.5 provide a foundation on which to base the set of hypoth-
eses that were presented in this chapter, and will be evaluated over the course 
of the chapters to come. Doing so should bring us closer to solving the puzzle 
that drives this research, namely what explains FEMA’s pre-Katrina preparedness 
to manage hurricanes in what was otherwise an era of heightened attention to 
homeland security? In the following chapter, I shall present the research design 
and methodology that are used in this study.
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3.1 Introduction
As the discussion in the preceding chapter illustrates, different streams of neo- 
institutionalism offer different predictions concerning how actors will behave in 
the event of major change in the institutional environment. The streams are used 
in this study to examine the behaviour of a single federal bureaucracy (the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency, FEMA) in managing one type of foreseeable 
complex problem (hurricanes) prior to and after the onset of major institutional 
change (following the 9/11 attacks) from different theoretical angles. Ideally, 
doing so will yield insights that enable us to answer the research question that 
forms the basis for this study, namely:
What are the conditions that promoted change in FEMA so as to generate (or prevent 
the generation of ) high levels of preparedness in managing hurricanes?
In this chapter, the case study methodology that is employed in studying the 
case is described, followed by a discussion of how the independent variable 
(institutional change) and the dependent variable (hurricane preparedness) will 
be operationalized, which objects will be studied, which methods will be used 
to study them, and the source selection process. In the latter half of the chapter, 
the hypothesis confirmation or rejection process, research limitations, and the 
prospects for generalizability are discussed.
3.2 A single-case case study methodology
This study utilizes a single-case case study methodology, which has been cho-
sen because it allows for the case (government management of a specific type 
of foreseeable complex problem) to be approached from different theoretical 
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angles.1 This methodology is suitable for other reasons as well. For instance, the 
case at hand is a large one that spans several decades and involves many different 
actors, including a dozen congresses and four presidential administrations, all of 
which had a role to play in determining the conditions under which FEMA oper-
ated. The single-case methodology is able to accommodate complex, empirically 
dense cases like this.2 Furthermore, this methodology should be useful in filling 
certain gaps in the existing body of knowledge on any number of subjects, not 
least the history of emergency management policy, practice and organization in 
the United States over the past few decades.3
However, the single-case case study methodology does have certain weaknesses 
that need to be recognized and taken into account. For instance, Gary King warns 
that case studies of this kind ‘have limited success in theory building [and] can-
not exclude alternative theories’. Furthermore, ‘Their findings are limited by the 
possibility of measurement error, probabilistic causal mechanisms, and omitted 
variables’.4 While valid points all, the view here is that these limitations can be 
managed through the use of process tracing (described in section 3.2.4), which 
allows for many observations on the dependent variable. The data set generated 
through process tracing should provide a robust basis for theory testing while 
simultaneously reducing the risk for different types of measurement error.
3.2.1 Case selection 
The general phenomena being studied here are complex problems and how 
government bureaucracies operating in a federal setting manage them. In this 
case, we will examine a single government agency (FEMA) and how it worked 
over time (its behaviour) to address a specific foreseeable complex problem (the 
seasonal hurricane threat facing the nation) prior to and then after an instance of 
major institutional change (prompted by the 9/11 attacks in September 2001), 
or, put another way:
FEMA’s activities between 1979 and 22 August 2005 in independently and together 
with other federal, state and local authorities preparing for a possible hurricane 
affecting the United States.
1 Eckstein, 1975: 99, in George and Bennett, 2005: 75. The chosen methodology is inspired by 
other notable studies that use case studies to test theory. These include Allison’s 1971 study of 
the Cuban Missile Crisis and Sagan’s study of US nuclear safety using normal accidents and 
high reliability organizations (HRO) theory (Allison, 1971; Sagan, 1993: 49, in George and 
Bennett, 2005: 118-119). See also Denzin, 1978; and Webb, et al., 1966.
2 Hay, 2002: 47. See also George and Bennett, 2005: 81.
3 George and Bennett, 2005: 93.
4 King, et al., 1994: 208-211, in George and Bennett, 2005: 220.
57
Chapter 3: Research design and method
The year 1979 was the first year in which a single agency of government (FEMA) 
was responsible for coordinating the totality of federal emergency preparedness 
and management activities. (Having said this, it is important to recognize that 
some of FEMA’s preparedness responsibilities were reassigned to other parts of 
the federal bureaucracy, soon after FEMA joined the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS).5) Meanwhile, 22 August 2005 has been chosen as an end point 
for the case in light of the fact that this was arguably the last point at which 
FEMA could engage in general preparedness activities without having any specific 
knowledge that a large-scale hurricane was likely to strike south-eastern Louisiana 
in the coming days. That being said, it is important to emphasize that this case 
is squarely focused on FEMA’s hurricane preparedness activities generally, and 
not its hurricane preparedness relating to the New Orleans scenario specifically.
Before going any further, it is necessary to acknowledge the massive decades- 
long effort led by the US Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) and other federal, 
state and local authorities to build flood protection infrastructure in and around 
the city of New Orleans. However, these efforts fall beyond the scope of this 
study, given that flood protection tends to be organized within the mitigation 
phase in the emergency management cycle, not the preparedness phase.
This case has been chosen for the fact that FEMA failed to effectively respond 
to Katrina. By all accounts, FEMA’s preparedness to manage a major hurricane 
(the dependent variable) was inadequate in the face of Katrina and I hope to 
establish why this was the case. However, it should be said that the decision to 
choose a case based on pre-knowledge of the value of the dependent variable 
at a given point in time (August 2005) is frowned upon by neo-positivists. For 
instance, Barbara Geddes argues that while cases selected on the dependent 
variable may be ‘ideal for digging into the details’ and may serve to ‘identify 
plausible causal variables’, they typically fail to ‘test the theories they propose, 
and, hence, can not contribute to the accumulation of theoretical knowledge’.6 
On the other hand, George and Bennett suggest that the selection of cases on the 
basis of known outcomes ‘[makes] the process-tracing test of [the] theory more 
severe’ than it otherwise might be.7 I find this and other arguments in favour of 
selecting cases on the basis of the dependent variable more compelling than those 
against.8 That being said, it is nevertheless important that various ‘methodological 
safeguards’ (including process tracing and congruence testing) are put in place 
so as to mitigate the risk for selection bias.9
5 Peters, 2011: 76; Stern, 2003: 42.
6 Geddes, 1990. See also Achen, 1986, in Dion, 1998: 127-145; and King, et al., 1994, in 
Dion, 1998: 127-145.
7 George and Bennett, 2005: 23, 24.
8 Hall, 2000, in George and Bennett, 2005: 206.
9 Flyvbjerg, 2006. See also Collier and Mahoney, 1996: 56-91.
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3.2.2 The independent and dependent variables
The institutional environment is conceptualized as an actor-centric one that 
consists of norms, rules, routines and values that serve to constrain and enable the 
behaviour of actors in different ways. It follows that change in the institutional 
environment will prompt varying degrees of change to these institutional forces, 
which in turn will influence how actors behave. In my view, major institutional 
change is most likely to occur where a major disruptive event of an exogenous 
nature focuses elite attention on a given policy issue/set of policy issues, resulting 
in change to the norms, rules, routines and values that make up, in this case at 
least, the institutional environment unique to FEMA (the independent variable, 
X). As some combination of these institutional forces change, we would expect 
to see at least some change to the way in which FEMA behaves and, thus, its 
preparedness for hurricanes (the dependent variable, Y). In other words, we should 
expect to see FEMA’s preparedness to manage hurricanes change as change occurs 
in the institutional environment specific to FEMA. The relationship between the 
independent and dependent variables is depicted in the figure below.
Change in the 
instuonal 
environment 
specific to FEMA 
(X) 
Shis in norms, 
rules, rounes, 
values and 
preferences/interests  
FEMA’s 
preparedness to 
manage hurricanes 
(Y) 
Figure 2. The independent and dependent variables
The case is divided at the point of major institutional change into two phases 
using the before-after approach (otherwise referred to as the within-case method 
of causal interpretation).10 Assuming that major institutional change is only 
possible as the result of a focusing event, it is necessary to identify those events 
during the period under study (1979-2005) that were able to bring considerable 
amounts of attention to bear on the field of emergency management. With the 
pre-knowledge available to me at the outset of this study, the fall of the Soviet 
Union, Hurricane Andrew, and the 9/11 attacks would appear to meet this cri-
terion.11 As the threat of nuclear war faded following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, many of the resources that had been used to build up and maintain the 
massive national civil defence apparatus that existed in the United States could 
now be used to deal with other issues instead. The question was which. Hurricane 
Andrew, which happened to make landfall just as this debate was taking off, 
10 van den Bosch and Cantillon, 2006: 298-299; George and Bennett, 2005: 166.
11 Other possibilities that were considered include the Love Canal environmental disaster (first 
detected in the late 1970s), the Exxon Valdez oil spill (1989), the Loma Prieta and Northridge 
earthquakes (1989 and 1994, respectively), and the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami.
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revealed serious gaps in the Federal Government’s capabilities necessary to deal 
with natural disasters. Though the storm and the problems that it revealed would 
capture policymakers’ attention in the months to come, the nation’s strategic 
emergency management architecture at the federal level went largely untouched. 
While it was clear that FEMA would be expected to pay more attention to 
natural disasters in the future, little was done to alter FEMA’s mandate, give it 
more resources, or redraw the burdensome oversight landscape that the agency 
was forced to operate in. In other words, the policy debate during the first half 
of the 1990s resulted in nothing more than fine-tuning at FEMA and the field 
of emergency management more broadly.
The terror attacks that struck the United States during the mid-1990s served 
to reopen debate concerning the nation’s emergency management capabilities. 
Whereas FEMA had been central to the post-Andrew debate, it was a relatively 
peripheral player in the emerging fight over how to achieve better coordination 
between the law enforcement, border control and emergency management 
domains in preparing for future terror attacks in the United States. The 9/11 
attacks presented the proponents of a broader ‘homeland security’ approach 
with an opportunity to push through their agenda, prompting dramatic govern-
ment reforms on a scale not seen since the 1940s. As part of the government 
reorganization that followed, FEMA lost its status as an independent executive 
agency when it was reorganized within the new DHS. In this respect, the post-
9/11 reforms would appear to constitute the single most dramatic example of 
institutional change in the period stretching from 1979 to 22 August 2005, far 
exceeding that which occurred after the fall of the Soviet Union or Andrew. As 
such, the 9/11 attacks provide a suitable point at which to divide the case into 
two phases, one stretching from 1979 to 10 September 2001) and the other 
from 11 September 2001 until 22 August 2005).
The dependent variable in this case, meanwhile, is hurricane preparedness 
at FEMA. The assumption here is that major change in the institutional envi-
ronment after the 9/11 attacks resulted in shifts in norms, rules, routines and 
values that compelled the members of FEMA to alter their behaviour in ways 
that influenced the agency’s hurricane preparedness (by all accounts negatively). 
However, we should nevertheless expect to see at least some variation in the 
dependent variable over time, even in the absence of major institutional change.
3.2.3 Objects of study
Having defined the case and depicted the relationship between the independent 
and dependent variables, we now turn to the task of identifying the objects to be 
studied. While dozens of federal departments and agencies have formal respon-
sibilities in supporting federal hurricane responses, FEMA alone was responsible 
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for coordinating the entirety of the Federal Government’s efforts, both in pre-
paring for and responding to hurricanes between 1979 and 2004 (when FEMA’s 
preparedness tasking was relocated elsewhere within DHS). For this reason, the 
primary object of study in this case is FEMA and its hurricane preparedness 
activities over time. The fact that formal responsibility for preparedness was 
shifted out of FEMA in 2004 should be acknowledged and is accounted for in 
the analysis in Chapter 5.
In order to understand how major institutional change influenced FEMA 
and its preparedness, we shall focus primarily on the behaviour of the FEMA 
leadership, which I argue comprises a small group of political appointees and 
civil servants charged with, among other things, formulating policy, effectively 
administering the agency, and ensuring that policy is implemented as intended.12 
The FEMA leadership as conceived here is the agency’s primary point of con-
tact with policymakers, and does not belong within the policy elite. My view 
is that while FEMA’s leadership certainly plays an important role in providing 
information to policy elites responsible for overarching policy formation, they 
are typically not full-fledged players in the policy debate.
Who exactly is part of the FEMA leadership? For the purposes of this study, 
this group includes a small number of individuals who are organized within the 
Office of the FEMA Administrator (more commonly referred to as the FEMA 
director). Besides the director himself,13 the Office of the Administrator has 
through the years typically included a deputy director, a chief of staff, various 
advisory functions, the assistant administrators for different agency departments 
and programme offices, as well as officers responsible for the agency’s overarching 
functionality (administration, procurement, and, information/data/IT). Of these, 
however, I argue that very few have a vital role to play in the interplay with the 
policymaking level, let alone in making strategic decisions concerning agency 
direction and focus (in this case what it should be prepared for and to what extent 
it should be prepared). These individuals include: 1) the FEMA director; 2) his 
or her chief of staff; 3) the deputy administrator; and 4) the assistant adminis-
trators for preparedness, response and recovery, emergency management, and 
disaster coordination. Obviously, this is a highly formalistic conceptualization 
of the FEMA leadership. While I do recognize that informal leaders may play 
an important role in shaping particularly the norms, informal rules and values 
that define organizations, we are unlikely to detect any influence that they might 
have if they are not members of the FEMA leadership as it is defined here.
12 Brunsson and Olsen, 1993; Andrew and Carr, 2013.
13 To date, no woman has ever held the post of FEMA director.
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Mile’s Law (where one sits determines where one stands) could lead one to assume 
that the FEMA leadership may be constrained and enabled by the same set of 
norms, rules, routines and values that guide the behaviour of other members of the 
FEMA bureaucracy.14 Like Allison in his 1971 study of the Cuban Missile Crisis, 
I argue here that the behaviour of the FEMA director and other members of his 
staff may reflect the norms, rules, routines and values that guide the behaviour 
of the organization as a whole.15 That being said, March and Olsen remind us 
that ‘politics follows the logic of consequentiality while public administrators 
and judges follow the logic of appropriateness’.16 As such, it is conceivable that 
agency leaders with political ambitions or who hope to be promoted to, say, a 
senior leadership position within DHS, may be motivated to behave in ways that 
offer them the best prospects for advancement, and not on the basis of what is 
considered to be appropriate behaviour within the agency that they are charged 
with leading.17 Any evidence to suggest that members of the FEMA leadership 
failed to adhere to the prevailing logic of appropriateness within FEMA might 
give credence to the claims of the rational choice institutionalists, and undermine 
certain claims made by the normative institutionalists in particular.
All too often, case studies concerning disruptive events neglect to situate them 
in a broader institutional context. For instance, what other issues on the policy 
agenda were decision-makers grappling with at the time? Which were prioritized, 
and what implications did these prioritizations have for the ability of actors to 
manage disruptive events when they did finally occur? Using the institutional 
perspective on preparedness presented in Chapter 2, we should be able to capture 
the broader institutional environment in which FEMA operated in the long 
lead-up to Katrina. Specifically, we should be able to see what issues hurricane 
preparedness competed with on the policy agenda, how FEMA responded to 
any policy shifts that took place, and what implications the agency’s response 
had for its preparedness for hurricanes. So as to depict the broader institutional 
context, we will need to capture the behaviour of many other actors, including 
successive White House administrations, members of Congress, senior adminis-
trators at DHS and other relevant federal departments and agencies that FEMA 
partnered with, policy entrepreneurs (think tanks and lobby organizations, for 
example), and the media. This will be accomplished using process tracing, which 
is discussed in the following section.
14 Miles, 1978.
15 Allison, 1971.
16 March and Olsen, 2006b: 703.
17 Morris, 2006: 288.
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3.2.4 Process tracing
Process tracing is employed in this study to confirm the existence of any causal 
mechanisms that might exist between change in the institutional environment in 
which FEMA operated and the agency’s preparedness in managing the complex 
and foreseeable threat posed by hurricanes.18 According to George and Bennett, 
process tracing enables the researcher to be ‘deliberately selective, focusing on 
what are thought to be particularly important parts’ of otherwise extended, highly 
complex historical narratives like that at hand.19
In this case, we seek to capture and understand the behaviour of different 
actors (discussed in the preceding section) operating in the field of emergency 
management/homeland security as they go about preparing (or not) for major 
hurricanes over the course of several decades. This task will be accomplished by 
following a number of different processes chronologically. As Stern, et al. point 
out, the original process tracing methodology can be augmented by insights from 
other fields of study to make it more useful in studying particularly complex crisis 
cases.20 In his dissertation from 1999, Stern proposed a cognitive institutional 
approach to process tracing consisting of four steps, namely:
– Place the crisis in context
– Establish a time frame/develop a narrative
– Dissect the acute crisis
– Reassemble the crisis and place it in a broader perspective21
While this is not a crisis study, but rather a pre-crisis study, Stern’s approach 
nevertheless reminds us of the need to properly contextualize the case and to 
construct a sufficiently rich and focused empirical narrative that allows us to 
draw sustainable conclusions concerning the different causal mechanisms at play.
Given that the research at hand is squarely focused on the preparedness phase 
of the emergency management cycle, process tracing is applied in order to follow 
certain processes at primarily the federal level that played a part in determining 
just how prepared FEMA was for Katrina in 2005. These processes include con-
gressional debate and lawmaking pertaining to emergency management/homeland 
security, certain year-to-year funding decisions made by members of Congress, 
executive decisions influencing the relevant federal agencies and their operations, 
FEMA’s relations with other federal, state and local actors, and internal agency 
processes influencing what the agency was prepared for and to what extent, to 
name a few. Of course, it is important to acknowledge that the cyclical nature of 
emergency management means that organizational preparedness will inevitably 
18 George and Bennett, 2005: 183, 210, 213, 217.
19 George and Bennett, 2005: 211.
20 Stern, et al., 2014: 404.
21 Stern, 1999: 59.
63
Chapter 3: Research design and method
be influenced by events, developments, trends, etc. within the other stages in 
the cycle.22 Assuming this is the case, it is important to recognize those events 
(natural disaster-related or not) and the responses to them that had the potential 
to influence the agency’s preparedness for hurricanes in particular. Equally so, we 
should recognize and account for any mitigation works/programmes that may 
have the effect of reducing the burden on organizations that would otherwise 
need to prepare for certain, now-mitigated contingencies.
Some critics of process tracing contend that single-case case studies provide 
an insufficient number of observations on the independent and dependent var-
iables alike (the degrees of freedom problem), preventing the researcher from 
drawing anything more than what Bennett and George refer to as ‘provisional 
conclusions’.23 The fact that process tracing is capable of generating multiple 
observations on the dependent variable should enhance the validity of the 
findings, at least when compared with multi-case studies with multiple varia-
bles.24 Furthermore, the use of process tracing should enable the researcher to 
detect evidence of equifinality (where a given end state is reached down a path 
other than that which was initially envisioned) and spuriousness (the presence 
of unforeseen variables that are part of the causal path).25
Finally, the ability of process tracing to capture phenomena that are central 
to specific streams of neo-institutionalism should facilitate the theory testing 
aims of this study. For instance, Colin Hay argues that process tracing is useful 
in capturing indications of both gradual and more sudden forms of change in 
‘political structures, institutions, codes, conventions and norms’ over time.26 
Furthermore, process tracing has the potential to reveal instances of path depend-
ency and to depict the nature of relationships between principals and agents.27
3.2.5 Sources
The task of piecing together the case has been accomplished in part through: media 
reports (national and international print and web-based media, network, cable 
television and radio broadcasts); popular history accounts; reports published by 
think tanks, interest groups, and industry representatives; academic works; and a 
website maintained by a retired FEMA employee. Every effort has been made to 
identify any biases the authors may have had and, equally important, what role, 
if any, these documents played in the policy debate on emergency management 
22 Rubin, 2007: 4-5.
23 Bennett and George, 1979. See also Cook and Campbell, 1979.
24 Bennett, 1992; Eckstein, 1975: 85; King, et al., 1994: 225.
25 Bennett and George, 1979; Cook and Campbell, 1979; Garrett and Weingast, 1993; George 
and Bennett, 2005: 182, 201, 209, 212, 215, 217, 220-221, 283; Hall and Taylor, 1996; 
Krasner, 1984; Kreps, D., 1990; Peters, 1999: 19.
26 Hay, 2002: 136.
27 George and Bennett, 2005: 213.
64
The 2005 Hurricane Katrina response failure
in the United States. After all, accounts of this kind may serve as ‘an important 
part of contextual developments to which policymakers are sensitive, to which 
they are responding, or which they are attempting to influence’. 28 Academic 
works in the fields of cultural geography, sociology, psychology, economics, 
public administration, organizational studies, political science, and international 
relations have also been helpful in capturing certain crucial elements of the case.
The study also draws on numerous official documents, including government 
reports, congressional minutes, interviews, public investigations and inquiries, and 
internal evaluations. Besides providing valuable empirical data concerning the 
case, some of these documents provide indications of change in the institutional 
environment and show how FEMA behaved in response. That being said, the 
methodology accounts for the possibility that such documents may be used to 
advance ‘the political and personal goals of those officials who control their release’.29
It should be said that the body of data on FEMA and the agency’s management 
of different disruptive events over the period spanning from the mid-1990s until 
2005 is much larger than it is over the period from 1979 to the mid-1990s. In 
other words, the historical record pertaining to the case suffers from a certain 
imbalance over time. Furthermore, it is important to point out that large amounts 
of new data tend to emerge in the wake of major disruptive events, but especially 
ones that are managed poorly. For instance, the amount of information concerning 
FEMA’s preparedness activities before and after the likes of Andrew and Katrina 
dwarfs that concerning ‘quieter’ periods in the agency’s history. This has certain 
implications if we are interested in drawing valid conclusions concerning the 
impact of institutional change on organizational behaviour.
Between 2005 and 2008 I conducted several trips to the United States that 
were funded by the Swedish Emergency Management Agency (SEMA) in order 
to study the government responses to Katrina and Gustav. All told, nearly 40 
interviews (one-on-one or in a group setting) were carried out with mid- and 
senior-level officials at FEMA, the US Department of Transportation (DoT), the 
US Coast Guard (USCG), state and local government, as well as key non-gov-
ernmental and private sector organizations such as the Red Cross and private 
ambulance providers in Louisiana, Texas and Washington, D.C. These interviews 
have been useful in contextualizing the circumstances immediately leading up to 
and surrounding the management of Hurricanes Katrina and Gustav. That being 
said, the information collected tends to concern the management of Katrina and 
Gustav and thus falls beyond the scope of the case at hand. Repeated attempts 
were made at the time to contact many of the key players in the White House, 
Congress, at FEMA, and within the DHS leadership that figure prominently 
in this study. Unfortunately, they were either unavailable or not willing to be 
28 George and Bennett, 2005: 95, 97-98.
29 George and Bennett, 2005: 99-100.
65
Chapter 3: Research design and method
interviewed for the project underway at the time. This was perhaps to be expected. 
After all, Katrina in particular was a highly politicized event that was closely 
scrutinized at all levels of government. Even if these officials had been willing 
to participate, they are unlikely to have provided more detail than that which 
already exists in the public record.
3.3 Hypothesis confirmation or rejection
In this section, the conditions necessary to confirm the four research hypotheses 
depicted in section 2.6 are set out and discussed.
3.3.1 Hypothesis I
If the normative institutional assumption is correct, we would expect to see that 
the more deeply entrenched the norms, rules, routines and values that constrain and 
enable FEMA’s behaviour, the less likely the agency will be to alter its mission and 
the focus of its activities in the event that priorities change on the policy agenda. 
The first step in testing this hypothesis is to look for evidence of organizational 
norms and values that determine the organization’s purpose (‘why we are here’) 
and what practices and behaviour are appropriate within the organization (‘how 
things are done around here’). In order to see why actors formally exist, we need 
to look to documents like letters of authorization issued by legislative bodies 
and/or the executive and organizational mission statements. However, normative 
institutionalism tells us that organizations and their members may perceive of 
themselves as having an entirely different purpose and/or are prone to behave in 
ways that are not necessarily reflected in official documents. As such, the task of 
determining how things are actually done requires that we examine the formal 
plans, SOPs and guidelines that formally guide organizational behaviour, and 
then consider whether or not they are reflected in the actor’s observed behaviour. 
Where they do not correspond, it is necessary to identify those institutional forces 
that compel actors to behave the way that they do.
This study relies heavily on the available historical record to provide evidence 
to suggest the nature and strength of the institutional forces that may or may 
not compel actors to behave in ways that differ from the expectations of policy-
makers. We might expect to see a particularly entrenched logic of appropriateness 
in organizations that have existed for a long time, have clear mandates, enjoy 
stable leadership, and have low rates of personnel turnover. Different institutional 
forces will conceivably be less deeply rooted where the organization’s mission is 
perceived as being poorly articulated, its existence is in question, or where rates of 
personnel turnover are high (thereby making it difficult to establish and maintain 
common understandings as to what appropriate behaviour is).
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The normative institutional assumption is that the stronger the logic of appro-
priateness within the organization, the more convinced its employees will be 
that what they are doing and how they are doing it (the methods they employ in 
accomplishing their work) are correct and defensible. Proving or disproving this 
hypothesis requires looking for evidence to suggest how this and other related 
institutional forces influence the organization’s behaviour, specifically in times 
of major institutional change. Instances like these tend to pose challenges to the 
institution’s conceptualization of itself, its own worth, and its purpose. Here, 
organizations have ‘the option either of reinforcing commitment to […] old 
values or finding some way of making effective changes’ that bring their behav-
iour in line with other actors that they share interdependencies with.30 Again, 
we might assume that organizations with particularly strong and deeply rooted 
institutional norms, rules, routines and values will be resistant to the pressures to 
change that emerge as shifts occur in the institutional environment. The stronger 
the organization’s logic of appropriateness is, the more likely it will be to seek to 
stave off pressures to alter its behaviour. In this study, we will seek evidence to 
suggest efforts on the part of actors that can sometimes take very public forms, 
for instance where agency officials openly oppose proposed changes, or that 
sometimes take place behind closed doors. Of course, the study is also sensitive 
to the possibility that actors who are hostile to on-going changes may simply 
be slow to alter their behaviour accordingly, if at all. However, evidence of this 
kind is perhaps most likely to emerge in the wake of major disruptive events, 
which tend to reveal how organizations actually behave.
3.3.2 Hypothesis II
The historical institutionalists’ view is that organizations are set on certain tra-
jectories at the point of inception, which they then find it exceedingly difficult 
to deviate from.31 Institutional life is characterized by long periods of relative 
stability that are occasionally punctuated by events that have the potential to bring 
about sudden, sometimes dramatic institutional change that create conditions 
allowing organizations to overcome both ‘the inertia created at [institutional/
policy] inception’ and historically determined patterns of behaviour.32
In order to test Hypothesis II (the greater and more sudden the emergence of 
pressures for change in the institutional environment, the more likely FEMA will be 
to alter its priorities concerning what threats it prepares for), we will first need to 
identify different occasions that had the potential to punctuate the policy equilib-
rium as it pertained to FEMA.33 This will be accomplished using process tracing, 
30 Peters, 1998: 10.
31 Streeck and Thelen, 2005.
32 Peters, 1999: 72.
33 Streeck and Thelen, 2005.
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which allows us to see any evidence in the history of both FEMA and the wider 
emergency management/homeland security domain that events prompted major 
institutional change in the institutional environment unique to FEMA. Once these 
events have been identified, we can then begin to evaluate the extent to which 
each actually generated pressures on FEMA to alter its behaviour in one way or 
another. (As noted above, my argument is that the 9/11 attacks alone prompted 
major institutional change in the institutional environment unique to FEMA. 
This is an opportunity to test this claim.) Evidence of this kind may take any 
number of forms. For example, we might expect to see that certain events led to 
a sudden increase in the number of players engaged in a given policy debate over 
a relatively short period of time. Presumably, the greater the number of players 
involved in the contests that tend to arise over priorities before, during and par-
ticularly after the onset of certain major disruptive events, the more organizations 
are likely to feel compelled to alter their behaviour as a result. (At the very least, 
we should see evidence to suggest an enhanced readiness on the part of actors to 
alter their behaviour once the policy fight is over and a new policy is articulated 
and handed down.34)
Assuming my assumption is borne out by the case, we will be able to observe 
to what extent, if at all, FEMA’s behaviour changed as a result of shifts in insti-
tutional conditions that occurred after the 9/11 attacks. Even where my claim is 
not supported by the data, we should nevertheless be able to draw certain con-
clusions concerning how other more significant events subsequently influenced 
FEMA’s behaviour as a result.
3.3.3 Hypothesis IIIa
Rational choice institutionalism would have us believe that individuals are rational 
actors with their own unique set of interests who attempt to maximize their util-
ity from within the institutions that they join voluntarily.35 Here, individuals’ 
decision-making takes place on the basis of the logic of consequentiality (‘how 
likely am I to be rewarded or punished for my behaviour?’) and not on the basis 
of what is most appropriate in the institutional context. The assumption based 
on this stream of thinking is that the more individual leaders at FEMA work to 
ensure that the agency is prepared to manage threats that are prioritized on the policy 
agenda (by acting as (or at least being perceived to be) ‘good agents’), the more likely 
they will be to achieve their own interests. In other words, the FEMA leadership 
could be expected to align the agency’s focus with those issues that dominated 
the policy agenda as long as doing so was likely to move them closer to achieving 
their own personal interests.
34 Hall and Taylor, 1996: 9.
35 Ostrom, 1986; Ostrom, 1990.
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In order to test this hypothesis, we will first need to identify those interests that 
motivated the various individuals belonging to the FEMA leadership during the 
period under study. The discussion in Chapter 2 suggests that interests can be 
motivated by any number of things, including professional standards, the desire 
to be a team player, the pursuit of career advancement, status, financial gain, 
or some combination thereof. However, it is possible that it may be difficult to 
determine which specific interests are actually at play in motivating different 
individuals’ behaviour. Indeed, in the absence of empirical data that clearly and 
irrefutably states their interests, we are reliant on individuals themselves to reveal 
what motivates them. The odds of this happening are low. That being said, we 
are reminded of the claim made by Milner, that a given actor’s ‘preferences […] 
derive from their interests’. As such, we may be able to extrapolate individual 
interests from their policy preferences. By the same token, however, Milner 
warns that individuals’ ‘policy preferences will vary according to their political 
situation, for example, their party affiliation, constituency characteristics, and so 
on’.36 Though process tracing is certainly useful in reconstructing the context and 
political situation in which actors find themselves operating, we may nevertheless 
be confronted with certain instances where it is impossible to confidently claim 
to have identified which specific interests motivate the behaviour of individuals.
Assuming that it is in fact possible to identify the interests underlying indi-
viduals’ behaviour, the next step in proving or disproving Hypothesis IIIa entails 
observing how individuals behave in leadership positions at FEMA, particularly 
during periods of major institutional change. Regardless of what is seen to 
motivate their behaviour and no matter how receptive they are to the policy 
determinations made by elites, rational choice institutionalism predicts that 
leaders will seek to avoid being sanctioned for their behaviour. It follows then 
that even where they are opposed to the institutional change that is underway, 
they will be compelled to align (or at least be seen to align) the organizations 
under them and their activities with the revised priorities on the policy agenda. 
That being said, the methodology is arguably also equipped to capture instances 
where leaders are torn between intra-organizational pressures to competently 
represent and defend the interests of the organizations that they lead and their 
own inclination to behave in ways that advance their own individual interests, 
whatever they may be.
3.3.4 Hypothesis IIIb
The final hypothesis in this study is closely related to and shares the same the-
oretical underpinnings as Hypothesis IIIa. Here, we are concerned with what 
role, if any, the professional profile of individual leaders plays in shaping their 
36 Milner, 1997: 15.
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interests, but also whether an individual’s professional profile can be used as 
a predictor of how they are likely to respond to major change in the institutional 
environment. Generally speaking, the suggestion here is that individuals with 
a political or administrative background will be more likely to act in accordance 
with change in the institutional environment than their counterparts with a 
technical background.
While a total of seven individuals were confirmed by Congress to head 
FEMA between 1979 and 2005, the behaviour of only three of them will be 
used to test this hypothesis. These include Louis P. Giuffrida, James Lee Witt 
and Michael Brown. This decision has been made for two reasons. First of all, 
these three men headed the agency during particularly transformative periods 
in the agency’s history (the years following the creation of the agency and the 
resurgence of civil defence, in the aftermath of Andrew and the rise of terrorism 
on the policy agenda, and during the process by which FEMA joined DHS). 
Seeing how these individuals behaved during these turbulent periods in FEMA’s 
history is likely to yield findings that should be particularly helpful in proving 
or disproving the hypothesis at hand. Second, significant amounts of empirical 
data on certain former FEMA directors (Macy, Becton, Stickney and Allbaugh) 
appear to be missing, leaving with me little or no basis upon which to assign 
them a professional profile.
The first step in testing this hypothesis is to assign the three former FEMA 
directors a professional profile. My assumption is that university education, 
professional training and previous professional experience will be helpful indi-
cators to this end. That being said, it may not always be obvious which profile 
an individual should be assigned, but especially where he possesses a combina-
tion of technical and political-administrative attributes (say, an elected official 
with a degree in engineering). Once the task of assigning each FEMA director 
a professional profile has been completed, they will then be observed as they 
respond to and deal with change in the institutional environment. Presumably, 
political-administrative-type leaders will be more aware of and responsive to such 
shifts than their technical-type peers. One relatively simple way of measuring 
attentiveness to such shifts is to observe how quickly government agencies shift 
focus and how engaged leaders are with members of the policy elite in the process, 
and also how satisfied policymakers are with their performance.
3.4 Limitations
This study’s narrow focus on a small number of actors at the federal level presents 
certain potential blind spots that should be addressed. First of all, the discussion 
in Chapter 2 shows that federal systems tend to create deep interdependencies 
between different actors with unique roles and competencies operating at 
different levels of government. This is certainly true in the field of emergency 
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management/homeland security, which has in fact become all the more com-
plex in recent decades as more and more non-governmental and private sector 
actors take on formalized roles in responding to disruptive events. This arguably 
reflects a philosophical shift within the field away from a preference for tightly 
controlled government-led responses toward more collaborative responses that 
incorporate resources and capabilities on a community-wide basis.37 In other 
words, the number of stakeholders with a voice in the field of emergency manage-
ment/homeland security has increased at the same time that the predominant 
role of government in setting the agenda and dictating relevant policy has been 
undermined. With some rare exceptions, this study does not take into account 
the contacts that FEMA had with these actors, nor how, if at all, these contacts 
influenced FEMA’s hurricane preparedness over the years.
Furthermore, the argument in this study is that the FEMA leadership is 
guided by and represents the common set of norms, rules, routines and values 
that exist throughout the agency that they lead. That being said, the literature 
suggests that different organizational cultures are likely to exist within one and 
the same bureaucracy.38 Assuming this was the case at FEMA, the FEMA lead-
ership would presumably have been forced to choose actively or not which set of 
norms, rules, routines and values that existed within the different sub-cultures or 
factions within the agency they were to be guided by. As it is, though, this study 
goes only so far in capturing the FEMA leadership’s relations with the different 
departments and component programmes that made up the agency.
3.5 Generalizability
Achieving external validity, or the ability to generalize results to other cases, 
requires that we stipulate which class or classes of typologically similar cases 
we expect the study to be applicable to.39 This case is narrowly focused on a 
relatively small number of actors within the Federal Government in the United 
States charged with responding to a specific form of complex foreseeable problem, 
namely hurricanes. While recognizing that ‘cases that appear to be typologically 
similar may differ in an as-yet unspecified causal variable that leads to different 
outcomes’, I posit that the study’s findings should apply to cases involving the 
management of foreseeable complex problems by constellations of actors oper-
ating in complex institutional environments, particularly government agencies 
operating in a federal context.40 Such problems might include major winter 
storms, spring flood events, seasonal power outages, major public health events, 
37 DHS, 2011; Kettl, 2006: 375.
38 Christensen and Røvik, 1999.
39 George and Bennett, 2005: 115-116, 117, 102. See also Elman and Elman, 2002: 240.
40 George and Bennett, 2005: 77, 120. See also Deverell, 2010; Flyvbjerg, 2006; Skocpol, 1979; 
and Yin, 2003.
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and even foreseeable financial disturbances. The study should also yield find-
ings concerning the challenges individuals and organizations everywhere tend 
to encounter in balancing the imperative to prepare for rare but serious threats 
with acute pressures to respond to more immediate and persistent problems.
Finally, the close attention that this study pays to FEMA should allow us 
to draw conclusions concerning the effects that reforms of different kinds have 
on government bureaucracies, especially in instances where they are relocated 
and/or where their status/mission set is subject to renegotiation.41 Obviously, a 
slightly smaller set of findings unique to this study should be applicable to other 
emergency preparedness and management agencies (EPMAs) operating in federal 
and non-federal systems of government alike.
3.6 Conclusion
Having presented the methodology used in this study and the different processes 
by which I will seek to confirm or reject the different hypotheses that guide study 
in the coming chapters, I now turn to the case at hand, namely FEMA’s hurricane 
preparedness from 1979 to August 2005, just days before Katrina made landfall.
41 Government Accountability Office, 2003.
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Chapter 4: Hurricane preparedness at FEMA 
from 1979 to 2005
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA’s) work 
in the field of emergency preparedness with a particular emphasis on hurricanes 
is described using process tracing. A brief overview of the Federal Government’s 
involvement in emergency management generally and hurricane preparedness 
specifically prior to 1979 is provided in section 4.2. The purpose of this discussion 
is to contextualize and provide general background information on the bureau-
cratic environment that FEMA was expected to operate in and the legacy that it 
inherited when it was created in 1979.1 The subsequent sections are intended 
to describe how policymakers and the federal bureaucracy behaved in response 
to various disruptive events in the country’s history, including Hurricane Andrew 
and the 9/11 attacks. The decision to divide the narrative at these two junctures 
in particular was made in order to strengthen the claim repeated throughout 
this study that the 9/11 attacks and not Hurricane Andrew or some other event 
constituted the single most dramatic change to FEMA’s institutional environ-
ment between the point of FEMA’s creation in 1979 and August 2005, when 
Katrina made landfall.
While it is important to emphasize that this is not a study of FEMA’s pre-
paredness for a hurricane strike on New Orleans specifically, the empirical data 
presented in section 4.6 provides indications as to how major institutional change 
in the post-9/11 period affected FEMA’s own hurricane preparedness as well as 
its work in supporting state and local partners in what was arguably one of the 
most at-risk regions of the country.
1 Stern, 1999: 33-59.
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4.2 Preparedness for hurricanes prior to 1979
Responsibility for emergency management and emergency preparedness in the 
United States in the years following independence was exclusively a local matter.2 
The first documented instance of piecemeal federal assistance to a state or local 
authority came in 1803, when Congress allocated financial assistance to the town 
of Portsmouth, Massachusetts in the wake of a major fire. This decision, which 
many members of Congress worried was an unconstitutional intervention into 
state and local affairs, would go on to provide the legal precedent for over 100 
subsequent instances of federal assistance between 1803 and the late 1940s.3 
According to Keith Bea, this ad hoc way of managing disasters, sometimes with 
federal assistance but more typically without, would over the course of the 
coming decades ‘[evolve] into an established policy area that reflected a greater 
awareness of the complex responsibilities of federal and nonfederal entities before 
and after catastrophes’.4 The Great Mississippi Flood of 1927 and the Dust 
Bowl drought in particular were instrumental in demonstrating the need for 
the federal government to interject itself in instances where ‘disasters and their 
effects [did] not respect state boundaries’.5 However, this would be difficult to 
accomplish so long as no federal disaster programs existed.6
In 1950, Congress sought to address the lack of federal structures through the 
Disaster Relief Act, which, among other things, pre-authorized the president to 
distribute federal disaster aid, established consistent standards for use in making 
such determinations, and encouraged state and local partners to develop their 
own emergency management plans.7 The new law promised that state and local 
authorities, alongside disaster victims:
[would] no longer [have] to wait until Congress met, debated, and acted upon 
a reported need. Rather, Congress authorized providing assistance in advance, so 
that just one person – not hundreds of lawmakers – could decided that a disaster 
warranted the distribution of funds.8
According to Schneider, the ‘framework for governmental disaster assistance that 
[the Act established] has essentially remained in place’ ever since.9
Following the detonation of the first Soviet atomic bomb in 1949 and the 
subsequent outbreak of hostilities on the Korean peninsula the following year, 
2 Schneider, 2005: 19.
3 Barry, 1998: 369-370; Cooper and Block, 2006: 47; May, 1985; McQuaid and Schleifstein, 
2006: 50; Morris, 2006: 287; Schneider, 2005: 19; Schroeder, et al., 2001: 361-362. See also 
Butler, 2007a: 13; Moss, 1999: 312; and Rubin, 2007: 6.
4 Bea, 2007: 81.
5 Butler, 2007b: 49.
6 Kreps, D., 1990: 281. See also FEMA, 2005.
7 Bea, 2007: 83-84; FEMA, 2005; Morris, 2006: 287, 289; Schroeder, et al., 2001: 361.
8 Bea, 2007: 83-84.
9 Schneider, 2005: 20.
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the threat of communism and nuclear war with the Soviet Union were coming 
to dominate the national political agenda in the United States.10 As the nuclear 
threat grew, many states, not least California and New York, began putting in 
place or ramping up pre-existing World War II-era civil defence programmes 
intended to protect the general public from harm, either though evacuation, by 
sheltering in place, or some combination thereof. Following calls by the states 
for the Federal Government to better support their efforts, Congress passed the 
Civil Defense Act (CDA) of 1950. Among other things, the Act called for the 
creation of a Federal Civil Defense Administration (FCDA), the construction 
of shelter facilities around the country, and the procurement of material that 
could be provided to the states to support their own civil defence activities. The 
FCDA would be authorized to ‘prepare civil defense plans and programs for the 
nation, coordinate federal activities with states and border countries, encourage 
states to develop interstate mutual aid compacts, and provide grants to states 
for civil defense activities’.11
Initially at least, civil defence and emergency management would be adminis-
tered by different agencies at the federal level, but by 1953, the FCDA was given 
authority for both tasks. Meanwhile, President Truman for the first time delegated 
various so-called emergency functions to different federal departments. Going 
forward, the FCDA (later known as the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization 
(OCDM) after being merged with the Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM) in 
1958) would be responsible for coordinating the efforts of other federal depart-
ments and agencies both in orchestrating civil defence activities and in providing 
disaster relief.12 Which mission dominated the new agency then? The record is 
somewhat muddled in this regard. On the one hand, Schneider and Schroeder, 
et al. both paint a picture to suggest that as civil defence came into vogue, other 
threats, including natural disasters, faded as national priorities.13 On the other 
hand, the historian Harry B. Yoshpe suggests that ‘the federal government [was 
criticized] for its seeming evasion of responsibility for civil defense [during 
the 1950s]’, so much so in fact that Congress would be compelled to pass an 
amendment to the CDA clarifying the Federal Government’s role.14 What is 
clear is that the Federal Government was spending much more on civil defense 
than it was on emergency management during the 1950s and into the first half 
of the 1960s. For instance, Bea points out that ‘from 1950 to 1964, the federal 
government issued 174 disaster declarations, resulting in total expenditures of 
almost $275 million […]. By comparison, Congress had appropriated more 
than $450 million for civil defense planning from FY 1951 through 1958’.15
10 Bea, 2007: 82; Schlosser, 2013: 176.
11 Bea, 2007: 82.
12 Bea, 2007: 84-85.
13 Schneider, 1995: 20-21; Schroeder, et al., 2001: 361.
14 Yoshpe, 1981: 27. See also Bea, 2007: 85.
15 Bea, 2007: 87.
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Upon taking office in 1961, President John F. Kennedy ordered that responsibility 
for the federal civil defence mission be moved from the OCDM to the Office of 
Civil Defense (OCD) within the Department of Defense (DoD). A year later, 
in 1962, the OCDM would be shuttered and the Office of Emergency Planning 
(OEP) in the Executive Office stood up in its stead.16 In subsequent years, the 
new office was confronted the 1964 Alaska earthquake and then Hurricane Betsy 
(1965). According to Bea, these events ‘gave further evidence of a recognition 
by Congress that the policy framework for disaster relief that had been built in 
1950 [with the first Disaster Relief Act] could be expanded to accommodate 
more complex emergencies’.17 In response, Congress passed the Disaster Relief 
Act of 1966. Besides broadening the scope of eligibility for various federal relief 
programmes, the Act ‘[linked] civil defense warning systems with threats from 
natural disasters (a forerunner of the ‘dual-use’ or ‘all-hazards’ concepts developed 
later) and [authorized] the president to coordinate federal assistance efforts’.18 
Two years later, the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 was passed, creating 
the hugely popular National Flood Insurance Program.19
The major disasters that struck across the United States during the mid- to late 
1960s certainly did their part to elevate emergency management on the policy 
agenda. Meanwhile, civil defence was relegated to ‘the back burner’, but especially 
once public opinion concerning US nuclear strategy and the nation’s involvement 
in Vietnam began to sour.20 Civil defence was seen by many Americans as part of 
a wider, offensive nuclear strategy that they worried was likely to make it all the 
easier for the United States to be drawn into an all-out nuclear war.21 In some 
respects, these public sentiments dovetailed with the aims of US foreign policy 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Whereas once 
the United States sought confrontation with the Soviet Union, it now sought to 
build trust between the two superpowers. Continuing to build up the nation’s civil 
defence infrastructure in such an environment might send the wrong message.22 
In this climate, it was impossible to attract additional funding for civil defence 
despite concerns that the programme was growing increasingly ineffectual in the 
face of an actual nuclear attack.23
In 1969 Congress passed legislation that further refined Disaster Relief Act. 
However, this legislation was slated to ‘sunset’ the following year. In a letter to 
members of Congress, President Nixon made it clear that he intended to put 
16 Bea, 2007: 84-85.
17 Bea, 2007: 90.
18 Bea, 2007: 92.
19 Bea, 2007: 92.
20 Bea, 2007: 88.
21 Green, 2014.
22 Green, 2014.
23 Bea, 2007: 88.
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forth new legislation that, as he put it, would make the nation’s ‘federal disaster 
assistance program more effective and efficient’.24 The Disaster Relief Act of 
1970 that came as a result of the White House’s efforts is noteworthy for several 
reasons. Besides further expanding federal authority in responding to disasters, 
the Act for the first time emphasized the Federal Government’s role in mitigation 
and preparedness.25
As noted above, the Disaster Relief Act of 1966 first opened the door for 
the nation’s considerable civil defense capabilities to also be used in managing 
disasters.26 Eight years later, the National Security Council directed the OEP 
and numerous federal departments to implement ‘dual-use plans, procedures and 
preparedness within the limitations of existing authority, including appropriate 
related improvements in crisis management planning’.27 At DoD, for instance, 
‘The dual-use policy led to new responsibilities […], such as funding emergency 
preparedness grants submitted by state and local governments, administering 
emergency warning and communications systems, and building an intergovern-
mental network to reduce catastrophic losses’.28
The mid-1970s brought several dramatic changes to the nation’s emergency 
management system. In 1973, Nixon shut down the OEP, transferring its 
various authorities to other federal departments (the Federal Disaster Assistance 
Administration (FDAA) within the Department of Housing and Human Services 
(HUD), the General Services Administration (GSA), the Department of the 
Treasury, etc.).29 According to Bea, ‘This restructuring shifted the responsibility 
for disaster assistance from the White House to agencies outside the Executive 
Office’.30 The same year, the Nixon administration embarked on a programme 
aimed at devolving certain disaster relief responsibilities to the states and local 
government. However, members of Congress opposed this proposal. In the 
Disaster Relief Act of 1974 that was passed the following year, the Congress 
actually broadened the Federal Government’s role even further (although it did 
seek to placate the Nixon administration in requiring that recipients of federal 
relief create and maintain mitigation strategies). Crucially, the 1974 Act for 
the first time articulated the presidential disaster declaration process and gave 
the president the authority to establish a nationwide preparedness programme, 
while allocating funding to support state and local authorities in developing 
emergency plans.31
24 Bea, 2007: 93.
25 Bea, 2007: 94-95.
26 Senate Special Committee on National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers, 1976.
27 Green, 2014; National Security Council, 1972.
28 Bea, 2007: 101.
29 Morris, 2006: 287.
30 Bea, 2007: 95.
31 Adamski, et al., 2006: 6; Bea, 2007: 99-101; Sylves, 2007: 144.
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As much as civil defence might have languished on the proverbial back burner 
during the 1970s, all accounts are that DoD had been successful in creating a 
well-oiled national organization with clear roles and responsibilities.32 The same 
could not be said where disaster management was concerned. For instance, a 
report issued by the National Governors’ Association in 1978 argued that there 
were too many federal emergency management agencies and programmes, they 
were incapable of effectively coordinating with one another, and they were overly 
focused on the recovery phase.33 A succession of reports commissioned by the 
Carter administration and Congress came to much the same set of conclu-
sions.34 As a result, the Carter Administration drafted what came to be known 
as Reorganization No. 3, which would consolidate the Federal Government’s 
emergency management programmes into a single independent executive agency 
accountable to both the president and members of Congress. The following 
year, President Carter issued a set of executive orders that served to consolidate 
all existing federal emergency preparedness, management, recovery and mitiga-
tion programmes, as well as many civil defence programmes, into the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).35 (It is worth noting that according 
to Cumming, President Carter himself had at least some reservations that the 
creation of FEMA would create a form of moral hazard whereby the existence of 
a ‘one-stop shopping system for disaster relief and other assistance [FEMA] […] 
might easily result in even more pressure for financial assistance to the states, 
and in particular those who were the least prepared for disasters of all types’.36)
Rather than confront various political interests in Congress, Schroder, 
Wamsley, and Ward suggest that the Carter White House opted to simply trans-
fer the various programmes and their authorizing statutes into FEMA without 
asking members of Congress to change the law or to reauthorize the agencies and 
programmes slated to be reorganized. As a result, FEMA ‘came into existence 
fragmented, with hermetically sealed program compartments each overseen by 
a political appointee with his or her own links to […] congressional committees 
and the interest groups concerned with the specific program’.37 The circumstances 
surrounding the creation of FEMA left the agency ridden with different sets of 
interests that hampered efforts to formulate a common agency mission, let alone 
achieve effective intra-agency cooperation and coordination. Over the longer term, 
this fragmented oversight arrangement allowed several distinct threat cultures 
32 Cooper and Block, 2006: 48; Green, 2014.
33 Adamski, et al., 2006: 6; Bea, 2007: 102; Popkin, 1990; Schroeder, et al., 2001: 369-370.
34 Bea, 2007: 103.
35 Cooper and Block, 2006: 49; Cumming, 2010a; Green, 2014; Morris, 2006: 285.
36 Cumming, 2010a.
37 Schroeder, et al., 2001: 369-370. See also Cumming and Sylves, 2005: 29.
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(‘a disaster culture, a flood insurance culture, a HAZMATS culture, including 
civil defence, and a national security culture’) to emerge at the agency.38
As the discussion above suggests, developments in the field of emergency 
management since the founding of the United States have been toward more 
standardization and shared responsibility between and among the different levels 
of government. At the same time, though, it is clear that the policy agenda has 
seen certain threats wane in relevance as others emerge and take their place.
4.3 From the Carter Administration to Hurricane Andrew
John Macy, a civil servant who had previously served as head of the US Civil 
Service Commission and the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and who had 
experience working in the Nixon White House, was chosen by President Carter 
to head FEMA in its first years. In many ways, Macy was a logical choice, given 
his long experience of government reorganizations.39
The passage of the Civil Defense Act in 1980 for the first time formally broad-
ened ‘the definition of civil defence to include peacetime disaster response’. With 
the passage of the Act, funds and resources that had previously been reserved 
exclusively for civil defence were now available for use in managing peacetime 
emergencies as well. As Macy saw it, the emergence of an increasingly common 
pool of federal resources for use in dealing with all types of emergencies neces-
sitated the development of an all-hazards approach to emergency management 
and a common national response framework at the strategic level, what later 
came to be known as the Integrated Emergency Management System (IEMS).40 
(The National Interagency Incident Management System (NIIMS), later short-
ened to NIMS (National Incident Management System), first adopted by the 
National Wildfire Coordinating Group in 1982, is IEMS’ tactical counterpart. 
Over the decades to come, stakeholders at every level of government would 
adopt NIMS.41) The fact that the agency was being compelled to broaden its 
focus to include threats other than nuclear attack appears to have prompted the 
FEMA leadership to take steps to demonstrate what this meant for the nation’s 
civil defence capability. One outside report commissioned by FEMA itself found 
in 1981 that FEMA’s civil defence programmes were being ‘neglected’ by the 
president and members of Congress.42 Even early on, the new agency was clearly 
resisting institutional pressures to shift focus away from civil defence.
38 Cumming and Sylves, 2005: 23.
39 Cumming and Sylves, 2005: 29; Haddow and Bullock, 2003.
40 Green, 2014.
41 Harrald, 2007: 162.
42 Yoshpe, 1981.
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During Macy’s 17-month stint as FEMA director, the agency received high 
marks in managing a number of major disruptive events, including Hurricane 
Fredric, the Three Mile Island nuclear accident, the tail end of the Love Canal 
environmental disaster, and the eruption of Mount St. Helens.43 Meanwhile, 
Americans were preparing to go to the polls. The incumbent, President Carter, 
who had been pushing for détente with the Soviets and a reduction in the size of 
both countries’ nuclear arsenals, was to be roundly defeated by his Republican 
opponent, Ronald Reagan. According to Eric Schlosser, Reagan’s ‘optimism had 
tremendous appeal to a nation that seemed in decline’ and felt itself to be weak 
in relation to the Soviets, who seemed to be extending their reach and influence 
around the globe. Part of the Reagan Administration’s decidedly more hawkish 
strategy in the coming years would be to outspend the Soviet Union militarily 
in the hope of bringing about the collapse of the entire Soviet system.44 If the 
nation’s nuclear arsenal was to be expanded, the Reagan Administration needed 
to ensure that its citizens would be safe in the event of a nuclear attack. After 
nearly a decade of dwindling interest in civil defence, it was suddenly in vogue 
again.45 This shift in priorities had immediate implications for FEMA, which 
was responsible for a number of national preparedness programmes, including 
civil defence and continuity of government operations (CoG).46
The incoming Reagan Administration replaced Carter’s FEMA pick, John 
Macy, with Louis O. Giuffrida, a former military officer who was close per-
sonal friends with Reagan’s attorney general, Edwin Meese.47 The Reagan 
Administration’s reemphasis on civil defence created a ‘two-headed’ organization 
at FEMA, where spending on various highly classified ‘black budget’ programmes 
within the agency’s National Preparedness Directorate far exceeded that on 
natural disaster preparedness and response by the much smaller State and Local 
Preparedness and Support Directorate.48 One employee at the agency during this 
period suggests that a clash of cultures emerged between ‘the national security 
folks’ and the ‘weenies’ working with emergency management.49 At the same 
time, FEMA under Giuffrida was quickly acquiring a reputation as a ‘dumping 
ground’ for individuals that the White House or the FEMA director himself 
owed favours to. In order to free up positions for these individuals, Giuffrida’s 
staff either fired civil servants outright, or, where this was not possible, forced 
them into ‘dead-end and unpalatable jobs that would lead them to resign’.50
43 Cooper and Block, 2006: 50-51.
44 Schlosser, 2013: 433, 441.
45 Cooper and Block, 2006: 51; Perrow, 2005; Schroeder, et al., 2001: 374-377.
46 Cooper and Block, 2006: 53-54; Schroeder, et al., 2001: 373.
47 Cumming, 2010d.
48 Gup, 1994.
49 Cooper and Block, 2006: 55.
50 Schroeder, et al., 2001: 372-376; McQuaid and Schleifstein, 2006: 110-111.
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Like Macy before him, Giuffrida grudgingly made regular appearances before the 
various congressional committees and subcommittees with oversight authority 
over FEMA’s many component programmes. According to Cumming and Sylves, 
‘FEMA leaderships were often highly defensive in their dealings with Congress’, 
given the fact that members of Congress tended to use these opportunities to 
demand that FEMA ‘take on new programs, functions, or activities’ that risked 
running counter to the president’s own agenda.51 Such was certainly the case 
during Giuffrida’s visits to Capitol Hill, during which congressional Democrats 
called on FEMA to redirect its attention away from civil defence to other, more 
likely threats.52
In 1985, allegations emerged that federal disaster assistance administered 
by FEMA had been used to reward the Reagan Administration’s political allies 
at the state level.53 Then Representative Al Gore, a Democrat from Tennessee 
on the House Science and Technology Committee began pushing for congres-
sional hearings. Meanwhile, the Department of Justice (DoJ) launched a formal 
investigation into Giuffrida and many of his top aides.54 Ultimately, a number 
of FEMA officials including Giuffrida were compelled to leave the agency. Gore 
later stated that Giuffrida’s ‘resignation [marked] the end of a disastrous era for 
FEMA and [brought] hope for more competent stewardship’ in future.55 While 
Giuffrida was credited with some successes (in consolidating the various FEMA 
programme offices into a single headquarters building in Washington and imple-
menting IEMS across the country, for instance), the scandals that defined the 
agency during the early to mid-1980s would haunt FEMA for years to come.56
Just as Giuffrida was leaving office, FEMA was in the process of launching a 
National Hurricane Program (NHP). The NHP, which would exist for decades 
to come, was headed up by FEMA in cooperation with numerous other federal 
agencies, including the National Weather Service (NWS), the Department of 
Transportation (DoT), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), to name a few. The purpose of 
the programme was primarily to generate research on the hurricane phenomenon 
and to support hurricane preparedness activities at the state and local levels.57
Julius W. Becton, Jr., a former Army lieutenant general who had previously 
served in a senior leadership position at the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID), replaced Giuffrida.58 Like Giuffrida before him, Becton 
51 Cumming and Sylves, 2005: 29. See also Schroeder, et al., 2001: 374; and Green, 2014.
52 Schroeder, et al., 2001: 374; Green, 2014.
53 Schroeder, et al., 2001: 375.
54 Adamski, et al., 2006: 7; Schroeder, et al., 2001: 375-377.
55 McQuaid and Schleifstein, 2006: 111.
56 Cumming, 2010d; Schroeder, et al., 2001: 377.
57 Sylves, 2007: 144-145.
58 Cumming, 2010d; Schroeder, et al., 2001: 377.
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was primarily focused on FEMA’s national preparedness operations, even though 
the agency would only deal with non-nuclear events during his time at FEMA. 
Though Becton would be ‘credited with restoring integrity to the operations 
and appropriations of the agency’, Democratic policymakers continued to take 
issue with the discrepancy between what FEMA was preparing for and those 
threats that it was regularly confronted with.59 That FEMA continued to struggle 
in managing relatively minor natural disasters suggested to many members of 
Congress that the framework by which the Federal Government engaged with 
state and local authorities in responding to emergencies and disasters was in need 
of additional refinement. In 1988, Congress passed the Stafford Disaster Relief 
and Emergency Assistance Act, which replaced the Disaster Relief Act of 1974.60 
According to Tonya Adamski, Beth Kline and Tanya Tyrrell:
The Act […] made several changes in existing federal disaster policy. First, 
inconsistencies in past policies were clarified by redefining the definition of an 
emergency situation. Second, the responsibilities and obligations of public insti-
tutions during natural disasters were expanded. Third, a process to guide when 
and how emergency management agencies across the intergovernmental system 
would become involved in a crisis situation was established […], delineating 
how the response would move from the local level through the state up to the 
federal level […].61
Furthermore, the Act vested in the president the power to unilaterally declare 
federal emergencies and disasters so as to expedite the Federal Government’s 
ability to render aid to the states. Finally, the Act stipulated that FEMA develop 
a Federal Response Plan (FRP) that reflected the reforms that had been made. 
(It would take nearly four years to complete the first version of the plan, which 
was released in 1992.62) Simply put, these changes were intended to standardize 
the Federal Government’s interactions with state and local authorities during all 
phases of the emergency management cycle, and not just in the recovery phase 
(as had been the case in earlier decades).63
The following year, George H. W. Bush succeeded Ronald Reagan at the 
White House. In the months following Bush’s inauguration, FEMA responded 
to a succession of major disruptive events, including an earthquake in the San 
Francisco Bay area and Hurricane Hugo. The agency was roundly criticized for its 
response to Hugo in particular.64 A subsequent House investigation found that 
FEMA was a seriously flawed organization that, among other things, remained 
a repository for unqualified political appointees.65
59 Adamski, et al., 2006: 7. See also Haddow and Bullock, 2003.
60 Schneider, 2005: 22.
61 Adamski, et al., 2006: 7.
62 Harrald, 2007: 161-162.
63 FEMA, 2006d; Harrald, 2007: 162; Schneider, 2005: 22.
64 Franklin, 1995.
65 Schroeder, et al., 2001: 378.
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In 1990, Wallace Stickney, a former New Hampshire transport commissioner 
with little emergency management experience, replaced Becton. How Stickney 
ended up at FEMA is illustrative of FEMA’s continued susceptibility to polit-
ical whim. According to John McQuaid and Mark Schleifstein, John Sununu, 
President Bush’s chief of staff and the former governor of New Hampshire, had 
long been hostile to FEMA, which in earlier years had stymied efforts to build a 
nuclear power plant in his home state.66 To Sununu’s mind, Becton’s replacement 
needed to be friendly to the nuclear power industry. Stickney appears to have 
fit the bill, though he was reportedly uninterested in the agency he was being 
asked to lead. More than anything, Stickney viewed the appointment as an 
opportunity to put together what he at one time referred to as a ‘nice retirement 
package’.67 According to one long-time FEMA employee, Stickney would go on 
to demonstrate ‘a real aloofness’ as Director.68
Stickney joined FEMA just as the agency’s primary Cold War-era missions 
were once again being ‘undermined and eroded’, this time by the sudden and 
by many accounts largely unexpected fall of the Soviet Union. Seemingly over-
night, the threat of full-scale nuclear war and/or a Communist takeover of the 
government had disappeared. In Stickney’s own words, ‘The evil empire had 
crumbled, the Warsaw Pact nations were becoming independent […] It was a 
time of transition on the world scene’.69 The Trefry Report, an internal review 
on FEMA security practices, was released a mere year later. This report reflected 
the dramatic changes taking place on the world stage. Among other things, the 
report found that ‘the geopolitical tenor in the world has evolved from that of 
two superpowers with their client and satellite states to that of one superpower 
and a series of states involved in a search for stability and development’. In what 
President Bush himself would refer to as this new world order, there was a reduced 
need for the utmost secrecy at FEMA.70
However, a number of factors prevented the agency from swiftly declassifying 
its operations and shifting focus away from civil defence. First of all, FEMA’s 
national security activities involved close coordination with the Department 
of Defense and the Department of Energy, both of which required high levels 
of security from those that they partnered with. As long as this was the case, 
FEMA was prevented from lowering its own security levels in any meaningful 
ways.71 Even if FEMA’s relations with other key stakeholders had allowed for 
declassification, agency leaders were likely to have encountered considerable 
internal opposition to any such move from the agency’s National Preparedness 
66 McQuaid and Schleifstein, 2006: 112-113.
67 Cooper and Block, 2006: 57.
68 Bosner, 2005.
69 Gup, 1994.
70 FEMA, 1992b: 8.
71 FEMA, 1992b: 10.
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(NP) Directorate, which was deeply vested in maintaining the agency’s security 
culture. This and other factors led to serious ‘territorial divisions’ between the 
NP and the State and Local Preparedness and Support (SLPS) Directorates (the 
aforementioned emergency management ‘weenies’).72 Finally, the Trefry Report 
showed that many at FEMA believed that ‘a security clearance is important for 
a successful career’ within government.73
The Bush White House was reportedly aware of the situation facing FEMA, 
as well as persistent congressional criticism of the agency’s performance. One of 
the foremost critics of the agency during this period in time was Senator Barbara 
Mikulski, a ranking Democrat on the Senate Committee on Appropriations. 
Recognizing that any attempt to reform FEMA would bring his White House 
into conflict with any number of congressional committees with stakes in FEMA, 
President Bush preferred to defer dealing with the FEMA problem until after the 
1992 presidential election.74 However, the Bush Administration failed to anticipate 
Hurricane Andrew, which brought national attention onto FEMA and would 
go on to scuttle the president’s chances of winning re-election later in the year.
Andrew struck southern Florida in August 1992, leaving in its wake mil-
lions without electricity, over 200,000 residents homeless, and 61 dead. What 
federal officials in Washington failed to realize was that the storm had totally 
incapacitated state and local authorities.75 In an effort to retake command over 
the situation, President Bush effectively circumvented FEMA in creating a 
presidential task force headed by his Secretary of Transportation, Andrew Card, 
who visited Florida for the first time six days after landfall, just as the first federal 
troops were arriving in the state.76 Candidate Bill Clinton, then the Democratic 
governor of Arkansas, saw opportunity in the Bush Administration’s handling 
of Andrew, which had transformed Florida into a swing state going into the fall 
election season. Three months later, Clinton took Florida and the White House.77 
Clinton had learned one important lesson by watching Bush – ‘responding to 
disasters could be good politics’.78 Meanwhile, FEMA emerged from Hurricane 
Andrew a much lambasted and demoralized agency that the public had little 
confidence in. President-elect Clinton signalled that he had every intention of 
reforming the agency once in office.79
72 Cooper and Block, 2006: 55; FEMA, 1992a.
73 FEMA, 1992b: 9.
74 Schroeder, et al., 2001: 374-375, 378-381; ‘The Storm’, 2005.
75 McQuaid and Schleifstein, 2006: 113-115; Schneider, 2005: 87-101; Schroeder, et al., 2001: 
378.
76 Adamski, et al., 2006: 8; McQuaid and Schleifstein, 2006: 113-115; Schneider, 2005: 87-101; 
Schroeder, et al., 2001: 378.
77 McQuaid and Schleifstein, 2006: 113-115; Schneider, 2005: 87-101; Schroeder, et al., 2001: 
378.
78 McQuaid and Schleifstein, 2006; 119. See also Adams, 2005.
79 Cooper and Block, 2006: 58.
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4.4 From Hurricane Andrew to 9/11
The government’s botched handling of Hurricane Andrew breathed new life 
into Senator Barbara Mikulski’s earlier calls for a thorough study of the nation’s 
emergency management system. In the months after the storm, Mikulski slipped 
an addendum into the notes of an appropriation bill requiring that FEMA 
commission the National Academy of Public Administration (NAPA) to carry 
out just such a study. Using her clout as chair of the Senate Committee on 
Appropriations, she forced the Government Accounting Office (GAO) to carry 
out a similar study.80 According to one GAO official at the time, ‘[Mikulski was 
not] a member of Congress we were eager to upset. […] [She was] a very key 
player in Congress for us, and we were there to help her’.81
In early 1993, the NAPA report was released. The investigators did not mince 
words. In their view:
FEMA has been ill served by congressional and White House neglect, a frag-
mented statutory charter, irregular funding, and the uneven quality of its 
political executives appointed by past presidents. In short, the agency remains 
an institution not yet built.82
Among other things, the NAPA report recommended ‘a reduction of political 
appointees […], development of a competent, professional career staff and 
appointment of a career executive director’ and ‘access to, and support of, the 
President through the creation of a Domestic Crisis Monitoring Unit in the White 
House’.83 The GAO came to a similar set of conclusions. The Clinton transition 
team, while receptive to these findings, was keen to avoid being forced into action 
by Mikulski. It is for this reason that one of Clinton’s first moves as president was 
to nominate James Lee Witt, a business owner, former country judge, and former 
state emergency management director, as FEMA director.84 Witt’s nomination 
was intended to signal to members of Congress that the Clinton Administration 
was aware of and would work to resolve the problems plaguing FEMA. During 
his nomination hearing, Witt asked members of Congress for one year to reform 
the agency. If he failed, Witt promised to support legislation that would do away 
with FEMA.85 The Clinton Administration was well aware of the political stakes 
associated with fumbling the next Andrew. So as to avoid the same fate as George 
H. W. Bush before him, Witt was ‘specifically ordered [by the White House] to 
focus FEMA on natural disasters even though its portfolio as assigned by statute 
80 Schroeder, et al., 2001: 378-381.
81 Franklin, 1995.
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and Executive Order was broader’.86 Furthermore, Clinton saw to it that Witt 
always had a direct line of contact in to the White House. Later on, in 1996, 
Witt was even given ex officio status in the president’s Cabinet.87
Witt’s arrival at FEMA on April 7, 1993 heralded a number of reforms at 
the agency, most of which had been recommended by the GAO and NAPA, as 
well as the FEMA Inspector General. As Witt saw it, many of the changes that 
needed to be made hinged on employee morale, which could only be expected 
to improve once the agency did away with its reputation as a ‘dumping ground’ 
for political appointees.88 As such, Witt worked to secure assurances from the 
Clinton Administration that the FEMA director would have veto power over the 
White House Personnel Office’s hiring to FEMA posts. In so doing, Witt was 
able to ‘[return] the agency to a commitment to merit or career professionalism 
[…] similar to other agencies’.89 At the same time, Witt worked to emphasize 
the value of FEMA’s cadre of loyal career civil servants who felt that they had 
received little recognition during the Giuffrida and Becton years. In what has 
since become a central piece of FEMA lore, Witt reportedly stood at the front 
entrance to FEMA headquarters on his first day on the job and introduced himself 
personally to every employee that passed.90 According to Aaron Schroeder, Gary 
Wamsley and Robert Ward, symbolic gestures such as these served to ‘[wipe] 
away much of the bitterness and dissension’ that had plagued employees’ relations 
with the FEMA leadership in earlier years.91
In the years to come, many of FEMA’s programmes concerned with civil 
defence and CoG were either dissolved or converted for use in managing natural 
disasters. At the same time, senior administrators were encouraged to focus on 
natural disaster preparedness.92 Meanwhile, the agency’s emergency operations 
centre (EOC) was relocated from a reinforced underground bunker at FEMA’s 
Mt. Weather site in western Maryland (one of the sites where the nation’s lead-
ership was to be located to in the event of a nuclear attack) to its headquarters 
in Washington, D.C.93 The agency also adopted a new approach in dealing with 
its state counterparts.94 Under Witt, FEMA established Performance Partnership 
Agreements/Cooperative Agreements (PPA/CAs) with state offices of emer-
gency management. According to Sylves, ‘A PPA/CA is analogous to a contract 
between FEMA and state officials regarding the outcomes expected from funding 
86 Cumming, 2010c.
87 Cumming, 2010c; Sylves, 2007: 113.
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support’. With each PPA/CA, which was signed by both the state’s governor 
and the president, ‘FEMA and state officials hoped to achieve mutually agreed-
upon performance outcomes while building emergency management capacity’.95 
In addition, FEMA worked to give the states more discretion concerning how they 
spent federal funds and by further streamlining federal aid request procedures.96
It is perhaps unsurprising that given the one-year deadline that he had imposed 
on himself, Witt made sure that FEMA had competent media/congressional rela-
tions staff that could promote and defend the reforms that the FEMA leadership 
was pursuing. This was no small feat, given that the number of committees and 
subcommittees with formal oversight over the agency’s programmes numbered 
16 and 22, respectively. Unlike many of his predecessors, Witt demonstrated a 
keen appreciation for the importance of good working relations with members 
of Congress if his reforms were to be successful. Despite his and other FEMA 
officials’ efforts, however, the agency was unable to prevent Senator Mikulski 
from proposing a bill in August 1994 calling on FEMA to more clearly focus its 
activities on natural disasters and to develop a national emergency management 
plan. However, the bill was forgotten after the fall 1994 elections, which saw 
dramatic Democratic losses in both the House and the Senate.97
According to Sylves, ‘Each president’s declarations reveal something about that 
president as a person, as a public executive, and as a politician’.98 President Clinton 
redoubled his efforts to ensure that he would be re-elected in 1996 following the 
Democrat’s congressional losses. Part of the Clinton Administration’s re-election 
strategy reportedly entailed using FEMA as a means to shore up support in 
critical battleground states. According to Cooper and Block, ‘Communities hit 
by […] disaster [were known to use] federal cash to bankroll pet projects that 
had previously been shot down by Congress’. In other words, the president was 
in a unique position to inject federal funds into political backers’ home districts 
through the federal emergency/disaster declaration process. During his eight 
years in office, Bill Clinton would issue more emergency/disaster declarations 
than any president past or since.99 The majority of these were issued in election 
years.100 There is of course another, somewhat less cynical explanation for why 
the number of presidential emergency/disaster declarations increased during the 
1990s. As noted above, it may have been the case that FEMA’s PPA/CA initiative 
gave the states better tools with which to seek out federal disaster relief that they 
had earlier lacked.101
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The bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993, the Mississippi River floods 
of the same year, and the bombing of the Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma 
City in 1995 constituted opportunities to test the capabilities of the ‘new’ 
FEMA under Witt. While the agency received generally high marks in all three 
instances, FEMA’s own investigators and the GAO saw room for improvement 
in a number of areas, not least the agency’s ability to effectively coordinate with 
state and local authorities.102
While FEMA responded to over 500 different events during the 1990s, 
only two, the World Trade Center and Oklahoma City bombings, were acts of 
terrorism.103 Nevertheless, these and other events abroad, including gas attacks 
in the Tokyo subway (1995), the Khobar Towers bombing (1996), and attacks 
on two US embassies in Africa (1998), suggested to many observers a growing 
terrorist threat facing the nation.104 The situation was all the more worrisome 
given that security was growing increasingly lax at numerous chemical and nuclear 
weapons depots at various sites in the former Soviet Union. The likelihood that 
these materials would fall into the hands of terrorists appeared to be growing. 
There was at the time a growing consensus among policymakers in Washington 
that FEMA should be responsible for supporting state and local authorities 
in preparing for such an eventuality.105 This was later formalized in the 1996 
Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act (otherwise known as the 
Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment), part of a larger defence authorization 
bill passed the same year.106 Nevertheless, Witt would grow increasingly worried 
that this tasking risked distracting FEMA from what he considered to be the 
agency’s primary mission, namely natural disaster management. Senior FEMA 
officials reportedly advised Witt to reconsider his stance, given growing inertia in 
Washington toward the terrorism issue. They argued that if Witt was not willing 
to whole-heartedly embrace the task of training state and local authorities in 
managing the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), the agency risked 
becoming irrelevant. As it was, Witt eventually shifted his stance on the issue, 
but not before Congress reassigned the WMD preparedness tasking to DoD and 
relocated one of FEMA’s terrorism preparedness programmes to the DoJ. Soon 
after, planning began ahead of the first major national-level emergency man-
agement exercise of the new century, TOPOFF 2000, which would simulate a 
major terror attack.107 By this point, FEMA had revised the FRP to for the first 
time include a terrorism annex.108
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Following the passage of the 1996 Act, members of Congress and the White 
House entered into negotiations concerning the creation of the United States 
Commission on National Security/21st Century. What later came to be known as 
the Hart-Rudman Commission was tasked with carrying out a thorough review 
of the nation’s national security priorities going into the new century. In early 
2001, the commission released its findings. In light of the growing likelihood of 
a major terror attack on US soil, the commission recommended the creation of 
a National Homeland Security Agency (NHSA) able to effectively coordinate all 
necessary federal resources in the event of any major disruptive event, including 
a major terror attack. While the new agency proposed by the Commission’s 
members was intended to replace FEMA, it would ‘retain and strengthen FEMA’s 
10 existing regional offices as a core element of its organizational structure’.109
While President Clinton was reportedly receptive to the Commission’s find-
ings, he preferred to let his successor, George W. Bush, act on them as he saw 
fit. As it was, the NHSA proposal was a ‘non-starter’ for Bush, who had run for 
president on a platform of small government and less spending. He was not about 
to launch his presidency by expanding the size of the federal bureaucracy. While 
Bush fully intended to leave FEMA in place, he chose to replace James Lee Witt 
with Joe Allbaugh, Bush’s former campaign manager.110 Even though Allbaugh 
would have preferred a position within the White House, he would go on to 
loyally pursue the Bush Administration’s small government philosophy as FEMA 
director. For instance, Allbaugh explained in an interview soon after coming to 
FEMA that he ‘was concerned that federal disaster assistance had evolved into 
both an oversized entitlement program and a disincentive to effective state and 
local risk management’.111 As Allbaugh and others in the Bush Administration 
saw it, one way of ‘incentivizing’ the states to take more responsibility for their 
own preparedness was to make disaster recovery more costly. Initially at least, 
the White House hoped to convince members of Congress of the need to amend 
the Stafford Act so that the states would be obligated to cover a larger percentage 
of the cost of post-disaster recovery work. When these efforts failed, Allbaugh 
stepped in, implementing a number of internal policy changes that were aimed 
at devolving as much responsibility as possible to state and local authorities. One 
particularly controversial change involved offering federal funding for state-led 
initiatives on a competitive basis, rather than on a per-need basis as had been 
the case earlier. (The concern was that some of the most vulnerable jurisdictions 
around the country lacked the resources and grant-writing expertise necessary 
to compete for and win the federal grants being offered by FEMA.) Meanwhile, 
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Project Impact, one of FEMA’s most popular disaster mitigation programmes 
launched during the Witt years, was cut outright, while other programmes 
suffered funding cuts.112
In order to fully implement these policy changes, Allbaugh felt the need 
to rid the agency of remaining Witt loyalists, either by letting them go or by 
side-lining them within the agency. Cooper and Block later likened Allbaugh’s 
arrival at FEMA to the process of ‘de-Stalinizing Russia’. Agency morale suffered 
as a result.113 During Allbaugh’s first year, new applications to FEMA slowed 
to a trickle, while agency veterans began making plans to either go into early 
retirement or to begin working as private contractors.114 Ironically, FEMA would 
become increasingly reliant on these contractors as the size of its permanent staff 
dwindled.115
While Allbaugh worked to reduce the agency’s responsibility for preparedness 
and mitigation at the state and local levels, he was lobbying the White House to 
allow FEMA to take more responsibility for the nation’s terrorism preparedness 
(much of which was assigned to DoD at the time). Soon after, President Bush 
approved a request by FEMA to establish an Office of National Preparedness 
at the agency. According to Adamski, Kline and Tyrrell, ‘This was the first step 
[by the George W. Bush Administration] in refocusing FEMA’s mission and 
attention from the all-hazards approach of emergency management embraced 
by the Clinton Administration’.116 In May 2001, Vice President Dick Cheney 
notified Allbaugh that he was planning to announce FEMA’s new direction at a 
meeting of the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) on 12 
September 2001.117 Cheney’s scheduled appearance was subsequently cancelled 
for obvious reasons.
4.5 9/11 to Hurricane Katrina
The 9/11 attacks (and the anthrax attacks targeting members of the media and 
senior members of Congress that came soon after) prompted momentous change 
across the country, not least within the Federal Government. According to John 
R. Harrald, the Federal Government’s examination of its structures in the months 
after the attacks ‘identified a need for a fuller integration of law enforcement 
and emergency management during the response to a terrorist attack and for the 
creation of a true national response system that can integrate the efforts of local, 
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state, and federal civilian and military response forces’.118 Based on these findings, 
the Congress would in subsequent sessions pass the USA PATRIOT Act, which 
strengthened law enforcement’s powers to investigate suspected terrorists, and 
the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), which, 
among other things, created the position of Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI), who would be charged with coordinating the work of the nation’s 
intelligence-gathering agencies and leading the new National Counterterrorism 
Center (NCTC). Otherwise, the Act made changes to federal law as it pertained 
to any number of areas, including transportation security, border control and 
immigration, and visa routines.
The attacks also prompted calls by ranking members of Congress for Bush 
to reconsider the Hart-Rudman Commission’s recommendations. However, 
whereas the Commission had only recommended that FEMA be replaced by 
another federal agency, members of Congress were now pushing for the creation 
of a whole new Cabinet-level department focused on homeland security. Bush 
hoped to placate members of Congress by creating a small Office of Homeland 
Security (OHS) in the White House in October 2001, just one month after the 
9/11 attacks. The OHS would be charged with coordinating the federal bureau-
cracy in areas pertaining to homeland security.119 The job of leading the office 
was given to Tom Ridge, a former Pennsylvania governor who Kettl suggests ‘had 
perhaps the toughest job in government after the president’s’, seeing as he had 
a small staff and a weak mandate to lead. Furthermore, members of Congress 
were pushing for the passage of some form of homeland security legislation that 
gave them more control over Ridge’s operations.120
Rather than allow Congress to pass legislation authorizing the OHS or 
any similar structure within the White House, the Bush Administration chose 
instead to enter into negotiations with members of Congress and union leaders 
over the creation of a new homeland security department. Key sticking points in 
the negotiations concerned whether or not the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) should be included in the new 
organization, and also whether the employees in the new department should 
be provided the same labour protections as other federal employees. Though 
negotiators could ultimately agree that the FBI and CIA would not be reorgan-
ized, they could not come to a compromise on the labour issue, which enjoyed 
considerable support among Democrats in Congress.121 The stalemate ended 
following unexpected gains by Republicans in the 2002 mid-term elections, 
forcing remaining Democrats in Congress to abandon their position on the 
issue. Weeks later, President Bush announced the creation of a new Department 
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of Homeland Security (DHS) with 160,000 employees, which, in his words, 
would ‘increase [the Federal Government’s] focus and effectiveness’ in securing 
the country from future acts of terrorism.122 The new department would have 
three primary missions, namely: ‘(1) to protect the United States from further 
terrorist attacks; (2) to reduce the nation’s vulnerability to terrorism; and (3) to 
minimize the damage from potential terrorist attacks and natural disasters’.123
The task of designing the new department and the national strategy for 
homeland security that it would be charged with implementing fell to the 
OHS.124 Working with the White House chief of staff, Andy Card, the OHS 
set about creating a planning committee consisting of a small group of senior 
officials, military officers, and academics that would develop a detailed pro-
posal as to which agencies should be included within the new department. The 
planning committee’s proposal was then handed to a small group based out of 
the Transition Planning Office in the Executive Office of the President tasked 
with handling the practicalities associated with creating the new department. 
There was wide recognition that the transition planning group had received an 
unenviable assignment, given any number of physical, cultural and organizational 
hurdles that would need to be addressed in merging nearly two dozen federal 
agencies into a single cohesive organization, and then winning over the support 
of members of Congress.125
Allbaugh, who reportedly opposed the inclusion of FEMA within DHS on 
the grounds that the agency would lose a direct line of contact into the White 
House, saw to it that FEMA was represented in the transition planning team by 
his former college roommate, Michael D. Brown, who had gone on to become a 
lawyer, one-time political candidate and former commissioner for an international 
Arabian horse association before coming to FEMA in February 2001 as general 
counsel.126 Like Allbaugh before him, Brown had little previous emergency man-
agement experience. According to Cooper and Block, Brown’s involvement in 
the DHS transition process would make him numerous enemies, but also some 
allies among other DHS sceptics working in the federal bureaucracy.127
The planning team’s initial proposal envisioned FEMA inheriting a number 
of terrorism preparedness and emergency medical programmes from the FBI, 
DoJ and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). However, 
DoJ patrons in Congress subsequently managed to block the transfer of the 
department’s first responder preparedness training programme to FEMA, while 
the FBI, unable to stop the loss of its programmes to FEMA, stripped them of 
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staff before they could be transferred.128 Meanwhile, a new proposal emerged 
for several pre-existing FEMA offices, including the recently created ONP, to be 
moved to the Border and Transportation Security Directorate within DHS.129 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) worried that such a move would 
in part give FEMA less visibility over the entirety of federal preparedness and 
mitigation programmes and disrupt the agency’s relationships with state and 
local emergency managers around the country.130
Neither Allbaugh nor Brown appears to have anticipated the direction the 
work in the technical group would take. According to Cooper and Block, ‘Brown, 
who had thought he was drawing up plans for an enhanced FEMA as a central 
hub of the nation’s homeland security efforts, suddenly discovered that FEMA 
would lose programmes under the new configuration and drop a rung in stat-
ure’.131 The final outputs of the transition planning team fed into the process of 
drafting the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created DHS, stood up on 
1 March 2003 under the leadership of Tom Ridge.132
The new department was initially organized into five directorates, each of 
which was headed by a deputy secretary who reported to the DHS secretary 
directly. Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson would be responsible for the newly 
created Emergency Preparedness and Response (EP&R) Directorate, in which 
FEMA, the Coast Guard (USCG), the Secret Service (USSS), and Citizenship 
and Immigration Services (USCIS), along with smaller programmer offices 
from other departments.133 Particularly, FEMA would be tasked with ‘[leading] 
the effort to prepare the nation for all hazards and effectively manage federal 
response and recovery efforts following any national incident’. It would also retain 
responsibility for certain disaster mitigation programmes, first responder training 
activities, and the US Fire Administration (USFA).134 However, Harrald points 
out that not all of the Federal Government’s pre-existing preparedness functions 
were moved to EP&R. For instance, the DoJ’s Office of Domestic Preparedness 
(ODP) ended up as part of the State and Local Government Coordination and 
Preparedness Office in a wholly different directorate within DHS. As a result, it 
would become ‘a competitor to FEMA for mitigation and recovery funding.’135
Initially at least, FEMA and several other agencies joining EP&R would not 
be permitted to retain their names and unique logos. After considerable lobbying 
by the FEMA director and his staff, an administrative decision was made reversing 
this decision insofar as FEMA was concerned.136
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One of the new department’s first assignments would be to develop a National 
Response System (NRS) in accordance with Homeland Security President 
Directive 5, issued in February 2003. This new arrangement was expected to 
account for and, where appropriate, incorporate the existing ‘incident command 
system; multi-agency coordination systems; [and] unified command.’ This work 
was expected to generate a national ‘all-discipline, all-hazards’ plan for responding 
to disruptive events (the National Response Plan (NRP), described below).137 
According to Harrald:
The development of emergency management policy and structure following 9/11 
was the extension of a thirty-year trend. Since the 1970s, the U.S. emergency 
management community had increased its ability to structure and manage a 
large response through improved plans and adoption of the ICS.138
As many as eighty-eight congressional committees and subcommittees exercised 
some form of oversight over the various federal agencies programmes that now 
belonged within DHS.139 According to Thomas A. Garrett and Russell S. Sobel, 
this entailed a more indirect and muddled form of congressional oversight over 
each DHS component agency, including FEMA. Meanwhile, the DHS leader-
ship was obligated to answer to ‘many masters’ with different, often conflicting 
interests. In this new environment, it would not always be easy to interpret and 
then convey elite direction to the various actors making up the massive DHS 
organization. Garrett and Sobel argue that the task of interpreting the preferences 
of the various committees and subcommittees had in fact been much easier when 
FEMA was an independent agency, when ‘oversight [over the agency] was clear, 
as were the sources of congressional influence’.140 Meanwhile, Thomas Foley 
and Warren Rudman argue that the ‘fragmentation of oversight’ that came with 
the creation of DHS served to ‘[preserve] rivalries and cultural barriers that the 
creation of [DHS] was intended to eliminate; and it prevent[ed] DHS from 
acting as a single, well-coordinated team’.141
According to Harrald, the various agencies to be reorganized within DHS 
experienced the transition very differently:
For some agencies, the transition went relatively smoothly. The Secret Service was 
moved with form and function intact. The Coast Guard moved from the U.S. 
Department of Transportation to DHS without losing its unique status as an 
independent entity, and it gained a direct reporting relationship to the secretary 
of homeland security. […] FEMA, however, lost much of its bureaucratic and 
operational strength.142
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For many at FEMA, the move to DHS was interpreted as a ‘demotion’ that only 
further demoralized the agency. According to one long-time FEMA employee:
When I first started here in the early 1980s, the old-timers were thrilled to be 
an independent agency – they thought they had really moved up in the world. 
Those of us who were here through the 1990s really thought we’d accomplished 
something as an agency. We had a good reputation; we’d worked hard to be an 
effective agency, and we were visible. When discussions began in 2002 to make 
us part of DHS, a lot of us felt like we’d been kicked in the gut. It was as if our 
reward for all we’d accomplished was a great big demotion.143
Immediately before FEMA was formerly transitioned into DHS, Joe Allbaugh 
announced his intention to leave the agency.144 President Bush subsequently 
nominated Michael Brown to replace him, reportedly over the objections of Karl 
Rove, one of the president’s closest advisers.145 Brown, who had been hoping for 
a more senior position within DHS, was nevertheless excited by the prospect of 
leading FEMA through the DHS transition period.146
To many veteran civil servants at FEMA, the agency’s sinking morale during 
the early Bush years was as much a consequence of any on-going organiza-
tional changes as they were internal staffing choices. In Brown and the other 
new members of the FEMA ‘front office’, agency veterans saw a return to the 
Giuffrida-era cronyism of the 1980s. Most troubling for many was the fact that 
with the exception of an acting deputy director of operations, none of FEMA’s 
senior administrators had any significant prior emergency management experi-
ence. According to a former director of response who chose to leave the agency 
in February 2005:
The impact of having political [sic] in the high ranks of FEMA […] that’s 
what killed us [sic] was that in the senior ranks of FEMA there was nobody 
that even knew FEMA’s history, much less understood the profession and the 
dynamics and the roles and responsibilities of the states and local governments.147
It is important to mention the relationship between Michael Brown and DHS 
Secretary Ridge was reportedly fraught with tension from the get-go. Ridge later 
said of Brown: ‘I didn’t like him. I don’t know what his problem was, but I felt 
that he wanted to be the guy in charge’.148 (According to Brown, ‘DHS and I had 
a personality clash, for lack of a better term’.149) The relationship between Ridge 
and Brown would deteriorate further during the late spring of 2003, when Brown 
began pushing for the ODP to be moved from the State and Local Government 
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Coordination and Preparedness Office to FEMA, a proposal that had been blocked 
by members of Congress in 2002. (Brown’s reasoning at the time was that ‘if the 
ODP controlled terrorism grants, which after 9/11 had grown into the billions 
of dollars (compared to the few hundred million on offer for natural disasters), 
it risked skewing the way states prepared for all-hazards management’.150) Ridge, 
who recognized the political headaches that taking on DoJ’s patrons in Congress 
entailed, rejected the idea out of hand.151 In fact, Ridge in September 2003 would 
approve a proposal to move most of FEMA’s preparedness grant programmes to 
the ODP.152 According to Cooper and Block, the dispute between Brown and 
Ridge over ODP was symptomatic of ‘a wider philosophical battle’ within DHS:
On one side were former law enforcement officials who advocated secrecy, tight 
security, and intelligence as the key to minimizing the trauma of any terrorist 
attack. On the other side were firefighters, rescue workers, and emergency man-
agers who emphasized collaboration, information sharing, public awareness, and 
mitigation efforts to reduce the impact of all disasters, whatever their origin.153
Evidence suggests that FEMA found itself under significant pressure to shift 
its focus away from natural disaster and toward terrorism instead. So long as it 
remained focused on natural disasters, the agency risked being perceived as out 
of step with the new department’s foremost priority, terrorism. However, senior 
FEMA officials, including Michael Brown, found themselves torn between the 
need to adjust to the bureaucratic changes going on around them and agency’s 
preference not to abandon what had by the early 2000s become its primary 
core competency, namely managing natural disasters.154 A set of studies carried 
out by the Partnership for Public Service and the Federation of Government 
Employees in late 2003 found FEMA to be suffering from low morale and severe 
staff retention issues.155 In June 2004, the head of FEMA’s union sent an open 
letter to members of Congress, stating that:
Over the past three-and-one-half years, FEMA has gone from being a model 
agency to being one where funds are being misspent, employee morale has fallen, 
and our nation’s emergency management capability is being eroded. […] Our 
professional staff are systematically being replaced by politically connected nov-
ices and contractors. […] So many people have left who had developed most of 
our basic programs. A lot of institutional knowledge is gone. Everyone who is 
able to retire has left, and then a lot of people have moved to other agencies.156
150 Cooper and Block, 2006: 81. See Harrald, 2007: 172-173 for a list of different federal terrorism 
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It is clear that by 2004, numerous warnings existed in the public record concerning 
the deteriorating situation at FEMA.157 Meanwhile, Brown continued working 
within the DHS organization to defend FEMA’s interests, not least keeping the 
preparedness tasking within the agency. In a letter sent to DHS Deputy Secretary 
Michael Jackson, for instance, Brown made the case that:
In this new era of heightened security, we have created an ever evolving depart-
ment and sometimes emergency preparedness is inadvertently considered the 
same as other DHS functions such as law enforcement duties at airports, inter-
ception of illegal aliens and inspection of cargo at ports of entry. Those are true 
law enforcement duties inherent to the DHS mission. For these organizations, 
their preparedness mission is focused on prevention of incident, not response to 
disasters. Emergency Preparedness means the capability to respond a disaster, 
regardless of what causes that disaster. […] FEMA is a very small part of DHS 
in terms of budget, personnel and other resources. Merging FEMA’s small pre-
paredness functions with the prevention mission of the department will destroy 
the emergency management cycle and lead to failure.158
However, it is ironic that the more Brown sought to defend FEMA and its role, 
the more problems he seems to have created for the agency. According to Bill 
Carwile, a senior FEMA official who retired immediately before Katrina:
Mike was his own worst enemy. He was smart and he was often right but he 
always undermined himself with this bizarre mix of insecurity and arrogance. 
He never cultivated any friends [within DHS] or anywhere in Washington for 
that matter that I could see who were willing to go to bat for him. And the sad 
truth is that FEMA suffered for it. FEMA suffered because people were making 
stupid decisions and Brown could not stop them.159
Relations between FEMA and the DHS leadership deteriorated even fur-
ther during the process of developing a new National Response Plan (NRP), 
which was to replace the FRP. Initially, Secretary Ridge tasked the head of the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to lead the effort to develop the 
new plan with the assistance of consultants from the Rand Corporation.160 In 
the months to come, a number of inter-agency working groups were created to 
support the TSA in drafting the new plan. However, FEMA would reportedly 
withdraw from the project after tensions developed between the RAND project 
manager and FEMA’s representatives. In May 2003 a first draft of the new plan 
was distributed to state and local emergency managers for comment. The new 
plan, which appeared to suggest that the Federal Government would be in charge 
of responding to disruptive events rather than an equal partner working with 
state and local authorities, was roundly rejected.161
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At this stage, DHS Secretary Ridge and his staff took responsibility for the task 
of rewriting the plan, which, unlike its predecessor, was expected to address every 
stage in the emergency management cycle.162 Officials at DHS argued that the 
NRP needed to be an all-hazards incident management plan that ‘[provided] 
the framework for federal interaction with state, local, and tribal governments; 
the private sector; and NGOs in the context of domestic incident prevention, 
preparedness, response, and recovery activities’. The plan was touted as a vital tool 
in ensuring ‘the seamless integration of the Federal Government’ in supporting 
authorities at the state and local levels. The Secretary’s office went to great pains 
in the next draft of the plan to emphasize the fact that ‘incident response [should] 
be handled at the lowest possible organizational and jurisdictional level’.163
While state and local authorities were still critical of the new draft (for being 
too long, too complicated, too focused on terrorism), the NRP replaced the FRP 
in early 2005. State and local emergency management agencies were requested to 
‘modify [their] existing incident management and emergency operations plans 
[…] to ensure proper alignment with NRP coordinating structures’ by April of 
the same year. Federal departments and agencies had until mid-autumn of the 
same year to complete this task.164 According to the DHS Inspector General, 
‘The implementation of the NRP occurred on an aggressive schedule’ and only 
with grudging support from state emergency managers, many of whom did not 
receive training on the intricate and acronym-heavy plan prior to implementa-
tion.165 According to Cooper and Block, Brown was ‘scrupulously loyal’ to the 
Bush Administration, and thus made few if any public statements critical of the 
new plan.166 Brown later claimed that he had indeed had doubts about the plan, 
mainly that it created an unnecessary amount of bureaucracy that threatened to 
reduce the effectiveness of any government response, but that he chose to ‘work 
within the system’ to address the issue.167
According to Harrald, the national ‘response system was in transition’ as the 
2004 hurricane season approached:
Housed within DHS, FEMA maintained its Stafford Act responsibilities, includ-
ing the obligation to appoint a federal coordinating officer for each state included 
in a presidential disaster declaration. [The National Incident Management 
System (NIMS)] had become a national standard, but its implementation was 
not yet required. The final NRP was in draft form; the governing policy document 
essentially continued the policies and practices of the FRP with changes made 
to acknowledge the location of FEMA within DHS.168
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As it turned out, four major hurricanes would strike Florida during the hot 
summer months, making it the most costly hurricane season on record and 
prompting what FEMA described as the ‘largest mobilization of emergency 
response and disaster resources’ in the agency’s history.169 For Brown, this was 
an opportunity to demonstrate that FEMA was still relevant, and, if anything, 
could manage the hurricanes without help from DHS. (At one point during 
the 2004 response, Brown reportedly asked Andrew Card, the president’s chief 
of staff, to keep DHS ‘out of [his] hair’.170) On the surface at least, the almost 
entirely FEMA-orchestrated response received high marks from federal, state 
and local officials alike.171 According to Harrald, ‘The agency’s organizational 
location within DHS helped it to obtain and coordinate other DHS resources, 
but in general, the disaster response was managed using pre-DHS procedures 
and protocols’.172
However, the DHS Inspector General later identified any number of problems 
related to the agency’s long-term recovery operations, supply chain management 
and data processing that were not immediately evident to observers.173 According 
to Michael Brown himself, ‘[FEMA’s] logistics just sucked. It was awful’.174 For 
many seasoned agency hands, the 2004 hurricane season revealed an even larger 
problem, namely a lack of effective leadership at FEMA. In September 2004, 
FEMA’s cadre of federal coordinating officials (FCOs), a group of senior offi-
cials specially trained for leadership in coordinating federal responses to major 
disruptive events, raised this issue with Michael Brown personally.175
The Bush Administration nominated Michael Chertoff, a former DoJ offi-
cial and judge, to replace Tom Ridge as DHS secretary in late January 2005.176 
According to McQuaid and Schleifstein, Chertoff was ‘a product of the GOP 
meritocratic establishment’ who appealed to Republicans and Democrats alike.177 
Furthermore, Chertoff appeared to understand the immense challenges facing 
the department, one of which was ‘knitting [the department’s] many fiefs into 
a cohesive whole’ and reconciling the various, sometimes oppositional inter-
ests in Congress that were simultaneously pulling the department in different 
directions.178
Brown reportedly saw the departure of Ridge as an opportunity to put a stop 
to repeated cuts in FEMA’s funding, or what FEMA officials had come to refer 
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to as ‘DHS taxes’ levied against the agency. According to Cooper and Block, 
‘FEMA […] was dunned for as much as $80 million a year. For an agency with 
only a $550 million operating budget on average, the loss was huge’.179 These cuts 
forced FEMA to cut full-time staff and reduce the total number of operational 
emergency response teams tasked with providing emergency medical care, urban 
search and rescue (USAR) capabilities, and victim identification competencies.180 
According to one observer, the fact that FEMA belonged to DHS was ‘making 
it very, very hard for FEMA to function as it used to’.181
In early 2005, at around the same time that Chertoff was nominated to 
lead DHS, FEMA awarded an outside contractor, the MITRE Corporation, a 
$500,000 contract to investigate FEMA’s response during the 2004 hurricane 
season. Just as many at FEMA had suspected, the study found numerous prob-
lems at the agency, including ‘unclear lines of communication […]; a dearth of 
top–level emergency management expertise; low morale; and a lack of manpower, 
training and money’.182 The investigators described an agency unable to fulfil its 
core mission, led by individuals who ‘wasted too much time’ in conflict with the 
DHS leadership.183 One FEMA employee responding to an anonymous survey 
that was part of the study described a ‘void’ at the top of the agency, which was 
wont to react ‘to politics and hot potatoes’, while another employee suggested 
that the leadership did not fully understand the emergency management cycle, 
nor how the agency actually responded to disruptive events.184
The idea was that elements of the MITRE report could be used as leverage 
in future discussions with Chertoff, who exercised considerable control over the 
process of allocating funds within DHS. However, any such discussion would 
have to wait until a department-wide Second-Stage Review (2SR) ordered by 
Chertoff had been completed. According to Chertoff himself, the purpose of the 
2SR was ‘to make sure that [the DHS] organization [was] best aligned to support 
[its] mission’.185 However, the review process was presumably also intended to 
ensure that the department was adhering to its original mandate and that each 
component agency was doing that which policymakers intended them to do. 
Indeed, Kettl argues that DHS had long struggled ‘to define its mission and just 
what ‘homeland security’ meant’. The same was true of every agency that joined 
the department, each of which was expected to carry out new homeland security 
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missions ‘without sacrificing any of their existing missions’. ‘The more time that 
passed after September 11, the more the older missions reasserted themselves 
and presented problems of balance to top officials’.186
As noted above, FEMA had by this point already lost several programmes 
either to other directorates within DHS or to other departments. The hope at 
FEMA was that the 2SR findings would recommend that FEMA reclaim at 
least some of these programmes.187 This was not to be. Among other things, the 
2SR findings released in July 2005 recommended that the EP&R Directorate 
that FEMA belonged to should be closed down, and two new directorates, a 
Response Directorate and a Preparedness Directorate, be created in its place.188 
The majority of the existing FEMA organization would be organized within 
the Response Directorate, where it would ‘focus on its historic and vital mis-
sion of response and recovery’. Meanwhile, all remaining FEMA preparedness 
programmes would be moved to the Preparedness Directorate, which would be 
expected to ‘support FEMA with training resources and […] continue to rely on 
FEMA’s subject matter expertise and the expertise of our other components in 
promoting preparedness’.189 The post-2SR reorganization was to be completed 
by October of the same year.190
Chertoff rightly expected that the 2SR findings would disappoint many 
actors in the field of emergency management. For instance, David Liebersbach, 
the president of NEMA, wrote to members of Congress only days after the 2SR 
was released to protest the ‘unnecessary separation of functions [that] will result 
in disjointed response and adversely impact the effectiveness of departmental 
operations’. Three weeks later, Liebersbach and Michael Brown met with DHS 
Deputy Secretary Michael Jackson in Washington to make the same argument 
in person.191 Brown for his part appears to have resigned himself to the fact that 
he could not prevent the impending reorganization of DHS. In fact, Brown had 
decided to leave FEMA, effective late August 2005.192
By the time Katrina made landfall in late August 2005, many of the changes 
proposed by Chertoff had been implemented. However, there was still much work 
to be done before the reorganization was fully implemented.193 What was in place 
was, as Harrald puts it, ‘a new, but basically untested, national response system 
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that made emergency management an integral part of homeland security’.194 
In the following section, FEMA’s preparedness to deal with the New Orleans 
scenario, arguably the nation’s single most significant hurricane vulnerability at 
the time, is discussed.
4.6 Preparing New Orleans for ‘The Big One’
New Orleans has been called ‘the impossible but inevitable city’ – inevitable to 
the extent that market imperatives dictate that a major port must exist at the 
mouth of the Mississippi River, but impossible given the region’s ‘wretched’ 
climate and geography. Residents have for centuries seen fit to make significant 
alterations to the city’s physical landscape in an attempt to maximize the economic 
potential and increase the liveability of the region.195 However, these efforts have 
had the unintended consequence of increasing the vulnerability of the city and 
its residents to hurricanes.
As noted in Chapter 2, the Federal Government has long shown reticence 
in responding to major disruptive events, let alone helping the states and local 
municipalities to mitigate known risks. However, the disruption to river-borne 
commerce caused by the Great Flood of 1927, which affected communities up 
and down the Mississippi River, was simply too great for the US government 
to ignore. In the wake of the flood, Congress tasked the US Army Corps of 
Engineers (USACE) with developing a system of flood barriers to protect built-up 
areas along the Mississippi, including New Orleans.196 A series of hurricanes that 
struck the southern United States in the late 1940s and early 1950s prompted 
discussion for the first time concerning the Federal Government’s role in hur-
ricane preparedness. Less than ten years later, the Corps of Engineers identified 
New Orleans as particularly at risk from hurricanes.197 In 1965, the US Congress 
passed the Flood Control Act, authorizing the Lake Ponchartrain and Vicinity 
Hurricane Protection Project (a series of levees, concrete floodwalls, barriers, 
and flood control gates intended to protect the city of New Orleans from a 
fast-moving Category 3 hurricane).198 The project, which was delayed many 
times due to design alterations, technical issues, and legal challenges, was slated 
for completion in September 2005, one month after Katrina made landfall.199
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According to Karen Bakker, Bruce Braun and James McCarthy, there is evidence 
to suggest that the sheer scale of the New Orleans-area flood protection project 
contributed to a false sense of security among Corps officials, local authorities 
and members of the public alike – everyone believed that the city was at less 
risk from hurricanes than was actually the case.200 However, it was only with the 
bungled evacuation of New Orleans ahead of Hurricane Georges in 1998 that 
state and local officials grew truly alarmed that New Orleans might actually be 
vulnerable to what would come to be known as ‘the big one’.201 After Georges, 
the state office of emergency preparedness and local officials agreed to develop 
a regional evacuation plan, which, among other things, would describe how to 
implement contraflow lane reversal. The Federal Government provided some 
funding for the development of the plan.202 Meanwhile, the local office of emer-
gency preparedness in New Orleans began work on what would be the city’s first 
Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan (CEMP).203
With a finalized regional evacuation plan in hand, the director of Louisiana’s 
emergency preparedness agency, Michael L. Brown (no relation to FEMA 
Director Michael Brown) penned a 22-page letter to FEMA in the year 2000 
requesting funds for a regional catastrophic hurricane exercise. The request was 
turned down, though this did not dissuade Brown, who re-sent the letter to the 
Allbaugh-era FEMA a year later, this time via a powerful Louisiana senator.204 
In one way, Brown’s timing was excellent; FEMA had recently identified the 
hurricane threat to New Orleans as one of three primary catastrophic scenarios 
facing the country (the other two being an earthquake in San Francisco and a 
terror attack in New York City). The agency estimated that as many as 25,000 
residents could be killed, with another 250,000 stranded as a result of flooding.205 
On the other hand, Brown’s request arrived in Washington immediately before 
the 9/11 attacks. Unsurprisingly, Brown’s request was again turned down.206 It was 
around this time that the local newspaper in New Orleans published ‘Washing 
Away’, a series of Pulitzer Prize-winning articles that illustrated the correlation 
between coastal erosion in the Mississippi Delta and south-eastern Louisiana’s 
increasing vulnerability to hurricanes.207 The ‘Washing Away’ series would inspire 
200 Bakker, et al., 2005. See also Colten, 2006; and Sen. Home. Def. and Gov. Affairs Comm., 
2006: 2.
201 Bradberry, 2006.
202 Beamish, 2005; Bradberry, 2006.
203 Brinkley, 2006: 19.
204 Fontenot, 2006.
205 Berger, 2001.
206 Cooper and Block, 2006: 7-11; Gilgoff, 2005.
207 McQuaid and Schleifstein, 2006: 125-126; ‘Washing Away’, 2002.
104
The 2005 Hurricane Katrina response failure
similar articles in a number of national popular scientific and trade publications 
in the years to come, all of which served to demonstrate the region’s growing 
vulnerability to hurricanes.208
As it turned out, New Orleans was slated to host the Super Bowl, the first 
major national event after the 9/11 attacks. For this reason, ‘New Orleans got 
more attention than most places [in the United States after the 9/11 attacks]. 
First FEMA, then DHS, poured money out of the terrorism spout and the city 
spent it on weapons-of-mass-destruction drills’. The city’s Office of Homeland 
Security and Public Safety (OHSPS) appears to have been focused on little else 
during 2001 and the first half of 2002.209 In the years following the Super Bowl, 
New Orleans would join several neighbouring parishes in a number of projects 
within the framework of the Urban Area Security Initiative administered by 
DHS. (As an indication of the initiative’s focus, the city’s request for flat-bottom 
boats was rejected – the DHS argument was that such boats would be useless in 
the event of a CBRN attack.)210
In 2003, FEMA allocated $500,000 to fund a two-week catastrophic hurri-
cane exercise in New Orleans the following summer. What became known as the 
‘Hurricane Pam’ exercise, which depicted a slow-moving Category 3 hurricane 
hitting New Orleans, would present a good opportunity for federal officials to 
evaluate the new DHS organization in managing a large-scale natural disaster.211 
Due to budget constraints, however, the exercise was subsequently shortened to a 
week, but nevertheless attracted approximately 250 federal, state and local officials, 
including at least one White House representative.212 Few follow-up meetings 
were conducted to discuss the exercise outcomes, resulting in delays in finalizing 
the regional catastrophic hurricane plan that the Pam exercise was expected to 
generate.213 Nevertheless, the exercise was credited with fostering relationships 
between federal, state and local participants, many of whom had never met nor 
previously been aware of the severity of the threat facing New Orleans.214
Just two months later, Hurricane Ivan struck south-eastern Louisiana. The 
state’s attempt to evacuate metropolitan New Orleans using contraflow resulted 
in gridlock from New Orleans to the state capital, Baton Rouge.215 In the wake 
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of Ivan, Louisiana’s Democratic governor ordered the state police and the state 
department of transportation to revise the state’s evacuation plan in cooperation 
with officials at the Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Preparedness (LOHSEP).216
The 2004 Boxing Day tsunami served as a reminder to senior FEMA officials 
concerning the vulnerability of coastal communities to major wave events. Soon 
after returning from a visit to Southeast Asia in early 2005, FEMA Director 
Michael Brown reportedly ordered agency planners to refocus their attention 
on preparing for an event on a similar scale in the US. According to one FEMA 
official, ‘New Orleans was the number one disaster we were talking about’.217
By April 2005, state planners in Louisiana had revised the regional evacuation 
plan as per the governor’s instructions after Ivan. The planners had also harmo-
nized the state’s ‘all-hazard’ emergency operations plan and incident management 
system with national-level planning documents, including the NRP. However, 
it is unclear if they had time to conduct any trainings or exercises in the region 
based on the new plan.218 At around the same time, officials in New Orleans 
released a revised but incomplete emergency plan.219 Given the fact that local 
planners had yet to finalize certain elements of the plan that would be crucial in 
the event of a hurricane (like mass sheltering), prominent local leaders recorded 
during the late spring a series of public service announcements (PSAs) urging 
residents to assist each other in leaving the city ahead of any future hurricane.220
4.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we are able to see the path by which the modern system of 
emergency management in the United States was developed, from whence the 
origins of FEMA as the nation’s single federal-level emergency management 
agency stem, and then how FEMA and the institutional forces that constrained 
and enabled the behaviour of its members were shaped over the ensuing decades 
by shifting threats and priorities, different leaders, and also by varying degrees 
of elite attention (and inattention). Furthermore, we were able to watch as the 
agency was confronted with the 9/11 attacks and the institutional change that 
they prompted. For FEMA, this meant relinquishing its status as an independ-
ent executive agency and instead becoming one of over twenty federal agencies 
that were joined under the DHS umbrella. Throughout, it has been possible to 
observe the agency’s work relating to natural disasters and hurricanes in particular 
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and to collect evidence to suggest just how prepared FEMA was to deal with 
these and other eventualities at different points in the agency’s history. In the 
analysis below, I shall seek to establish what, if anything, the historical record 
provided here allows us to say about the claim made earlier that the 9/11 attacks 
prompted the single most significant instance of institutional change in FEMA’s 
history. Assuming a convincing argument can be made for this claim, I am then 
prepared to argue for what practical implications this change had specifically 
for the agency’s hurricane preparedness, and then to what extent the different 
hypotheses articulated in Chapter 2 are borne out by the case. 
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5.1 Introduction
The case presented in Chapter 4 provides a foundation for the analysis of FEMA’s 
preparedness for dealing with the hurricane threat prior to and then after the 9/11 
attacks, which I argue prompted major institutional change within the institu-
tional environment that FEMA operated within. The agency’s preparedness for 
hurricanes is then approached from different analytical angles that are inspired 
by the primary indicators of preparedness (inter-organizational relations, threat 
identification/prioritization, and routines and protocols) that are included as part 
of the institutional perspective on preparedness. Based on the outcomes of the 
analyses of FEMA’s hurricane preparedness prior to and after the 9/11 attacks in 
sections 5.3 and 5.4, respectively, we should be able to see how, if at all, major 
institutional change influenced the state of FEMA’s hurricane preparedness. Based 
on the outcomes of the analysis, the research hypotheses are evaluated in the 
section that follows. Among other things, we should be able to see which streams 
of neo-institutional thinking are supported by our observations on the case.
Citations appear in this chapter only where new information is introduced. 
5.2 Major institutional change in the wake of the 9/11 attacks
This study centres on the claim that the 9/11 attacks prompted the single most 
significant period of institutional change within the field of emergency manage-
ment/homeland security between the point of FEMA’s inception in 1979 and 
August 2005, when Hurricane Katrina made landfall. In order to ascertain the 
state of FEMA’s hurricane preparedness over time, but particularly before and 
after 9/11, we must first demonstrate that the independent variable that I have 
selected is in fact valid, and that various potential errors in inference have been 
accounted for.
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In Chapter 3, I argued that besides the 9/11 attacks, the fall of the Soviet Union 
and the flawed response to Hurricane Andrew in particular had the potential 
to create certain pressures for change at FEMA and to emergency management 
policy writ large. Both of these events created a space in which policy debate 
ensued over what the nation’s emergency management system should be tooled 
toward managing (civil defence, natural disasters, all manner of threats?). In the 
years to come, a divide would emerge between those policymakers who preferred 
that FEMA be allowed to make itself more relevant in the post-Soviet world (by 
deemphasizing civil defence, for instance) and those who would that FEMA be 
shut down and a new agency created in its stead. As it was, the former, gradual 
reform approach prevailed.
Meanwhile, the record shows that the first World Trade Center attack and 
the Oklahoma City bombing ignited a policy debate concerning the growing 
threat of terrorism and what should be done about it. That being said, the change 
that came as a result was also largely gradual in nature, in large part because the 
outgoing Clinton Administration preferred to leave the arduous work of imple-
menting any major reforms to the next president. As it was, Clinton’s successor, 
George W. Bush, was initially disinclined to implement any dramatic reforms.
The 9/11 attacks, which took place just eight months after Bush had taken 
office in early 2001, prompted an unprecedented level of elite and popular debate 
on the terror issue. The resulting policy response – major intelligence and law 
enforcement reforms and the creation of the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) – reflected the long-held view of many powerful members of Congress and 
opinion-makers at Washington-area think tanks and in academia, namely that the 
counter-terrorism, intelligence-gathering and emergency management domains 
would be better coordinated if they were organized within a single homeland 
security domain. Seen from the historical institutionalists’ perspective, the 9/11 
attacks disrupted the policy equilibrium that had existed, thus creating a window 
of opportunity for the proponents of homeland security to push through their 
reform agenda. The results arguably constitute the single most dramatic example 
of institutional change during the period under study. For FEMA, the changes 
entailed losing its status as an independent executive agency, being forced to join 
DHS, and, by 2004, a winnowing down of its responsibilities.
Having proven the validity of the independent variable, we now move to assess 
the state of FEMA’s preparedness to deal with a major hurricane event prior to 
and then after the 9/11 attacks using an analytical framework underpinned by 
the primary indicators of preparedness identified in Chapter 2.
5.3 Hurricane preparedness at FEMA prior to 9/11
In this section, we examine FEMA’s hurricane preparedness from 1979 up until 
9/11 from a number of different analytical perspectives inspired by the afore-
mentioned primary indicators of preparedness. Doing so, we should be able to 
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see just how prepared FEMA was for a major hurricane strike at different points 
in its history, not least on the eve of the 9/11 attacks – immediately prior to the 
onset of major institutional change.
5.3.1 Inter-organizational relations 
Foreseeable complex problems are problems that necessitate effective multi-level 
and interagency coordination of resources. For many reasons, the Federal 
Government struggled in this regard until the late 1970s, when a single federal 
agency responsible for emergency management, FEMA, was created. By con-
solidating all existing federal emergency management agencies and programmes 
within FEMA, policymakers aimed to improve the speed with which the Federal 
Government responded to disruptive events and to reduce the administrative 
burden on those states seeking federal emergency/disaster assistance. In my 
view, the state of inter-organizational relations is a useful indicator of just how 
prepared a given organization is to effectively collaborate with others in man-
aging problems that emerge. The deeper the relationships that exist between 
actors, the better able they are likely to be to coordinate their activities in ways 
that are effective and that meet stakeholders’ expectations. Analysing FEMA’s 
relationships with other key actors with a role to play in dealing with disruptive 
events should provide some clues as to just how prepared FEMA was, and for 
what, between 1979 and September 2001. These actors include the Executive 
Office of the President (the White House), members of Congress, other federal 
departments and agencies, and state and local authorities.
The White House
The decision by the Carter Administration to organize FEMA within the execu-
tive branch and not as part of some other government department was made in 
order to expedite the process by which the president authorizes the states’ federal 
emergency/disaster assistance requests.1 While FEMA was formally in close 
organizational proximity to the president and his staff, the record suggests that 
few presidents demonstrated any particular interest in the agency’s operations. 
That being said, certain presidents were more engaged than others. For instance, 
President Clinton actually provided his FEMA director, James Lee Witt, with 
a seat in the Cabinet. Doing so gave Witt a more direct link to the president, 
members of his staff, and the heads of other government departments that FEMA 
needed to coordinate its activities with. In some ways, the general lack of presi-
dential attention to FEMA is surprising, given the significant political risks that 
the president faces in situations where government is perceived to mismanage 
1 Sylves, 2007: 117.
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disasters. In fact, making FEMA an executive branch agency arguably made it 
all the easier to hold the president accountable where things went wrong in the 
Federal Government’s response.
Meanwhile, many at FEMA saw only advantages in belonging to the exec-
utive branch. That being said, it is clear that this arrangement complicated the 
agency’s relations with the White House and influenced the agency’s operations 
in ways that were not always conducive to high levels of preparedness.2 Simply 
put, FEMA risked being used (or at the very least being perceived by others as 
being) a political tool of the White House. Among other things, the president’s 
political supporters were offered jobs at FEMA, even when they lacked rele-
vant professional qualifications and/or experience. While this practice was rare 
during particularly the Clinton era, President Clinton would gain a reputation 
for using his emergency/disaster assistance authority as a means to curry and 
reward political favours. Finally, the agency was expected to behave in ways that 
reflected and reinforced the administration’s agenda and priorities, no matter 
which president FEMA served under. In certain instances, the agency would 
find itself torn between allegiance to, on the one hand, the White House and, 
on the other, members of Congress with oversight authority over the agency’s 
various component programmes.
Congress
Though all existing federal emergency management agencies and programmes 
were consolidated within FEMA in 1979, the Carter Administration neglected 
to reauthorize each one. As a result, FEMA was left answerable to over twenty 
different congressional committees and subcommittees. This made for an 
exceedingly fragmented organization that struggled to reconcile the various and 
in many instances wholly contradictory forms of direction that it received from 
different members of Congress, but also the White House. Put another way, the 
agency found itself torn between different elite interests that expected different 
things of the agency. This situation effectively hampered the FEMA leadership’s 
ability to formulate an agency-wide mission and a common view on what the 
agency was working toward. While successive US presidents (not least Jimmy 
Carter, who personally oversaw the creation of FEMA) recognized the problems 
that FEMA’s complicated congressional relations created, they were reluctant to 
address the fundamental problem. After all, this would require asking certain 
members of Congress to cede oversight authority over ‘their’ component of the 
FEMA bureaucracy, and risked being perceived as an attempt on the part of the 
president to encroach on the legislature’s oversight authority.
2 For a thorough discussion of FEMA’s reliance on the White House for political support, see 
Sylves, 2007: 114.
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Federal departments and agencies
As noted elsewhere, FEMA was created so as to more effectively coordinate the 
federal bureaucracy’s efforts in support of overwhelmed state and local authorities. 
However, the new agency was by Federal Government standards a comparatively 
small and untested organization with relatively little political clout. For these 
reasons, it would take many years for FEMA to gain the acceptance of other 
federal actors, especially large departments like the Department of Defense 
(DoD), the Department of Justice (DoJ), and the Department of Energy (DoE). 
One consequence of the imbalance that existed between FEMA and key players 
like these was that FEMA was compelled to adopt some of their norms, rules, 
routines and values. For instance, DoD and DoE in particular refused to share 
information with counterparts that did maintain strict security procedures. As 
a result, FEMA had little choice but to retain much of its own Cold War-era 
security routines long into the 1990s, just as James Lee Witt was working to 
declassify much of the agency. In other words, the interdependencies that existed 
between FEMA and some of its larger partners sometimes prevented the agency 
from implementing its own policy agenda to schedule and/or as intended.
State and local authorities
The consolidation of the Federal Government’s emergency management func-
tions within FEMA prompted similar moves at the state and local levels, the 
aim being to achieve operational harmonization across the country. In the years 
that followed, FEMA introduced different sets of common guiding principles 
that were intended to ensure that disruptive events would be managed in simi-
lar fashion no matter where they occurred around the nation. These principles 
appeared in structures/documents like the Integrated Emergency Management 
System (IEMS) and the Federal Response Plan (FRP).
While these guiding principles enhanced the prospects for effective multi-level 
and interagency coordination, the nation’s primary emergency management 
agency was apparently preoccupied with civil defence during much of the 1980s. 
In practice, this meant that FEMA was particularly attentive in supporting 
preparedness in areas of the country that were likely targets for a Soviet nuclear 
strike (usually large urban centres). The nation’s general multi-level coordination 
capacity was limited as a result, something that was demonstrated time and again 
when FEMA responded to hurricanes and other natural disasters during the late 
1980s. With Hurricane Andrew, however, the problem could not be ignored 
any longer. While state governors and members of Congress began pushing for 
reforms to the nation’s emergency management system, the incoming Clinton 
Administration preferred a less radical approach. Rather than shutter FEMA and 
create a new agency in its stead (as some in Congress were proposing), Clinton 
was betting that James Lee Witt would be able to right the proverbial ship at 
FEMA, strengthen its relations with state and local partners around the country, 
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and give them more of a voice in determining how federal preparedness dollars 
were spent. By all accounts, Witt succeeded on every account. Calls for FEMA 
to be dismantled ceased.
The George W. Bush Administration, which came to office in 2001 on a plat-
form of smaller government, felt that many of the preparedness and mitigation 
programmes that had been put in place during the Clinton years constituted 
a moral hazard. In order to get state and local authorities to take more respon-
sibility for their own preparedness, Bush’s appointee to lead FEMA cut much 
of the funding for these programmes. Those funds that did remain were to be 
divvied up among state and local authorities on a competitive basis, not on the 
basis of who was most at-risk. The record suggests that this new policy strained 
relations between FEMA and the states, but also between many state governors 
and the White House. In practical terms, these cuts left FEMA officials with 
little regular contact with their state and local counterparts.
5.3.2 Threat identification/prioritization 
The shift in institutional attention away from civil defence during the late 1970s, 
just as FEMA was finding its footing, was as much a reflection of the increasing 
professionalization of emergency management in the United States as it was 
the Carter Administration’s foreign policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Given the 
political climate at the time, the agency began developing a new, all-hazards 
approach to emergency management. However, Ronald Reagan’s win in the 1980 
president election breathed new life into civil defence and put most of the work 
on all-hazards preparedness on the back burner. If the US was to outspend the 
Soviet Union militarily (a cornerstone of President Reagan’s national defence 
strategy), the administration needed to demonstrate that a robust civil defence 
programme was in place to protect the American populace in the event that an 
all-out nuclear war broke out between the two superpowers. As the record shows, 
FEMA would struggle for over a decade to shed the civil defence culture that 
emerged at the agency during the Reagan years.
Though emergency management was rarely a hot-button issue during the 
Reagan years, it did bubble up to the top of the political agenda on occasion, 
and never more so than during the heights of the Giuffrida scandal. While 
the Reagan Administration’s emergency management policy enjoyed strong 
Republican support in Congress, the Democratic opposition routinely raised 
concerns that FEMA’s apparent preoccupation with civil defence left the nation 
vulnerable to other threats. Though Giuffrida’s successor, Julius W. Becton, Jr., 
publicly recognized these concerns, there is little evidence to suggest that any 
major changes took place at the agency as a result. The sudden collapse of the 
Soviet Union served to reinvigorate the debate on emergency management in 
Congress. Many congressional Democrats and even a few Republicans argued 
that it was time for FEMA to abandon civil defence and embrace the all-hazards 
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approach to emergency management instead. The flawed response to Andrew 
only reinforced their argument. The empirical record points to a subsequent 
shift within FEMA from civil defence to all-hazards preparedness, but with an 
emphasis on natural disasters. This shift might conceivably have occurred even 
sooner were it not for certain factions within the agency that were vested in the 
agency’s civil defence/national security order. For many long-serving employ-
ees at FEMA, civil defence was all they knew and all they believed the agency 
should be focused on. Bringing them over to a new way of seeing FEMA’s role, 
or waiting for them to retire or find work elsewhere would take time. Second, as 
noted in the preceding section, structural relationships with other federal actors 
with strict security routines and protocols prevented FEMA from completely 
abandoning its Cold War mentality, even where the relevant parties within FEMA 
were prepared to do so.
I have emphasized in this study the role that focusing events play in bringing 
about major change in the institutional environment. It could be argued that 
the fall of the Soviet Union left policymakers in what was essentially a threat 
vacuum, or a situation in which there was no single threat around which they 
could immediately build consensus. When seen in this way, the end of the 
Cold War arguably constitutes a ‘de-focusing event’; all-hazards preparedness 
was embraced by policymakers, at least until a new threat replaced the spectre 
of nuclear war at the top of the policy agenda. I argue that this new threat was 
terrorism. By the latter half of the 1990s, the perception was that the nation was 
dangerously vulnerable to terrorism and that significant reforms were needed so 
as to facilitate the bureaucracy’s work in addressing the new threat. For its part, 
the FEMA leadership worried that policymakers risked losing sight of other 
threats that were just as if not more destructive than even a major terror attack.
It was in this climate that the Hart-Rudman Commission issued its findings. 
Among other things, the Commission found that the US had indeed grown more 
vulnerable to terror attack and recommended that a new National Homeland 
Security Agency (NHSA) replace FEMA. With less than a year left in office, 
President Clinton opted to leave these recommendations to the incoming Bush 
Administration to act on as it saw fit. As it was, the Bush Administration formed 
an Office of National Preparedness (ONP) within FEMA that would be tasked 
with coordinating elements of the Federal Government’s terrorism preparedness 
activities. It is clear that while the Bush Administration did recognize terrorism 
as a serious threat, it was initially reluctant to make any more significant changes 
to the federal bureaucracy.
5.3.3 Routines and protocols
This study reveals a general trend in the United States toward increased standardi-
zation in dealing with problems like natural disasters on a multi-level interagency 
basis. The pace of this trend accelerated starting in 1950, when the Congress 
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passed the Disaster Relief Act. Though the federal emergency/disaster assistance 
request process described in the Act was revised many times over the decades 
to come, the states maintained that it still failed to adequately explain how the 
federal-state-local interface was intended to work in practice. One of FEMA’s 
first tasks as an independent agency was to develop new routines and protocols 
that addressed these concerns. A few years later, FEMA unveiled the FRP. Like 
the Integrated Emergency Management Systems (IEMS), the FRP was intended 
to be used by federal, state and local actors in all manner of situations except 
nuclear war. (Separate plans existed for such a contingency.) By all accounts, the 
FRP was well-received across the country.
Never before had the nation’s emergency management system and the princi-
ples that guided it been so well-defined. Assuming there is a correlation between 
organizational formalization and response effectiveness, one could argue that the 
nation had never been more prepared to manage major disruptive events than it 
was during the 1980s. That being said, Meyer and Rowan remind us that routines 
and protocols may in fact depict the ‘myths of the institutional environment’, 
not how things are actually done or how prepared different actors actually are 
to carry out the work described in these documents.3 According to Clarke, the 
‘fantasy documents’ that organizations hold up as evidence of preparedness may 
in fact reveal more about stakeholders’ expectations than they do about actual 
organizational capabilities.4 The case reveals some grounds to support Clarke’s 
claim. Indeed, we see that though these routines and protocols were instrumental 
in helping federal, state and local actors orchestrate effective responses to some 
disruptive events during the 1980s, they were inadequate in other instances. 
That being said, the failure of organizations to perform to expectations need 
not necessarily impugn the quality of the plans themselves. Besides a good 
plan, successful responses are predicated on good working relations between 
the relevant stakeholders, but also that the stakeholders are prepared to perform 
to certain pre-agreed levels/standards. One of the arguments made earlier in 
this study, that systems of actors are only as robust as their weakest members, is 
borne out by the case – many of the response failures in the years leading up to 
the 9/11 attacks were not due to any identifiable deficiencies in the routines and 
protocols intended to facilitate multi-level interagency coordination. Instead, 
actors lacked familiarity with the relevant plans, were ill-equipped to deal with 
emerging problems, encountered difficulties working with one another, etc. 
In other words, routines and protocols can only do so much in ensuring that 
problems are effectively managed on a multi-level interagency basis. It is equally 
if not more important that actors comprehend and are prepared to perform to 
the standards that routines and protocols set for them.
3 Meyer and Rowan, 1977: 341-342.
4 Clarke, 1999.
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5.3.4 Assessing FEMA’s hurricane preparedness prior to 9/11
While FEMA was essentially a civil defence agency throughout much of the 
1980s, the agency nevertheless succeeded in building up a number of capabilities, 
certain forms of expertise (mass evacuation and mass sheltering, for instance), 
and close working relations with other federal, state and local partners that were 
useful in dealing with other threats, not least hurricanes. The early 1990s marked 
a clear break from the agency’s Cold War past. Under President Clinton’s pick as 
FEMA director, James Lee Witt, the agency embraced the all-hazards approach to 
preparedness, a move that we could reasonably expect served to further enhance 
the agency’s natural disaster preparedness. Furthermore, Witt enjoyed the support 
of both the president and members of Congress on both sides of the aisle, not 
to mention the FEMA rank-and-file. As a result, morale at the agency improved 
and staff turnover rates fell dramatically, enabling FEMA for the first time in 
years to retain core competencies and experience. When viewed in this light, the 
Clinton years marked a period of relative organizational calm at FEMA. All the 
while, however, the agency was under pressure to take on more responsibility for 
terrorism preparedness, though there is little to suggest that FEMA’s focus shifted 
in any meaningful way as a result. In summary then, all indications are that the 
FEMA that the Bush Administration inherited in 2001 was better positioned 
to manage a major hurricane than it had been when Andrew came ashore in 
1992, let alone during the 1980s, when it was preoccupied with civil defence.
In his first months in office, Joe Allbaugh, George W. Bush’s first pick as FEMA 
director, implemented a number of policy changes that in one way or another 
arguably reduced the agency’s hurricane preparedness. Foremost among these, 
a number of FEMA’s long-standing preparedness and mitigation programmes 
were either shut down or reduced in size. Assuming that preparedness in a federal 
system is dependent on good inter-organizational relations, one might argue that 
the limitations imposed on FEMA’s ability to collaborate with state and local 
counterparts on a regular basis, and not just in responding to the occasional 
emergency/disaster, influenced the agency’s hurricane preparedness negatively. 
Changes were also made to the agency’s hiring policy, thus once again opening 
up certain senior positions to political appointees, some of whom had little if 
any emergency management experience. These decisions rankled with many 
civil servants at FEMA, who felt that the Bush Administration’s policy choices 
risked in one way or another undermining many years of good work that had 
strengthened the nation’s preparedness for major disasters. In the years to come, 
many veteran FEMA employees opted to leave the agency, taking a fair share of 
the agency’s institutional memory and experience with them.
Having considered FEMA’s preparedness up to 2001 from different theoretical 
angles, it is possible to cautiously predict how FEMA might have performed had 
Katrina struck then and not four years later. Despite having painted a rather 
dismal picture of the situation at FEMA in the months leading up to 9/11, 
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I nevertheless maintain that the agency maintained a higher state of hurricane 
preparedness than at any earlier point in its history bar perhaps the very late 
1990s. After all, the agency had by 2001 been in existence over two decades, had 
developed good working relations with its federal, state and local counterparts, 
and retained most of its staff from the Witt years.
5.4 Hurricane preparedness at FEMA after the 9/11 attacks
We now turn our attention to the period stretching from 9/11 to mid-August 
2005, just days before Katrina made landfall. In this section, I consider to what 
extent the major institutional change that took place in the wake of the 9/11 
attacks compelled FEMA to behave in ways that served to raise, lower, or leave 
unchanged the agency’s preparedness for hurricanes. In other words, we should 
be able to see what implications the 9/11 attacks had for FEMA’s ability to 
prepare for Katrina.
5.4.1 Inter-organizational relations
The rearrangement of federal policy priorities and the accompanying reorganiza-
tion of the federal bureaucracy after 9/11 involved numerous federal departments 
and agencies, not least FEMA. In this section, we will examine how these changes 
altered FEMA’s relations with the White House, members of Congress, certain 
key actors within DHS, other federal departments and agencies, and, finally, 
state and local authorities.
The White House
Initially at least, the Bush Administration resisted congressional pressure to reform 
the federal bureaucracy after the 9/11 attacks. The president assumed (wrongly, 
it turned out) that members of Congress would be placated by the creation of a 
small office for homeland security in the White House. In the end, policymak-
ers agreed to create an entirely new department, DHS, into which FEMA was 
subsequently absorbed. Going forward, information that FEMA hoped to pass 
on to the White House would need to pass through different functions within 
the DHS organization, including the DHS secretary’s office and the relevant 
deputy secretary’s office. Staff at FEMA reportedly worried that the new chain 
of command would hamper the agency’s ability to provide early warning to 
the White House and risked slowing down the presidential emergency/disaster 
declaration process.
The record suggests that it would take a considerable amount of time for 
FEMA officials to accept the state of play that emerged after 9/11. Indeed, there 
is substantial evidence to suggest that senior officials in fact routinely circum-
vented the new chain of command once it was in place starting in 2003. In one 
117
Chapter 5: Analysis
particularly striking departure, the FEMA director himself attempted to go 
through the White House rather than the DHS leadership in coordinating key 
elements of the federal response to the 2004 hurricane season in Florida. Brown 
and other members of his staff ultimately accepted the new DHS hierarchy, albeit 
grudgingly. Nevertheless, this dynamic had lasting implications for FEMA-DHS 
‘front office’ relations, which are discussed in more detail below.
Congress
So as to speed up the creation of DHS, policymakers in Washington opted to 
forego the fraught process of renegotiating the individual operating authorities 
for most of the federal agencies and programmes destined for the new depart-
ment. As a result, as many as eighty-eight different congressional committees and 
subcommittees exercised some form of oversight authority over different agencies 
and programmes within DHS – including those that FEMA shared deep inter-
dependencies with. This situation served to further complicate FEMA’s relations 
with Congress, but also with its partners elsewhere within DHS. In addition, 
FEMA was expected to reconcile those directions that it received from Congress 
with those that came from the DHS leadership. Just as during the pre-9/11 years, 
different interests continued to pull the agency leadership in different directions.
DHS and other federal departments and agencies
The DHS leadership faced a number of challenges in merging over twenty federal 
agencies from across government into a new department with a single overarching 
mission, namely homeland security. While certain agencies that came under the 
DHS umbrella successfully redefined their pre-9/11 missions as part of homeland 
security, other agencies, including FEMA, took a more contrarian stance, arguing 
that the homeland security mission was a distraction from other, more pressing 
missions. According to Foley and Rudman, the intra-departmental tension that 
emerged as a result served to ‘[preserve] rivalries and cultural barriers that the 
creation of [DHS] was intended to eliminate’.5 The DHS leadership found itself 
in a difficult position, cast between certain actors that were proving resistant 
to the policy directives handed down by policymakers, and the policymakers 
themselves, who expected to see the post-9/11 reforms implemented quickly 
and as they had intended.
The relationship between DHS and FEMA specifically illustrates some of 
the problems facing the new department during the start-up phase. Initially at 
least, the FEMA director, Michael Brown, appeared to toe the proverbial party 
line (that the DHS reorganization was vital to the task of enhancing the nation’s 
safety and security). In public, he predicted that FEMA would be a stronger, 
5 Foley and Rudman, 2004.
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more capable agency as part of DHS. There is in fact some evidence to suggest 
that he actually believed this. After all, Brown was part of the DHS transition 
planning team, meaning that he had at least some influence over and ownership 
in FEMA’s future within DHS. That being said, Brown later claimed that he 
had in fact harboured serious reservations concerning the move to DHS, but 
reasoned that he could best defend FEMA’s interests as a player in the reorgan-
ization process. Regardless of what Brown actually believed, it is important to 
recognize that the DHS reorganization presented opportunities for significant 
career advancement. Brown’s full-throated public support for DHS may have 
been part of an ultimately unsuccessful bid to curry favour with the new DHS 
leadership as they went about filling top spots within the department.
Any optimism Brown might have felt concerning the reorganization began 
to fade by late 2003, when he reported recognizing that the FEMA ‘brand’ was 
under attack and that its preparedness programmes were being defunded so as 
to render them ineffectual. However, first DHS Secretary Ridge and then his 
successor, Michael Chertoff, quickly grew tired of Brown’s repeated and impolitic 
resistance to these policy changes. In the months and years to come, a sense of 
victimization appears to have set in at FEMA, not least within the director’s 
office. In this climate, relations between DHS and FEMA reportedly deteriorated.
Finally, the decision to move FEMA to DHS had implications for the agency’s 
ability to coordinate other federal departments and agencies. Whereas the agency 
once had relatively unfettered access to other federal actors up to and including 
the president, FEMA was now required to go through the DHS bureaucracy. 
According to Harrald, this was true both on a day-to-day basis and in respond-
ing to emergencies/disasters: ‘Federal coordinating officer[s in the field] had to 
communicate through [the head of the federal response (the Principal Federal 
Official (PFO))], the National Response Coordination Center [(NRCC)], the 
Homeland Security Operations Center [(HSOC)], and the DHS secretary to 
pass time-sensitive information to the White House’.6
State and local authorities
Like their federal counterparts, state and local emergency management officials 
felt compelled to act in ways that conveyed that they too were doing all that 
they could to prepare for a possible terror attack in their communities. However, 
while some officials fully supported the pivot toward terrorism, others worried 
that it served to distract them from other, more pressing issues. Even so, it would 
prove difficult to ignore the sizeable federal terrorism preparedness grants that 
were being made available. After all, this was ‘free money’ that many state and 
local authorities could use to fund their operations and procure new equipment 
(so long as it was primarily intended for use in the event of a terror attack). For 
6 Harrald, 2007: 180.
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its part, FEMA intensified its cooperation with officials in areas of the country 
that were considered to be particularly at-risk to terror attack. Meanwhile, the 
frequency of the agency’s contacts with state and local officials elsewhere around 
the country was reduced. That being said, FEMA continued throughout this 
period to offer support to state and local officials in Louisiana working to prepare 
a regional catastrophic hurricane plan. In fact, the agency was able to scrounge 
together funding for large portions of the 2004 Hurricane Pam exercise.
Much to the disappointment of many at FEMA and in the wider emergency 
management community, the post-Second Stage Review (2SR) ordered by the 
DHS secretary in late 2004 prompted all of FEMA’s remaining preparedness 
programmes to be moved to the Preparedness Directorate. In doing so, the DHS 
leadership violated a cardinal rule of emergency management – that the whole 
of the emergency management cycle should be managed by a single agency for 
the simple reason that the same people that prepare together should respond and 
then recover from disruptive events together. While FEMA retained responsibil-
ity for response and recovery in the post-2SR period, the loss of its preparedness 
programmes reduced its ability to build and maintain lasting relationships with 
state and local partners.
5.4.2 Threat identification/prioritization
I have argued that the sheer scale of the 9/11 attacks brought intense elite and 
popular attention to bear on terrorism, an issue that would go on to dominate 
the national policy agenda throughout the period leading up to Katrina. When 
policymakers were not discussing how best to prepare for another attack on the 
home front, they were occupied by the global War on Terror launched by the 
Bush Administration. In the political climate that existed at the time, there was 
little room for federal departments and agencies to discuss, let alone question the 
homeland security missions that had been assigned to them. The case at hand 
suggests that those who did choose to speak out were perceived as out of step 
with the nation’s priorities and risked being sanctioned as a result. Perhaps the 
national conversation might have taken on another form had something gone 
seriously wrong in the years between 9/11 and Katrina. The 2004 hurricane 
season, one of the worst in contemporary modern American history, certainly 
had such potential. As it was, though, FEMA’s apparent success in managing 
the situation that arose in Florida only reinforced the belief among policymakers 
that the national emergency management system had been strengthened by the 
post-9/11 reforms. Unbeknownst to them, however, certain key capabilities that 
FEMA would need in order to effectively manage Katrina had shown signs of 
deterioration as the hurricane season wore on.
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5.4.3 Routines and protocols
The emergency management system that was in place on the morning of 11 
September 2001 that was described in the FRP was generally regarding to 
be well-functioning (though there was always room for improvement, as the 
Hart-Rudman Commission had pointed out). With the creation of DHS, 
debate emerged over whether the FRP should simply be revised to reflect the 
new government order, or if a new plan was more appropriate. Ultimately, the 
Bush Administration chose the latter option. Even so, debate persisted over just 
how much of the FRP should be retained in the new plan. For instance, FEMA 
worried that starting from the ground up would require a massive retraining 
programme and would probably impact the nation’s preparedness negatively, 
at least in the short term. The DHS leadership, on the other hand, preferred 
that the NRP be developed from scratch. Responsibility for developing a first 
draft of the new plan was handed to the Transportation Security Administration 
(TSA), another agency under the DHS umbrella. The NRP was for numerous 
reasons developed on a relatively short timeline, allowing planners little time to 
collect comments from stakeholders before it was introduced in 2004. Many of 
the complaints that they heard in the months and years to come (that the NRP 
was far too long, too detailed, too focused on terrorism) were to be addressed 
during the next scheduled plan revision cycle.
The relevant departments and agencies at every level of government, as well 
as some private businesses and non-profit organizations with a designated role 
to play in responding to disruptive events, were required to harmonize their 
own plans with the NRP. Understandably, this process would take time. There is 
considerable evidence to suggest that while most of those actors involved in the 
response to Katrina had updated their plans by August 2005, few had adminis-
tered trainings aimed at familiarizing staff with the new plan.
In conclusion, it seems clear that the onset of major institutional change 
prompted organizational change that rendered existing routines and protocols 
obsolete. While the creation of a new plan, the NRP, was certainly effective in 
signalling to stakeholders that changes to the nation’s emergency management 
system had been made since 9/11, the eagerness of policymakers to see it intro-
duced as quickly as possible may have played a part in reducing the nation’s 
overall readiness to respond to disruptive events, especially events that required 
coordination on a multi-level interagency basis.
5.4.4 Assessing FEMA’s hurricane preparedness after 9/11
The 9/11 attacks were so sudden and on such a scale so as to bring sustained 
elite attention to bear on the nation’s ability to if not prevent then to respond to 
terror attacks on the home front. In the years to come, policymakers would take 
a number of dramatic steps aimed at addressing many of the weaknesses in the 
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nation’s homeland security apparatus that past studies (like the Hart-Rudman 
Commission) and the 9/11 attacks themselves revealed. However, the simple 
fact that terrorism dominated the policy agenda does not necessarily mean that 
FEMA was any less prepared to deal with other threats, including hurricanes, in 
the years to come. Indeed, certain circumstances in the post-9/11 environment 
would suggest that FEMA was in fact better equipped to manage such events than 
ever before. First of all, homeland security, which emergency management policy 
writ large had arguably been absorbed within, enjoyed significant elite engage-
ment in the immediate post-9/11 period. Second, FEMA now operated within 
DHS, which brought together a large number of federal agencies under a single 
organizational roof so that they might achieve better inter-agency coordination in 
preparing for and dealing with all manner of threats, including terrorism. Third, 
much more funding was available to FEMA (though most of these resources were 
earmarked for terrorism preparedness activities of different kinds).
However, the reality was that in fact the new focus on terrorism had a det-
rimental effect on the agency, at least over the short term. Among other things, 
the traditional emergency management issues that FEMA was most vested in 
received little attention in the new homeland security milieu. Meanwhile, FEMA’s 
role within DHS was poorly defined. Though the agency did receive additional 
funding for terrorism preparedness, the agency budget was otherwise cut. For 
these reasons, morale fell and the agency struggled to retain qualified staff. At the 
same time, relations between FEMA and the DHS leadership worsened, reaching 
their nadir following DHS Secretary Chertoff’s decision to move the totality 
of FEMA’s preparedness and mitigation programmes, a central element of the 
agency’s raison d’être, from the agency. Chertoff’s decision reflected a policy shift 
that ran counter to some of the most deeply rooted ideas guiding contemporary 
emergency management philosophy and practice. No matter how frustrated 
long-serving FEMA employees were with these developments, the agency found 
itself in a relatively weak position from which to defend its interests. Among 
other things, the agency apparently had relatively few particularly strong political 
backers in Congress, at the White House, or elsewhere within DHS who could 
effectively represent the agency’s views in the policy debate that ensued after 
9/11. For this reason, the FEMA director and his staff were forced to defend 
the agency’s interests on their own. Unfortunately for FEMA, the strategy that 
they chose appears to have been ineffective, if not downright counterproductive. 
The FEMA leadership would expend a substantial amount of time, energy and 
political capital in hopes of minimizing the perceived damage that belonging to 
DHS was inflicting on the agency’s sense of self and capabilities. It is perhaps 
unsurprising then that the agency was a less-than-fully integrated part of the 
department heading into Katrina.
But what, if anything, did the situation FEMA found itself in after 9/11 mean 
for the agency’s preparedness to manage hurricanes? Simply put, it is hard to say, 
given that the years leading up to Katrina provide us with few opportunities to 
evaluate the agency’s actual state of preparedness. That said, the evidence that 
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is available suggests that the agency’s hurricane preparedness was diminished, 
at least when compared to the pre-9/11 period. While it is impossible to know 
for certain, this research suggests that FEMA would likely have responded more 
satisfactorily to the worst-case New Orleans scenario had it taken place prior to 
the 9/11 attacks, not after.
In the section that follows, the four research hypotheses are evaluated. The 
insights gained through assessing FEMA’s hurricane preparedness over time are 
central to this task.
5.5 Evaluating the research hypotheses
One of the central aims of this study is to identify any benefits that different 
streams of neo-institutionalism might have in helping us better understand why 
organizations and individuals behave as they do, but also the nature of organ-
izational preparedness and how organizational preparedness is influenced by 
major institutional change. In this section, we shall discuss the extent to which 
each hypothesis is confirmed or rejected on the basis of the case. In so doing, 
we should begin to see how the different streams of neo-institutionalism help 
us come closer to answering these questions. We should also be able to see what 
real-world implications they have for practitioners tasked with preparing for 
foreseeable complex problems.
5.5.1 Hypothesis I
The claim made here is that the more deeply entrenched the norms, rules, routines 
and values that constrain and enable FEMA’s behaviour, the less likely the agency will 
be to alter its mission and the focus of its activities in the event that priorities change 
on the policy agenda. The evidence at hand appears to bear out this claim. The 
first decade of FEMA’s existence was a turbulent one marked by the inevitable 
growing pains that any new organization goes through, but also poor leadership, 
scandal and at times intense congressional scrutiny. Through it all, though, the 
agency remained squarely focused on civil defence. With it, a deep-seated security 
culture emerged at the agency. This study demonstrates just how difficult it was 
later for FEMA to shake the legacy of the Cold War following the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. While some policymakers would have FEMA begin addressing 
other threats (like natural disasters), others argued that the agency should retain its 
focus on civil defence. In my view, Hurricane Andrew revealed serious deficiencies 
in the Federal Government’s capabilities in managing natural disasters, thereby 
putting the debate over FEMA’s immediate future to rest, at least for a few years.
Under James Lee Witt, FEMA began slowly shifting focus from civil defence 
to all-hazards preparedness. In the process, a loyal cadre of civil servants holding 
strong convictions as to how things were to be done (what was appropriate) at 
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the ‘new’ FEMA emerged. Normative institutionalism helps us see how by the 
mid-1990s, FEMA had developed a distinct all-hazards culture that coloured 
its members’ preferences. As time went on and these preferences became more 
and more entrenched, it became increasingly difficult for the agency to change 
its behaviour in the event that elites expected it. As an example, the push for 
FEMA to take on more responsibility for terrorism preparedness during the 
mid- to late 1990s had many at FEMA, not least Witt himself convinced that it 
risked undoing, or at the very least undermining the agency’s generic approach 
to all manner of threats.
In many respects, the 9/11 attacks constitute essentially a third act in FEMA’s 
history. Whereas FEMA was preoccupied with civil defence during the 1980s and 
was working to implement the all-hazards approach during the 1990s, it found 
itself expected to focus on terrorism during the first half of the 2000s. Initially 
at least, the pressures to shift focus manifested themselves in small ways (with 
the creation of the ONP in early 2001), only to grow more significant as time 
went on (when the agency was forced to join DHS, for instance). Crucially, the 
changes that were underway ran counter to the norms, rules, routines and values 
that had defined the agency during the Witt years. This might explain why FEMA 
under Michael Brown resisted many of the pressures compelling it to realign its 
priorities as change occurred elsewhere in the institutional environment.
In conclusion then, we see that the normative institutional assumption – that 
the presence of deeply entrenched norms, rules, routines, and values defining 
appropriate behaviour within organizations makes them resistant to pressures to 
change – is supported by the case at hand. This is particularly apparent after the 
9/11 attacks, and to a lesser degree following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
and Hurricane Andrew.
5.5.2 Hypothesis II
Whereas normative institutionalism explains organizational resistance to change 
as a consequence of entrenched norms, rules, routines and values, historical insti-
tutionalism emphasizes instead the role that exogenous, usually rather sudden 
events play in creating institutional forces that compel organizations to deviate 
from longstanding institutional patterns of behaviour. That being said, the 
hypothesis that has been tested here also accounts for the possibility that major 
change can occur more gradually: The greater and more sudden the emergence of 
pressures for change in the institutional environment, the more likely FEMA will be 
to alter its priorities concerning what threats it prepares for.
The case at hand demonstrates that policymakers’ attention to policy areas 
with bearing on FEMA’s operations spiked to one degree or another on at least 
seven separate occasions between 1979 and 2005. These occasions include:
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– The return of civil defence to prominence on the policy agenda during the 
Reagan years;
– The collapse of the Soviet Union, prompting a reduction in the risk for all-
out nuclear war between the superpowers;
– The failed response to Hurricane Andrew in 1992;
– A series of terror attacks during the 1990s (the first World Trade Center attack, 
the Oklahoma City bombing, and the US Embassy bombings in Africa);
– The release of the Hart-Rudman Commission’s findings in the late 1990s;
– The 9/11 attacks in September 2001; and,
– The 2004 hurricane season in Florida.
All of these events served to generate momentum that in one way or another 
created pressures compelling FEMA to reassess and in some instances realign its 
threat priorities. Some were more in keeping with FEMA’s own perceptions of 
itself and its mission. For instance, though FEMA viewed itself as primarily a 
civil defence agency during much of the 1980s, the agency responded solely to 
incidents not involving nuclear war. In other words, while the agency did not 
champion the all-hazards approach during this period of time, it was certainly 
behaving like one. In practice then, the fall of Soviet Union saw FEMA being 
asked to formally broaden the scope of its operations in ways that reflected the 
spectrum of threats that it was in fact already sensitized to and that it spent much 
of its time dealing with. While achieving this shift in priorities proved difficult 
for many long-serving ‘cold warriors’ at the agency to accept, it was nevertheless 
much easier to accomplish than forcing the agency to deemphasize (at least 
temporarily) the all-hazards approach in favour of a single threat (terrorism) 
after the 9/11 attacks. Clearly, predicting the likelihood that organizations will 
readily shift focus in the face of elite pressure requires understanding just how 
dramatic the proposed change in fact is and how it is likely to be perceived by 
the organization’s members.
Furthermore, it is important to recognize the likelihood that power imbal-
ances will exist between and among different policy elites, thereby giving certain 
players more sway over the setting of the policy agenda than others. Which 
players hold sway will shift over time. In this case, we see that while the FEMA 
leadership was formally accountable to the White House, the DHS leadership 
(as of 2003), and members of Congress, the agency was typically more respon-
sive to the White House than any other stakeholder. This dynamic should be 
taken into account when gauging the pressures exerted on different actors, from 
whence these pressures stem, and whether or not their sources enjoy legitimacy/
relevance in the eyes of the target actors.
In conclusion, the hypothesis inspired by historical institutionalism appears to 
be supported by the available data. The case shows that the stronger the institu-
tional forces compelling actors to change their behaviour in one way or another, 
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the more FEMA’s priorities, organization and modes for operating were likely 
to shift in corresponding fashion. Furthermore, the case illustrates the extent to 
which forces for potential change are omnipresent in the environment in which 
actors operate, and that these vary in intensity, endurance and shape. More often 
than not, however, these forces will only prompt minor forms of gradual change 
that are sometimes difficult to detect.
5.5.3 Hypothesis IIIa
Hypothesis IIIa states that the more individual leaders at FEMA work to ensure 
that the agency is prepared to manage threats that are prioritized on the policy agenda 
(by acting as (or at least being perceived to be) ‘good agents’), the more likely they 
will be to achieve their own interests. This claim is inspired by rational choice 
institutionalism, which sees individuals as rational actors guided by the logic of 
consequentiality who seek advantage by belonging to organizations that serve 
to constrain and enable their behaviour through formal rules, incentives and 
sanctions, for instance. Unfortunately, comparatively little empirical data was 
available concerning the behaviour of individual members of the FEMA leader-
ship during the first two decades of the agency’s existence. For this reason, my 
assessment of the validity of Hypothesis IIIa is based solely on the behaviour of 
Michael Brown and, in certain rare instances, other members of his leadership 
team. With this in mind, the case appears to bear out the claim that there is a 
correlation between shifts in the overarching policy agenda and the behaviour 
of individual leaders.
It much less clear which interests motivated Brown and other members of his 
team to behave in the ways that they did. For instance, Brown initially supported 
the post-9/11 reforms. On the one hand, Brown’s support might have been driven 
by a desire to be a dutiful administrator or his own personal conviction that mov-
ing FEMA to DHS was in fact the ‘right’ thing to do given the circumstances. 
On the other hand, Brown might have seen personal gains to be had where he 
was perceived to be a good agent. What is clear is that by 2004, Brown’s view 
on the post-9/11 reforms had soured and he was reportedly contemplating an 
exit from the agency. This might explain his increasingly impolitic approach in 
opposing, first, pressures to focus more on terrorism and, later, the decision to 
remove the preparedness and mitigation missions from FEMA.
In conclusion, I argue that Hypothesis IIIa can be confirmed using particularly 
data-rich portions of the case. That being said, the task of confidently confirming 
or rejecting similar such hypotheses in future would benefit from more refined 
techniques with which to identify what motivates individuals to behave as they do 
in different situations. While the case at hand certainly supports the rational choice 
institutionalists’ claim that individuals seek to maximize benefit and hope to avoid 
being sanctioned, we are left wondering what exactly lies behind their actions.
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5.5.4 Hypothesis IIIb
Hypothesis IIIb supposes that if members of the FEMA leadership have a polit-
ical or administrative background, they will be more likely to act (and direct the 
agency they lead to act) in accordance with change in the institutional environment. 
Meanwhile, individuals with a technical background are less likely to be responsive 
to institutional change unless it corresponds with what they believe to be appropriate 
based on the technical standards of their profession. In order to validate this set of 
claims, we must first assign the individuals under study with professional profiles 
(political-administrative or technical) that accurately capture and reflect their 
professional backgrounds and experience. We then need to establish that a corre-
lation exists between institutional change and the behaviour of individuals with 
different professional profiles in response. The case at hand provides numerous 
observations on the behaviour of different FEMA directors over the past few 
decades, giving us many opportunities to evaluate this hypothesis. That being said, 
I have chosen to focus on those individuals that figure most prominently in the 
historical record, namely Louis P. Giuffrida, James Lee Witt and Michael Brown.
Louis P. Giuffrida was a career army officer who would go on to head a police 
training facility in California before becoming FEMA director in 1980. We might 
assume that Giuffrida’s time in the army served to familiarize him with the ‘tech-
nicalities’ of war fighting. However, my assumption is that he became increasingly 
involved in the administration of the military bureaucracy as he advanced through 
the ranks. While the available record provides numerous colourful anecdotes 
concerning Giuffrida’s leadership style, they reveal little concerning Giuffrida’s 
engagement in either the technical or political-administrative sides of FEMA’s 
operations during his time as director. As such, I suggest that more insights into 
Giuffrida’s background and professional experiences are required if we are to 
assign him a professional profile, never mind determine how responsive he was 
to any shifts in institutional attention that occurred during his time at the agency.
Unlike Giuffrida, James Lee Witt had little if any military experience. Witt 
entered into private enterprise early in life, starting a construction company at 
the age of 24 before becoming a county judge. Thanks to his political and busi-
ness connections, Witt was subsequently chosen by then-Governor Bill Clinton 
to head the Arkansas Office of Emergency Services and then FEMA in 1992. 
Clinton, who had looked on from the wings as Hurricane Andrew undid the 
Bush presidency, made it clear to Witt that he was determined to avoid end-
ing up in a similar situation. Witt’s apparent success in reinvigorating FEMA, 
revitalizing its ‘brand’, and shifting the agency’s focus away from civil defence 
appears to have been as much due to his grasp of the technicalities associated 
with emergency management as it was his ability to work with and meet the 
expectations of the White House, members of Congress, and FEMA’s state and 
local partners. Just as in Giuffrida’s case, it is not obvious that Witt fits any one 
profile particularly well, though the political-administrative profile would appear 
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to be a better fit than the technical one, even though he did demonstrate a good 
technical knowledge of key emergency management issues.
Of the three FEMA directors profiled here, Michael Brown is perhaps most 
easily assigned the political-administrative profile in light of his professional back-
ground and experience. Brown was a trained lawyer who, among other things, 
worked in administration, served briefly in local politics, ran unsuccessfully for 
the US Senate, and worked as a commissioner for an Arabian horse association 
before coming to FEMA to serve as general counsel. While his background 
certainly appears to have equipped Brown to detect and respond to shifts in the 
institutional environment (of which there were many in the post-9/11 years), 
there are indications that other individual-level characteristics left him poorly 
equipped to effectively defend FEMA’s interests within DHS. Indeed, Brown 
appears to have been a somewhat polarizing figure who struggled to cultivate and 
maintain political alliances that could be used to mitigate the effects of the changes 
underway at FEMA. In other words, the Brown example suggests that there is at 
best a weak correlation between having political-administrative qualifications and 
responding to institutional change in ways that satisfy stakeholders. (Of course, 
it is impossible to know if any other individual could have defended FEMA’s 
interests any better than Brown in the climate that existed in the post-9/11 years.)
The discussion above suggests that the professional profiles proposed here are 
insufficiently specified, thereby making it difficult to employ them effectively 
in characterizing individual leaders, let alone predict how they will behave in 
the face of institutional change. More refined criteria pertaining to each profile 
are needed if we are to confidently categorize leaders in this way. Any future 
research on this subject should address the fact that leaders may have long careers 
behind them that include both technical and managerial training and experience. 
Equally so, it is important to recognize that a single employer, like the military, 
for instance, may provide a combination of both technical and political-admin-
istrative experience, making it difficult to render judgement concerning which 
profile fits best on this basis alone. Finally, this study illustrates the importance 
of taking into account personality when attempting to predict how individual 
leaders will respond to institutional change.
5.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have been able to confirm that the 9/11 attacks set in motion 
events that prompted an unprecedented amount of institutional change in the 
institutional environment that FEMA operated within. The pressures for change 
that the attacks generated disrupted the historically determined patterns of 
behaviour that FEMA and so many other actors at every level of government had 
long been guided by. Having confirmed the validity of the independent variable, 
it was then possible to assess the state of FEMA’s preparedness to manage a major 
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hurricane before and then after the 9/11 attacks. I found that FEMA’s preparedness 
to manage a major hurricane had begun to deteriorate in the years after 2001 as 
various conditions in the agency’s institutional environment changed and the 
agency was obligated to respond. For instance, the analysis reveals that FEMA’s 
relations with many of its longstanding partners were weakened or disrupted 
entirely. Meanwhile, the agency struggled to build up good working relations with 
its new partners. As with many of its counterparts after 9/11, much of FEMA’s 
operations were guided by unfamiliar and untested routines, like the NRP, for 
instance. Furthermore, the agency was obligated to dedicate more of its attention 
to terrorism, which meant reallocating resources from other missions, not least 
the agency’s longstanding preparedness programmes. In short, the prospects for 
dealing with a major disruptive event in future were by all appearances not good, 
or at least worse than they had been before 9/11. The analysis suggests that the 
agency was much better positioned to manage an event on par with Katrina in 
the years prior to the attacks. By confidently asserting that FEMA’s capacity to 
manage hurricanes was diminished as a result of changing institutional conditions 
after 9/11, we are able to answer the research question in the chapter that follows.
In this chapter we have also evaluated the four research hypotheses, finding 
that the majority of the claims were substantiated by the empirical data, albeit 
in some instances with more certainty than in others. While I was unable to 
draw any definitive conclusions concerning Hypothesis IIIb on the notion of 
professional profile, it remains an interesting idea that deserves further consid-
eration by other researchers.
This analysis provides a basis for the discussion in the chapter that follows. 
Here, I will draw conclusions of a more general nature that have implications 
for theory and practice alike.
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6.1 Introduction
Besides contributing to the existing body of knowledge on Katrina, other natural 
disasters, and developments in emergency managent policy and practice in recent 
US history, a central aim of this study has been to make theoretical contributions 
to the fields of preparedness, emergency management, crisis studies, political 
science, public administration, and neo-institutionalism. These contributions 
are presented thematically in the sections that follow.
Among other things, this chapter addresses the central research question 
that this study set out to answer, certain methodological considerations, and 
the generalizability of the findings to other cases. This is followed by focused 
discussion concerning the study’s implications for: neo-institutionalism and 
certain specific streams of neo-institutional thinking; bureaucracies; the notion 
of foreseeable complex problems; preparedness; and emergency preparedness 
and management agencies (EPMAs). As with every research projects, some 
questions remain unanswered while new questions have emerged along the way. 
In section 6.8, I propose a modest programme for further research that, among 
other things, can be used in designing future studies of preparedness and/or 
that draw on neo-institutionalism as a theoretical basis. Of course, this study 
has certain practical implications that bear noting. In section 6.9, I provide a 
number of recommendations to policymakers and senior administrators who are 
involved in one way or another in the process whereby elite policy is developed 
and then handed down to the bureaucracy to be implemented. The chapter ends 
with a presentation of a draft diagnostic model for use in gauging organizational 
preparedness.
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6.2 Answering the research question
I set out in this study to identify those conditions that promoted change in the 
behaviour of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) necessary 
to generate (or prevent the generation of ) high levels of hurricane preparedness. 
Viewing the case through three different neo-institutional lenses has been useful 
to the task of detecting the presence of various institutional forces (norms, rules, 
routines and values) that influenced FEMA’s behaviour over time in ways that 
rendered the agency well-suited in managing certain complex problems and 
less so in managing others. Though FEMA’s history is defined by many major 
events that could conceivably have brought about dramatic institutional change, 
the 2001 terror attacks alone prompted reforms on such a scale and of such an 
intensity so as to dramatically alter the institutional landscape in which foresee-
able threats, not least hurricanes, were planned for and managed. Among other 
things, FEMA was subsumed within the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) and the emergency management domain that FEMA had long been a 
central player in was subsumed within the newer and much larger homeland 
security domain. Seemingly overnight, FEMA saw its priorities downgraded 
on the policy agenda, while its standing as the Federal Government’s ‘hub’ for 
emergency preparedness and emergency management was undermined somewhat 
by its loss of independent status.
Much of the popular and academic work on Katrina that has been published 
since 2005 tends to emphasize the circumstances mentioned above in attempting 
to explain FEMA’s failure to respond satisfactorily to the storm. But do these 
explanations suffice? Does the simple fact that terrorism dominated the policy 
agenda, or that FEMA was no longer an independent agency adequately explain 
FEMA’s preparedness ahead of Katrina? In my view, the answer is no. The insti-
tutional perspective on preparedness presented in Chapter 2 helps us see that 
these were changes to the institutional context in which FEMA operated, not 
explanations in and of themselves for why FEMA performed as it did in August 
2005. While the popular narrative suggests that FEMA was preoccupied with 
terrorism in the lead-up to Katrina, the various neo-institutional lenses allow us 
to see that the norms, rules, routines and values that defined FEMA’s own reason 
for being, the focus of its attention, and how things were done prior to 9/11 
were deeply ingrained and proved highly resistant to quick change, no matter 
how much elites expected it. For this and other reasons that might have stemmed 
from personal motivations, all indications are that the agency and its members, 
not least key members of the agency leadership, chose to expend considerable 
energy actually opposing the new terror tasking and the parameters imposed on 
the agency by virtue of DHS membership. In the process, the agency’s capabili-
ties in managing other threats, the ones that much of its staff articulated a clear 
preference that they be allowed to remain focused on, suffered.
In the following section, specific methodological issues that have arisen in 
carrying out this study are discussed.
131
Chapter 6: Findings
6.3 Methodological issues
The single-case case study methodology was arguably suited to the task of cap-
turing the complexity and empircal richness of the case. By allowing for many 
observations on the dependent variable over time, process tracing provided a 
robust basis on which to test different theoretical assertions, while at the same 
time addressing the risk for measurement error, one of the main weaknesses typ-
ically associated with this type of methodology. That being said, it is important 
to recognize the disproportionate amount of data that exists concerning FEMA’s 
activities during certain periods of time (mostly during and immediately after 
major disruptive events). Nevertheless, I argue that we are able to draw valid 
conclusions in all instances but one that is addressed in more detail in section 6.4.
One significant challenge in dealing with a case as large as this one involves 
managing instances where key actors were incorporated into other organizations, 
or where they simply disappeared. The most obvious example is at the point where 
major organizational reforms were made in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, where 
FEMA was organized within DHS and certain FEMA programmes were moved 
to other directorates within the new department. While I note the departure 
of these programmes from FEMA and the response to their removal by FEMA 
itself, I have chosen not to apply process tracing to these programmes in their 
new organizational homes. While I argue that this decision was appropriate in 
light of the study’s focus on FEMA in particular, it is important not to exclude 
the admittedly unlikely possibility that other DHS directorates conducted hur-
ricane preparedness activities of their own between late 2004 and August 2005.
Furthermore, the analysis in Chapter 5 demonstrates the need to account 
for intra-organizational relations when attempting to explain why actors behave 
as they do in their interactions with one another. For instance, we see that the 
FEMA leadership’s behaviour was constrained, enabled or otherwise influenced 
at different points in time by the norms, rules, routines and values, not to men-
tion the interests of specific factions within the agency. This finding obligates 
us to reconsider the assumption made in Chapter 3 that the FEMA leadership’s 
behaviour is determined by prevailing organization-wide norms, rules, routines 
and values. Rather, it is important to recognize that different factions invariably 
exist within organizations and that leaders will be inclined for different reasons 
to favour certain factions over others. Equally so, we should recognize the pos-
sibility that organizational leadership units may only be slightly influenced by 
organizational norms, rules, routines and values, if at all. Indeed, it may be the 
case that at the highest levels of public administration, the behaviour of at least 
some individual leaders is steered not by what organization-wide ideas as to what 
is appropriate, but instead by what is most likely to benefit their own individual 
interests. In other words, some career civil servants, like politicians, may well be 
guided by the logic of consequentiality.
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Finally, the core leadership group at FEMA was initially seen as being the agent 
in the principal-agent equation, insofar as it was charged with implementing 
policy handed down by elites. However, this study provides certain evidence 
to suggest that agency heads in particular may be allowed to play a meaningful 
role in the policy development process and, thus, could in some instances be 
considered to be part of the policy elite. Future studies should consider both 
the methodological and theoretical implications that such a choice might entail.
6.4 Neo-institutionalism
6.4.1 Introduction
Though not all of the research hypotheses could be proven using the case at 
hand, insights from the different streams of neo-institutionalism that they stem 
from nevertheless contribute to our understanding of how FEMA prepared for 
different threats and how it responded to major institutional change. In this 
section, we shall reflect on the implications that these and other related findings 
have for the existing body of neo-institutional theory.
6.4.2 Normative institutionalism
Of the three streams of neo-institutionalism considered here, normative insti-
tutionalism provides a particularly compelling explanation as to why major 
institutional change occurred in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in particular, and 
not at any other point in FEMA’s history. Though the nation had certainly been 
faced with terror attacks and other major disasters in the past, none were as sud-
den, as unexpected, or as unacceptable as the 2001 attacks. Wrong or not, the 
conclusion that most stakeholders drew at the time was that deep changes needed 
to be made in order to protect the nation from similar such attacks in future. 
The ensuing policy response saw policymakers take sweeping action in numerous 
policy realms. Rather than start from scratch, most of these policy choices were 
if not drawn directly from then were inspired by pre-existing strategic policy 
prescriptions found in the Hart-Rudman Commission’s reports, for instance.
That this was the case would seem to support Cohen, March and Olsen’s 
garbage can theory, which suggests that actors with limited amounts of resources, 
not least time, are apt to draw on pre-existing and available sets of standard 
responses over crafting new policy responses.1 In the example involving the 9/11 
attacks, for instance, the pressures to ‘do something’ were so great that policy-
makers could ill-afford to initiate the processes necessary to identify a new set of 
policy solutions. That being said, while garbage can theory provides a plausible 
explanation concerning where actors typically turn for policy solutions, I feel that 
1 Peters, 1999: 37.
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it fails to explain why they choose the solutions they do. Whereas garbage can 
theory emphasizes the extent to which the policy selection process is an exercise 
in elites ‘satisficing’, Allison’s organizational process model serves to problematize 
the process by which the bureaucracy goes about implementing the policy that 
elites select from the proverbial garbage can.2 This study demonstrates just 
how difficult it is for policy elites to predict with any degree of certainty how 
effectively their policy choices will in fact be implemented.
Though different forces compelled much of the federal bureaucracy to focus 
their energies on issues related to terrorism in the years after 9/11, the record 
suggests that the FEMA leadership fought to retain its focus on all-hazards pre-
paredness instead. When seen through a normative institutional lens, the new 
terror-centric order that emerged after 9/11 failed to conform to the agency’s 
own deep-seated notions concerning the appropriate ways and means by which 
to prepare for and deal with different threats, be they antagonistic or natural in 
origin. In certain respects, FEMA’s opposition to the new order is hardly sur-
prising. As much as normative institutionalism emphasizes the role that policy 
failures play in bringing about major institutional change, it fails to recognize 
the likelihood that different actors will feel more or less culpable for ‘what went 
wrong’, and that this might influence how receptive they are the policy prescrip-
tions that come as a result. In this case, FEMA had no role to play in any work 
that might have prevented the 9/11 attacks in the first place, and it responded 
effectively to events as they unfolded in New York City, Washington, D.C., and 
rural Pennsylvania. From the agency’s perspective, then, it might have felt unfair 
that FEMA should be forced to undergo change as a result of a policy failure 
not of its own doing.
As Goldman points out, normative institutionalism would benefit from a 
clearer notion of appropriateness and how it can be observed in organizations. 
Like norms and values, appropriateness is a somewhat vague concept that I have 
struggled to identify in FEMA and other organizations that appear in this study.3 
Generally speaking, I found that the larger the organization, the more difficult 
it was to confidently identify a single logic of appropriateness that guided its 
members. Instead, several different, sometimes conflicting logics appeared to be 
at play. According to Christensen and Røvik, however, the existing literature on 
normative institutionalism provides limited guidance to researchers faced with 
such situations.4 Even so, it is clear that the researcher should be prepared to 
dissect individual actors down into smaller subunits, but especially where this 
is likely to reveal the presence of different, sometimes conflicting institutional 
forces that may pull a given organization in different directions.
2 March and Simon, 1958.
3 Goldman, 2005.
4 Christensen and Røvik, 1999.
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Finally, normative institutionalism theory suggests that individuals are motivated 
to participate in organizations not by the prospects for personal gain, but because 
they are committed ‘to the goals of the organization, or at least [accept] the legit-
imate claims of the organization (or institution) for individual commitment’.5 
However, we find few specific suggestions in the literature concerning how we 
can observe or go about measuring said commitment. This issue, which has 
significant practical implications for hiring practices, for instance, also deserves 
additional attention.
6.4.3 Historical institutionalism
Historical institutionalism supposes that major institutional change is most likely 
in the event of a major focusing event capable of overcoming persisting, historically 
determined patterns of behaviour. While the case at hand provides considerable 
evidence of gradual institutional change during the late 1980s and much of 
the 1990s both within FEMA and in the broader policy landscape relating to 
emergency management/homeland security, the scale and pace of these changes 
pales in comparison to those that came about after the 9/11 attacks. Given the 
role that focusing events play as motors of institutional change, more work is 
needed in order to better understand and predict under what circumstances 
focusing events are likely to occur, what mechanisms are at play in compelling 
institutions to deviate from their historically determined paths, and who/which 
interests they are likely to mobilize.6 Furthermore, the Federal Government’s 
experiences in the years following the collapse of the Soviet Union demonstrate 
the need to distinguish between different types of focusing events. While the 9/11 
attacks focused attention on obvious deficiencies in the government’s capabilities, 
the fall of the Soviet Union did the opposite – it, a ‘defocusing’ event, allowed 
policymakers for the first time in many years to wonder what policy domains 
other than national defence/civil defence could be elevated on the policy agenda.
6.4.4 Rational choice institutionalism
Rational choice institutionalism is intentionalist insofar as it portrays individuals 
as being in control of the process of creating and then running organizations 
in ways that optimize their chances of achieving their aims. At the same time, 
though, it recognizes that these same actors are forced to contend with organi-
zational norms, rules, routines and values that serve as checks on their otherwise 
unbounded behaviour. However, critics argue that no matter how hard they try, 
actors are incapable of exerting the necessary levels of control, and certainly do 
not have access to all the information required, to participate in institutions 
5 Peters, 1999: 27.
6 Birkland, 1998: 53; Stone, 1989: 299.
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that fully maximize their utility. Of the three streams of neo-institutionalism 
considered in this study, rational choice institutionalism certainly goes furthest 
in acknowledging the tension that exists between the individual’s drive to max-
imize utility and those constraints on individual behaviour that organizational 
membership inevitably entail. According to William H. Riker, the challenge lies 
in determining the ‘relative significance’ of individual interests and institutional 
forces in explaining behaviour. ‘Very probably’, Riker argues:
Both are necessary and neither is alone a sufficient condition for outcomes. […] 
One fundamental and unresolved problem of social science is […] to learn to 
take both [preferences] and institutions into account.7
My view is similar to Riker’s – the nature of the relationship between institutional 
forces and interests is different in every given situation, and should for this reason 
be approached on a case-by-case basis.
The notion that individuals are driven by unique sets of interests underpins 
the notion that they can be assigned different professional profiles that can be 
used to predict how they will behave in different situations. While this idea is 
certainly an intriguing one in theory, there are certain practical hurdles that need 
to be overcome before it can be applied to other studies. For instance, we need 
to more clearly stipulate which types of education, training and/or professional 
experience are most closely associated with the political-administrative and tech-
nical profiles. Otherwise, it is difficult to assess what environment and responsi-
bilities a given individual’s background best prepares them for. For instance, what 
are we to make of individuals with long military experience? Does this type of 
professional experience provide technical competence, a keen understanding of 
the political-administrative context in which policymakers interact with senior 
administrators, or some combination of the two?
One of the unexpected benefits of exploring certain FEMA officials’ profes-
sional backgrounds and behaviour in the face of institutional change has been to 
reveal the role that personality plays in determining how effective an individual 
is in pursuing his or her own interests. While a considerable amount of research 
exists concerning the intersection between personality and leadership style, and 
also on what role leadership style plays in managing crises, much less has been 
done on the role that personality plays in determining how individuals develop 
and implement strategies for achieving their own aims and/or those of the organ-
izations under them, let alone how effective these different strategies ultimately 
show themselves to be.8 As Fred Greenstein, writing from the field of political 
psychology, argues, a more systematic approach to this question is needed.9
7 Riker, 1980: 432.
8 Boin, et al., 2010; Sylves, 2006.
9 Greenstein, 1992.
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6.4.5 The actor-centric institutional environment
The notion that every organization exists within its own unique institutional 
environment has proven useful in conceptualizing and capturing the institutional 
forces that were at play in influencing FEMA’s behaviour within the scope of 
the case. On the other hand, the assumption that every actor exists in its own 
unique ‘sphere’ arguably requires a fair degree of diligence on the part of the 
researcher hoping to fully grasp the relevant contextual factors. Among other 
things, this may require systematically mapping out the different formal and 
informal contacts/relationships that a given organization maintains with other 
actors. Only then is it possible to hypothesize concerning where, if at all, different 
constellations of actors share common norms, rules, routines and values. Needless 
to say, mapping exercises such as this risk being arduous ones. Closely defined 
parameters are needed so as to limit the number of actors to manageable levels.
Just as it is important to account for the influence that external actors are 
likely to exert on the formation and evolution of a single actor’s own norms, 
rules, routines and values, we also need to account for different factors at the 
intra-organizational level that influence how actors relate to those around them. 
For instance, this study demonstrates that FEMA consisted of several distinct 
‘factions’ that maintained sometimes very different ideas concerning what kind 
of organization FEMA should be and what it should be particularly well-pre-
pared for. Without first accounting for such intra-organizational dynamics, it is 
impossible to know with any certainty exactly whose norms, rules, routines and 
values are guiding the agency’s behaviour in its interactions with others. Based 
on my reading of the existing literature and the findings from this case, the larger 
the organization, the more likely it is that different sets of norms, rules, routines 
and values will exist. Needless to say, it behoves the researcher to determine which 
set has primacy at any given point in time. The use of different methodologies 
derived from the field of anthropology may be useful to this end.10
6.4.6 Conclusion
Neo-institutionalism clearly has the potential to contribute to our understand-
ing of the environment in which actors behave and respond to change, be it 
independ ently or in collaboration with others. Beyond serving to reinforce other 
scholars’ findings concerning the utility of neo-institutionalism, the outcomes 
of this study strongly suggest that the organizational preparedness literature in 
particular stands to benefit where a neo-institutional lens of analysis is applied. 
That being said, further refinements are necessary, the most obvious of which 
are discussed in more detail in section 6.8, where I propose a programme for 
further research.
10 Hudelson, 2004.
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6.5 Foreseeable complex problems
Foreseeable complex problems are defined as problems that are predictable, 
necessitate engagement from actors from different jurisdictions and/or different 
levels of government, and have severe negative consequences where they are not 
dealt with effectively. The primary challenge facing the relevant actors tasked 
with responding to such problems lies in achieving effective coordination in 
what tend to be complex, actor-dense environments. The decision to conceive 
of the hurricane threat in particular as a complex problem that actors foresee and 
then attempt to manage arguably enhances the generalizability of the findings 
to other cases where constellations of actors operating in complex multi-level 
systems (federal and non-federal (unitary) alike) set out to manage problems.
This study shows that the system of government in which actors operate pro-
vides the fundamental parameters within which they are able to coordinate (or 
not) with one another. For instance, the federal system that the relevant actors in 
the case at hand operated in provided the framework that determined how they 
would interact with one another and which unique responsibilities/competencies 
they each had or were expected to have. As much as such arrangements might be 
sensible ways to allocate responsibility for preparing for and managing different 
threats, this case also demonstrates that federalism has the potential to contribute 
to inter-organizational conflict (over who should fund preparedness work for 
different threats, for instance) that somewhat ironically risks in fact weakening 
overall levels of preparedness. The likelihood that this type of conflict is likely 
to arise is presumably somewhat smaller in other systems of government. In 
unitary states, for instance, the central government is supreme and there is less 
room (or need) for debate over cost-sharing, for instance. However, as tempting 
as it is to view federalism as a factor that impedes or at the very least makes it 
all the more to difficult to achieve high levels of preparedness, there is little to 
suggest that problems in unitary systems are not still complex ones requiring 
close inter-organizational collaboration across jurisdictional lines. Obviously, 
this issue deserves more attention in future.
Generally speaking, the notion of foreseeable complex problems has been 
useful in framing disruptive events in terms of what they are challenges to and not 
in terms of what their consequences are or are likely to be. That being said, this 
study raises questions concerning the utility of viewing certain problems as being 
foreseeable. In fact, every problem that actors working in the field of emergency 
management/homeland security might be faced with is theoretically foreseeable. 
Insights from the warning response literature and cognitive-institutionalism, for 
instance, demonstrate how a combination of cognitive, bureau-organizational 
and agenda-political factors collude to create situations where individuals and 
organizations alike fail to detect problems that are imaginable and foreseeable. 
Clearly, any future work on this definition should be more explicit concerning 
how narrowly or broadly the notion of foreseeability is to be defined. It may 
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well be the case that there is in fact little to be gained by conceiving of problems 
in this way – if all problems are foreseeable, what then distinguishes foreseeable 
complex problems from other problems that actors confront? Ultimately, it may 
well be more helpful to speak in terms of foreseen complex problems and then 
examine how the relevant actors address them.
6.6 Preparedness
6.6.1 Defining preparedness
Preparedness has been defined in this study as the ability for organizations to 
build up and maintain capabilities so as to effectively respond to problems in 
conjunction with other actors that exist in complex multi-level systems. Unlike 
many other definitions that exist in the literature, this one emphasizes the chal-
lenges inherent in managing problems in complex institutional environments. 
This definition has been useful in this instance, given the focus on foreseeable 
complex problems. That being said, it is important to point out that the appli-
cation of a generic concept of preparedness like this to cases where actors pursue 
threat-specific preparedness raises certain methodological issues that need to be 
addressed. If nothing else, it is important to recognize that the appearance of 
high levels of preparedness for a given threat or set of threats does not necessarily 
mean that the organization enjoys high levels of preparedness for other specific 
threats, let alone generally.
6.6.2 Primary indicators of preparedness
I argued in Chapter 2 that organizational preparedness could be gauged by 
examining prevailing conditions within three specific thematic areas, namely 
inter-organizational relations, threat identification/prioritization, and routines 
and protocols. The decision to structure the framework for analysis in Chapter 
5 around these indicators was intended to provide a basis for evaluating just how 
much they in fact revealed about FEMA’s state of preparedness over time. While 
the case certainly reveals a considerable degree of interdependency between these 
indicators, it appears that inter-organizational relations – the relationships but also 
the inevitable power dynamics (imbalances) that exist between different actors 
who are expected to prepare for and manage different problems – structures the 
processes by which threats are prioritized on the policy agenda and appropriate 
routines and protocols are developed. The various neo-institutional lenses help 
us see why inter-organizational relations are good in some instances and poor in 
others. For instance, where FEMA’s relations with other stakeholders were good, 
it was relatively easy to reach consensus concerning what needed to be done and 
to develop the rules and routines required to guide the different actors in carrying 
out the required work in joint fashion. On the other hand, as relations soured, 
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it grew increasingly difficult to accomplish these same tasks. The case suggests 
that inter-organizational relations appear to be dominant over the other two 
indicators, and for this reason is considered to be a particularly strong indicator 
of organizational preparedness. As much as working threat prioritization mech-
anisms and workable plans are necessary elements of any preparedness strategy, 
they are nothing without effective inter-agency relations.11
This study reveals other factors that also appear to influence levels of organ-
izational preparedness in ways that were initially unforeseen. One example 
is intra-agency relations. Indeed, we see in the case of FEMA during the late 
1980s and early 1990s and then again during the early to mid-2000s an agency 
consisting of different factions, each with its own view concerning FEMA’s core 
mission and purpose. The conflicts that arose as a result hampered operations 
and complicated the agency’s relations with other partners. We might reasonably 
assume that actors that are able to demonstrate intra-agency cohesiveness and 
a common sense of purpose are also capable of effectively coordinating their 
activities with others.
As the discussion in section 6.4.4 illustrates, certain factors at the individual 
level also appear to influence organizational preparedness. For instance, we see that 
the FEMA leadership, like senior administrators everywhere, had an important 
role to play in receiving and interpreting elite direction, translating it into specific 
taskings to the relevant component or components of the agency, following up on 
this work, and then reporting back to policymakers. They were also charged with 
spearheading work aimed at building up and maintaining relations with agency 
counterparts. However, there are strong indications that certain individuals in the 
agency’s history were better suited to this set of tasks than others, be it for their 
professional background and experience, their personality, or some combination 
thereof. Where individual members of the FEMA leadership served as effective 
bridges between policymakers and the agency bureaucracy, we see indications 
that the agency enjoyed relatively high levels of elite support, adequate funding, 
a strong sense of common purpose, high morale, and good working relations 
with other key stakeholders. On the other hand, where they did not, levels of 
elite support fell off, funding dried up, morale suffered, and interagency relations 
deteriorated. Obviously, shifts like this are apt to influence agency performance 
positively or negatively and for this reason should be considered when examining 
just how prepared organizations are for different eventualities.
In conclusion, the results of this study support the claim that there exist a 
number of primary indicators of preparedness. That being said, there appear to 
be at least five different indicators, including: inter-organizational relations, threat 
identification/prioritization, and routines and protocols; intra-agency relations; 
and leadership relations with both the policy elite and the organizations that they 
11 Government Accountability Office, 2006c. 
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lead. Furthermore, there are grounds to claim that a dependent relationship exists 
between the indicators, with inter-organizational relations dominant over some 
if not all of the remaining four. All five indicators have in one way or another 
been incorporated into the draft diagnostic model for gauging organizational 
preparedness, which is presented at the end of this chapter.
6.6.3 The political-administrative and technical dimensions of preparedness
The study’s findings appear to support the claim that states of organizational 
preparedness are influenced by developments in two distinct dimensions, one 
technical and the other political-administrative. While the behaviour of actors 
operating in the technical dimension is typically determined by what is con-
sidered to be appropriate behaviour within the organization, the players in the 
political-administrative dimension, but particularly elected officials and political 
nominees to government bureaucracies, are at least somewhat more likely to 
be guided by the logic of consequentiality as they go about trying to identify 
the limits of what is possible (and not sanctionable) behaviour. As the study of 
different FEMA directors shows, some individuals may find themselves forced 
to reconcile the pressures that the two opposing logics sometimes generate.
We see in this case that developments in the political-administrative dimen-
sion significantly impacted the nature of work in the technical dimension (where 
funding cuts put forward and approved by policymakers disrupted on-going 
agency projects, for instance). This study reveals few if any examples of the 
opposite being true. Future studies of organizational preparedness would arguably 
benefit where they distinguish between these two dimensions and then consider 
the implications that developments in one dimension have on the other, but also 
for organizational preparedness writ large.
6.7 EPMAs
This study provides us with numerous opportunities to theorize on the role, 
organization and staffing of EPMAs, which have certain defining characteristics 
that set them apart from other government bureaucracies.
First of all, EPMAs play a crucial role in facilitating multi-level interagency 
coordination prior to, at the onset of and after disruptive events. Second, 
EPMAs tend to be comparatively small organizations, meaning that they may 
encounter resistance to being coordinated from larger, better resourced actors 
with more political clout. In order to successfully coordinate the efforts of such 
actors, EPMAs need to be sensitive to their interests and motivations, but at the 
same time maintain close ties with policy elites that can support them if/when 
interagency conflict arises, for instance by levying different forms of sanctions 
compelling them to cooperate.
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There are strong indications that how organizations are organized in relation to 
one another plays a significant role in determining who they have regular contact 
with, in which situations these contacts occur, and, as a result, the nature of the 
norms, rules, routines and values that emerge as a result and that constrain and 
enable their behaviour, but also their effectiveness in carrying out their respon-
sibilities. Furthermore, organizational placement has implications for how their 
members view themselves, but also how others view them. This study suggests 
that one potential way of strengthening the coordinative capacity of EPMAs is by 
organizing them within the executive branch, as was the case with FEMA until 
2003. Doing so has many advantages, but also some drawbacks. First of all, the 
executive branch would seem to offer a natural platform for inter-departmental 
coordination, while at the same time providing relatively direct access to key 
decision-makers, not least the office of the executive and departmental heads. 
Furthermore, it is a way to signal to the public, policymakers, and other elements 
of the government bureaucracy that emergency management is an executive 
priority. On the other hand, being close to the executive entails a greater risk of 
being compelled to behave (‘used’) in ways that benefit members of the executive 
politically. For instance, FEMA was regularly accused of providing disaster assis-
tance to state and local jurisdictions on the basis of what was good politics for 
the sitting president. Furthermore, EPMAs within the executive branch may be 
rendered toothless where they lack a strong congressional mandate to coordinate 
the activities of other elements of the government bureaucracy. Clearly, the ques-
tion of where EPMAs are best located deserves additional attention. In my view, 
there are grounds to revisit certain elements of the ‘old’ institutionalism, which 
may offer insights concerning the role that formal organizational arrangements 
play in determining how and how well organizations behave.12
Emergency management is by turns fraught with political risks and opportu-
nity. As we have seen in this case, for instance, Hurricane Andrew demonstrated 
to the incoming Clinton Administration how important competently responding 
to disasters is to any president’s election/re-election strategy. So long as this is 
the case, EPMAs are likely to find themselves at the centre of political storms, 
but especially when things go badly. Regardless of where they find themselves 
organized, EPMAs also appear to be particularly susceptible to reorganization 
in the wake of policy failures – even in instances where they are not at fault. 
No matter how much policymakers believe that such reforms will strengthen 
the bureaucracy’s capacities and prevent similar such failures from occurring 
in the future, major reforms are almost always disruptive events that disturb 
established processes and upset long-standing relationships. For this reason, the 
reform process may in fact weaken the EPMA’s capabilities over the short term, 
12 Commons, 1910; Cooley, 1930; Krier, 2009: 395-397; Mitchell, 1935; Veblen, 1948.
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only to improve again as time goes by. Obviously, this has implications should 
the EPMAs be expected to respond to disruptive events that occur during the 
reform implementation period.
Following the 9/11 attacks, elites within DHS shifted responsibility for 
preparedness and mitigation, two central phases in the emergency management 
cycle, from FEMA to other directorates within the department. These moves were 
an affront to many FEMA employees who held deeply held beliefs about what 
emergency management is and how it should be carried out. One such belief 
was that the same agency should be charged with managing all four phases in 
the emergency management cycle. (After Katrina, the US Congress passed the 
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act (PKEMRA). Among other 
things, the Act returned the preparedness and mitigation taskings to FEMA.13) 
In my view, there are numerous strong arguments for assigning EPMAs with 
overarching responsibility for the entirety of the emergency management cycle. 
That being said, we should certainly look to other cases in other contexts to see 
if other arrangements are equally workable.
Finally, all indications are that EPMAs require a combination of subject matter 
experts tasked with carrying out different operational tasks and individuals that 
understand the interplay that exists between the agency leadership and policy 
elites. In my view, there is considerable evidence to support the claim that EPMAs 
(and all government agencies for that matter) are best led by senior administrators 
who understand the needs of and possess the ability to relate to policymakers. 
Suitable candidates are likely to have a political or administrative background, 
though this in no way precludes individuals with a technical background from 
having the requisite experience.
6.8 A programme for further research
While the institutional perspective on preparedness that was used in this study 
goes a good way in enhancing our understanding as to how organizations prepare 
for complex problems, many questions still remain or have emerged over the 
course of the study. The programme for further research that is proposed here 
aims to answer these questions, not least by enhancing our understanding of 
organizational preparedness.
First of all, the programme calls for the development of more coherent, test-
able definitions of key neo-institutional notions (foremost among them norms, 
values and appropriateness) and additional work aimed at refining normative 
institutionalism, historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism, 
all of which have been helpful to the task of understanding why organizations 
behave as they do. With regard to normative institutionalism, it remains unclear 
13 Chertoff, 2005a; Government Accountability Office, 2013.
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whether like-minded individuals are drawn to organizations that share their values, 
or if instead the organizations that they belong to shape their values over time. 
Hopefully, further study may allow us to come down on one side of this important 
issue, which has obvious practical implications for organizational hiring/leadership 
recruitment practices. Meanwhile, historical institutionalism holds that major 
institutional change is most likely where punctuated equilibrium precipitated 
by some form of focusing event occurs. Despite the amount of work that exists 
on this subject, certain gaps in our understanding remain. For instance, where 
do focusing events stem from? And is it possible to predict what their effects are 
likely to be when they do manifest themselves? Furthermore, the collapse of the 
Soviet Union provides a useful example of an event that, rather than focusing 
attention on a single policy area, serves to create a space for contests over multiple 
policy areas instead. Does the existing literature fully explain ‘de-focusing’ events 
like these? Finally, rational choice institutionalism would benefit from additional 
work that aims to explain the role that individuals’ backgrounds and experiences 
play in influencing their preferences and, thus, their likely behaviour in different 
situations. Needless to say, any such findings could be useful in further refining 
the notion of professional profiles introduced in this study.
The literature on neo-institutionalism seldom makes an explicit distinction 
between public and private sector or non-governmental organizations, though my 
impression is that it is primarily interested in and extracts observations from cases 
in the public sector. For this reason, it may be worthwhile to apply the theory to 
cases involving organizations operating in non-public sectors. Doing so may help 
us confirm (or disconfirm) that neo-institutionalism’s central tenets are applicable 
to organizations operating in different sectors. In a related vein, it is unclear that 
neo-institutionalism is equipped to account for the increasing privatization of 
heretofore government services and the bureaucracy’s growing reliance on con-
tractors. These parallel trends would appear to alter the traditional dynamics by 
which common organizational norms, rules, routines and values emerge within 
organizations and institutional environments more generally. Also, we should 
recognize the increasing decentralization of organizations, many of which allow 
their employees to work outside the confines of a common physical space. Does 
neo-institutionalism in its current state account for the process by which norms, 
rules, routines and values are created (or not?) in such an environment?
The second area of focus pertains to the notion of foreseeable complex prob-
lems, which should be applied to additional cases where organizations work to 
prepare for and manage problems. Among other things, doing so promises to 
provide additional insights on the notion of foreseeability, the conceptualization 
of preparedness used in this study, the idea that there exist two distinct but inter-
related dimensions of preparedness, and the revised set of primary indicators of 
preparedness, presented above.
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This study clearly illustrates the role that politics plays dramatically influences 
both the conditions under which EPMAs operate, their relations with key stake-
holders, and their behaviour in preparing for and managing different threats. In 
this, the final area of focus, the aim is to ensure that the existing body of theory 
satisfactorily reflects and accounts for the highly politicized environment in which 
EPMAs operate. While a substantial amount of scholarly attention has been given 
to politics as it relates to crisis/emergency/disaster responses, much less exists 
on the politics of preparedness. Is more work in this vein needed? Furthermore, 
this study suggests that organizational placement may have significant real-world 
implications for the ability of EPMAs to effectively collaborate with others. Future 
studies might study any correlation that exists between where EPMAs are located 
organizationally and their ability to manage complex problems.
According to King, ‘The conclusions of single case studies are much stronger 
if they can be compared with other studies’.14 Researchers looking to replicate this 
study might consider applying the institutional perspective on preparedness to 
other US federal agencies that were joined within DHS, like the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) or Customs and Border Protection (CBP). Alternatively, 
one could study FEMA’s hurricane preparedness activities between Katrina and 
Hurricane Sandy in 2012, by which point the Department of Homeland Security 
and FEMA had presumably implemented the post-Katrina reforms mandated 
by the Congress in 2006.15 As mentioned elsewhere, a substantial number of 
private and non-governmental actors have taken on key responsibilities in the 
contemporary emergency management system in the United States (for sheltering, 
animal care, certain rescue services, etc.). Among other things, the application 
of the institutional perspective to cases involving these actors as they go about 
preparing for and responding to disruptive events presents an opportunity to 
evaluate the extent to which the existing body of theory on neo-institutionalism 
is in fact relevant to organizations operating outside the public sector.
6.9 Practical recommendations to policymakers and senior 
administrators
The study has generated a number of insights that can be translated into practical 
recommendations to policymakers and senior administrators involved in one 
way or another in the process whereby elite policy is developed and then handed 
down to the bureaucracy to be implemented. Some of these recommendations 
are general in nature, while others are related specifically to preparedness.
This study shows that major disruptive events have the potential to quickly 
focus stakeholders’ attention to bear on specific policy areas. In such instances, 
14 King, et al., 1994: 208-211, in George and Bennett, 2005: 220.
15 National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, 2013.
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policymakers may feel that they are compelled to ‘do something’, oftentimes in 
short order. Policy elites would do well to recognize that the policy solutions that 
they generate under such conditions, while well-intentioned, may nevertheless 
engender uncertainty and inter-organizational conflict that actually serve to 
temporarily weaken, not strengthen, the affected bureaucracies’ capacities in 
dealing with different problems. This bears keeping in mind when executing 
major policy reforms, but especially in domains like emergency management/
homeland security, where bureaucratic underperformance can have serious real-
world implications.
The record on emergency management in the United States since the late 
1970s reveals a tendency for elites to select senior administrators not on the 
basis of their professional qualifications and experience, but rather on the basis 
of what makes sense politically. Policy failures may prompt scrutiny of these 
appointments. As much as it might make be politically advantageous to reward 
allies with well-paying jobs in government, policymakers should recognize that 
appointments like these may have serious practical implications for the perfor-
mance of the agencies that they are expected to lead, but also for their credibility 
and reputation.
Policymakers are understandably interested to know that the administrators 
that they appoint are equipped to implement policy as intended. In other words, 
policymakers have a preference for so-called good agents. However, this study 
suggests at best a weak correlation between being a good agent and the agency’s 
ability to effectively manage problems. After all, good agents may be handed 
‘bad’ policy that puts them and the organizations under them at a disadvantage 
in managing certain types of problems. For this reason, it is important that elites 
encourage agents to freely voice any concerns that they might have concerning the 
effects that different policy choices have/may have on organizational operations. 
Otherwise, elites may only hear what they want to hear, at least until actual events 
overwhelm the bureaucracies under them, thereby impugning their policies.
My final recommendation to policymakers concerns the content of the 
policy direction that they provide to agents. In this case, we see that conflicting 
policy directions from different interests in Congress created intra-organizational 
conflict at FEMA and even weakened the agency’s operational effectiveness. 
Clearly, the agency would have benefited from a more harmonized oversight 
environment. However, achieving such a state is easier said than done. Among 
other things, policymakers must be willing to work to solidify elite consensus 
on a piecemeal basis around those issues that are relevant to the bureaucracy in 
question. Alternatively, they should be willing to reduce the number of actors 
with oversight authority over it. However, doing so entails significant political 
risks that policymakers may be reluctant to take. Those that are up to the chal-
lenge may well be voted out of office before they have time to push through the 
necessary reforms.
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What advice then can we offer senior administrators charged with implementing 
elite policy? First of all, it is clear that organizations benefit by having leaders who 
are attuned to developments in the political-administrative environment. While 
some individuals are certainly better suited to this role than others, all leaders 
suffer from bounded rationality to one degree or another. The trick is to put in 
place mechanisms aimed at minimizing this problem as much as possible. One 
solution is to task other members of the organization with monitoring develop-
ments in the environment that they might otherwise miss. (In the United States, 
for instance, many federal agencies maintain congressional relations functions 
that allow senior administrators to both follow developments in and maintain 
relations with Congress.)
Senior administrators operate somewhere between policymakers and the rank-
and-file tasked with translating elite policy into practice. Unsurprisingly, their 
decisions sometimes fail to satisfy both constituencies. Unwinnable situations 
like these are particularly likely to arise in the event of major institutional change, 
where policy elites may expect senior administrators to implement changes that 
are anathema to existing organizational norms, rules routines and values. For 
instance, the changes that the FEMA director was forced to implement after 9/11 
seriously damaged staff morale and turned many long-serving employees against 
both him and the department that the agency now belonged to. This example 
demonstrates that no matter how much leaders strive to address employee concerns 
in times of reform/change, they cannot possibly satisfy everyone, but especially 
those individuals with particularly strong ideas about ‘how things should be done’. 
Such individuals may constitute so-called veto points within the organization 
that may slow the pace of policy implementation/change.
Finally, while the literature on bureaucracies suggests that organizations are 
inclined to avoid contact with one another, successful emergency management 
requires that organizations do just the opposite – that they actively seek out and 
maintain contact with one another in order to build up their own individual 
preparedness as well as their preparedness on an inter-organizational basis. Clearly, 
senior administrators have a vital role to play in building such relationships across 
interagency boundaries and between levels. Besides strengthening the organiza-
tion’s own ability to effectively respond to problems in future, bridge-building 
of this kind also serves to deepen the pool of allies that can be mobilized when 
administrators seek to, say, lobby elites in coordinated fashion.
6.10 Toward a diagnostic model for gauging organizational 
preparedness
I argued at the outset that this study makes a major contribution to our under-
standing of how organizational preparedness can be measured empirically. This 
is a task that has long vexed researchers working in the fields of emergency 
management, crisis management and preparedness. In this section, I propose 
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a first draft of a diagnostic model for use in quickly and inexpensively gauging 
organizational preparedness in bureaucratic organizations, including EPMAs. 
While the model has been developed particularly with the US federal system of 
government in mind, it should be applicable to organizations operating in other 
governmental settings as well. The model is intended to be used in its own right 
or as a complement to other, more costly validation activities that bureaucra-
cies typically use to test their own preparedness (such as full-scale exercises, for 
instance). As I say, however, this is a first draft. Reading on, it quickly becomes 
clear that additional refinements are required before the model can be tested.
In its present state, the model (presented in Table 1 below) consists of a set 
of 15 indicators that in one way or another capture evidence to suggest a certain 
state of preparedness for disruptive events. In developing each indicator, I have 
drawn on insights from the fields of emergency management, organizational 
theory, governmental politics, and neo-institutionalism. The model incorpo-
rates in one way or another the revised set of primary indicators of preparedness 
(inter-organizational relations, threat identification/prioritization, routines and 
protocols, intra-agency relations, leadership relations with policy elites and the 
organizations under them), as well as the notion that there exist two distinct 
dimensions of preparedness, one technical and the other political-administrative. 
For instance, the first three indicators included in the model actualize issues that 
pertain to the political-administrative level. These indicators say little if anything 
about how organizations prepare. Instead, they tell us about what policy elites 
expect organizations to be prepared for. The remaining 12 indicators address 
either the technically oriented work that organizations carry out in pursuit of a 
specific form and/or level of preparedness, or various qualities in organizations 
that influence their ability to pursue their work in an effective manner.
It is important to recognize that many organizations use various forms of 
capability assessment tools in order to gauge preparedness. Whereas these tools 
are typically intended to gauge organizational capabilities in narrowly defined 
spheres or with regard to certain missions or tasks (say, logistics support or crisis 
communication) and rely on objectively measureable criteria, the model proposed 
here is interested in a number of decidedly less tangible indicators of organiza-
tional preparedness that are inspired by the literature on neo-institutionalism 
and certain findings related specifically to this study. In their current form, each 
indicator is to be answered on a ‘yes/no’ basis. That being said, it is important 
to emphasize that organizational preparedness is actually something that exists 
to one degree or another. Future work aimed at refining this model or models 
like it should aim to develop a scaled system with which to assess each criterion. 
Without such a system, it is difficult to draw conclusions concerning the degree to 
which a given organization is prepared, let alone what it is prepared for. Despite 
this caveat, I expect that the model in its current form is capable of providing a 
general picture of how prepared an organization is, with the organization that 
meets every indicator arguably better prepared than the organization that only 
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meets a few. For this reason, a suitable first test of the model might entail contrast-
ing levels of preparedness within two or more organizations and then comparing 
these outcomes with how they actually responded to the same disruptive event.
Table 1. A diagnostic model for gauging organizational preparedness 16
Indicator Comment/clarification
Policy elites are attentive to and 
have vested interests in the 
organization and/or the mission 
that the organization is responsi-
ble for.
Elite attention to the organization and its activities may 
indicate political support for the organization and its 
mission. Organizations that enjoy elite support are 
presumably able to secure various forms of support 
that are needed to effectively carry out their missions. 
On the other hand, elite attention might also suggest 
dissatisfaction with the organizaton and/or its 
performance.
The organization’s leadership 
interacts with policy elites such 
that the organization’s interests 
are competently represented both 
on a day-to-day basis and in the 
event of a disruptive event.
In order for organizations existing in complex, mul-
ti-tiered systems of actors to execute their missions, 
they must effectively communicate with policy elites in 
order to secure various forms of support, be it finan-
cial or political. This task falls to the organization’s 
senior leadership. A situation in which the leadership 
lacks the ability to effectively interact with policy elites 
has implications for the organization’s ability to attract 
the funding and political support necessary in order to 
maintain a high level of organizational preparedness.
The organization’s leadership is 
involved in or at least has a good 
understanding of the organiza-
tion’s operations, including those 
aimed at enhancing the organiza-
tion’s preparedness for different 
eventualities.
A good understanding of how the organization works 
and the salient threats/vulnerabilities facing it is 
critical if leaders are to be effective proponents of the 
organization vis-à-vis policy elites. The engagement of 
the leadership with organizational preparedness 
activities specifically may signal to employees that 
preparedness is a leadership priority.
The organization’s structure and 
scope of work are formalized.
Organizational formalization is manifested through 
structures, routines, and protocols that define specific 
areas of responsibility, the scope of work within each, 
appropriate working methods, etc. Furthermore, there 
may be a correlation between levels of formalization 
and preparedness – the more defined the organization 
is, the more capable the organization is to systemati-
cally work to enhance its own preparedness.
The organizational culture is one 
that acknowledges the need for 
improvised responses to prob-
lems, particularly ones that are 
unforeseen.
Gillespie and Streeter argue that high levels of prepar-
edness are likely in organizations that are prepared to 
deviate from existing routines and protocols where 
they are ill-suited to the problems that they are faced 
with.16
16 Gillespie and Streeter, 1987: 157.
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Indicator Comment/clarification
Formal exchanges take place on a 
regular basis between the organi-
zation and other actors in the 
same policy domain.
The assumption here is that frequent formalized 
exchanges (depicted in common plans, mutual aid 
agreements, partnership arrangements, etc.) between 
actors expected to work with one another in dealing 
with a given problem effectively lowers transaction 
costs in times of emergency.
Mechanisms intended to facilitate 
the identification of organizational 
vulnerabilities exist on an organi-
zation-wide basis.
According to Reason, organizations may host potential 
latent failures or vulnerabilities that reduce their ability 
to effectively respond to threats, both independently 
and in conjunction with other actors.17 The organiza-
tion that is able to detect latent vulnerabilities and 
then feels confident in sharing these with other actors 
is all the more likely to enjoy relatively high levels of 
preparedness.
Inter-organizational mechanisms 
aimed at identifying and assessing 
issues that may hamper effective 
inter-agency responses to 
common problems are in place.
Given the interdependencies inherent in the field of 
emergency management, the extent of organizational 
preparedness is arguably higher where organizations 
jointly identify and address issues that might prevent 
them from effectively coordinating with one another.
The organization’s priorities are in 
line with those in the overarching 
policy arena/held by members of 
the policy elite.
Organizations whose priorities are in line with those of 
policy elites are likely to enjoy relatively high levels of 
material and symbolic support, providing them with 
the means with which to prepare. That being said, the 
priorities in the overarching policy arena may not 
accurately reflect the actual spectrum of threats ‘out 
there’. Indeed, it may well be that policy elites set the 
policy agenda in such a way that serves to enhance 
organizational capabilities to deal with one set of 
threats while reducing their capabilities in dealing with 
others that may be more likely and/or more disruptive.
Organizational preparedness 
activities are aimed at building up 
generic capabilities. At the same 
time, they account for those 
threats that are prioritized on the 
policy agenda and/or that the 
organization itself finds salient.
Organizations that work to build up generic prepared-
ness capabilities are likely to be better prepared to 
manage threats than those who are focused on 
establishing a narrow set of threat-specific 
capabilities.
Organizational preparedness 
activities engage all members of 
the organization in one way or 
another.
The greater the number of members of an organiza-
tion who are actively involved in various forms of 
preparedness activities, the more likely the organiza-
tion is to be prepared for different eventualities. 
17
17  Reason, 2006: 247, 249. See also Gillespie and Streeter, 1987: 155.
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It may well be that future research on this model or other models like it will show 
that tools like this should include fewer, not more indicators of preparedness. 
The question then is which criteria reveal the most about a given organization’s 
actual preparedness for different threats. It might also be the case that certain 
indicators are missing. One indicator that has not been included in the draft 
model is organizational placement. Is the location of the bureaucracy in the 
government (as part of a larger department, within the executive branch, as an 
independent agency of government) a factor in determining how prepared it is 
for different contingencies? If so, how? Furthermore, the model in its current 
form approaches every indicator equally. No claims are made concerning the 
possibility that some indicators are more telling indicators of preparedness than 
others. That said, future research may well demonstrate that certain indicators 
should be ‘weighted’ more heavily than others.
Indicator Comment/clarification
The organization seeks to engage 
in joint preparedness activities 
with other relevant actors.
Joint preparedness activities, including trainings and 
exercises, enable the establishment of common 
understandings, heightened inter-organizational 
familiarity, and the identification of potential problems 
that can hamper effective inter-organizational 
coordination.
The organization’s members have 
previous experience managing 
disruptive situations or situations 
that deviate from the norm.
Past experience of managing disruptive events 
arguably provides individuals with a better capacity to 
cope with and find solutions to similar such events in 
future.
Mechanisms intended to facilitate 
the documentation and imple-
mentation of lessons learned exist 
at all levels within the 
organization.
Organizational mechanisms for learning include 
hotwashes, debriefings, after-action reviews and other 
forms of internal review processes. Mechanisms 
should also exist to ensure that lessons learned are 
subsequently implemented within the organization.
Organizational morale is high 
throughout the organization.
Where organizational morale is low, the productivity of 
the employees may decrease and the quality of their 
work may suffer, not least any work aimed at enhanc-
ing organizational preparedness.
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Why do organizations sometimes fail to manage foreseeable problems?
Besides causing billions of dollars in damage, Hurricane Katrina flooded a major 
American metropolis and killed 1,800 people along the US Gulf Coast in August 
2005. The sluggish, poorly coordinated government response to the storm led 
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) came despite sweeping 
post-9/11 reforms to the nation’s homeland security arrangements, not least the 
creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which brought over 
20 pre-existing federal agencies, including FEMA, under one organizational roof. 
Proponents argued that this move enhanced the Federal Government’s capabil-
ities to effectively manage all manner of threats, including both future acts of 
terrorism and natural disasters. Katrina presented one of the first opportunities 
to put these claims to test. While state and local level officials were responsible 
for a number of decisions that served to leave hundreds of thousands of people 
stranded in greater New Orleans before Katrina made landfall, FEMA for its 
part proved incapable of effectively coordinating assistance to overwhelmed state 
and local authorities as the scale of the disaster grew over the hours and days to 
come. The Katrina response appeared to suggest that the Federal Government’s 
capabilities in managing the hurricane threat had not been improved since 9/11. 
In fact, there are indications that it may actually have deteriorated instead.
According to Donald Kettl, ‘Democracies don’t prepare well for things that 
have never happened before’.1 This implies that they are better suited to manage 
predictable, regularly recurring events, or what I refer to in this study as foreseeable 
complex problems. Hurricanes are one such example of this type of problem. 
Once a reluctant player in emergency management, the Federal Government has 
1 Kettl, 2007: 100.
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become a central actor in a highly standardized multi-level interagency emergency 
management system that is guided by thoroughly developed plans, routines and 
protocols that ensure the disruptive events are managed in similar fashion no 
matter where they occur around the country. As such, we would expect FEMA to 
be particularly well-suited to manage particularly those threats that are predictable 
and occur on a regular basis. Herein lies the puzzle that drives this study. If we 
accept that Hurricane Katrina was a foreseeable complex threat that the Federal 
Government maintained standardized routines to deal with and that homeland 
security was a policy priority in the post-9/11 period, why were many elements 
of the Katrina response orchestrated by FEMA found to be lacking?
If we take a step back, we see that the Katrina example is hardly unique. 
Governments at every level around the world routinely fail to respond to regularly 
recurring problems in ways that conform to the relevant stakeholders’ expectations. 
This dissertation, which uses the American experience in preparing for major 
hurricane events as a backdrop, aims to provide us with a better understanding 
as to why this is the case. While the existing literature on Katrina certainly goes 
a fair way in explaining FEMA’s flawed response, it does only so much to depict 
the unique institutional environment that FEMA operated within in the years 
leading up to the storm. By capturing relevant elements of the agency’s institu-
tional environment, this study aims to identify the spectrum of forces/pressures 
that compelled FEMA and those partners that it shared interdependencies with 
to behave in certain ways and, in turn, what influence, if any, such behaviour 
had on their ability to manage different threats, not least hurricanes, over time. 
Formulated another way, this study aims to answer the following research question:
What are the conditions that promoted change in FEMA so as to generate (or prevent 
the generation of ) high levels of preparedness in managing hurricanes?
The growing body of neo-institutional theory provides the theoretical underpin-
nings required to answer this question. While different streams of neo-institu-
tionalism might have different theoretical pedigrees, they all share the view that 
norms, rules, routines, and values serve in one way or another to constrain and 
enable the behaviour of actors in all that they do. While neo-institutionalism 
has been used extensively to study crisis/emergency/disaster responses in recent 
decades, it is employed far less often to study cases of organizational prepared-
ness. In this study, the Federal Government’s work in preparing for hurricanes in 
the years leading up to Hurricane Katrina is considered using three particularly 
well-developed neo-institutional perspectives, namely normative institution-
alism, historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism. Besides 
understanding the Katrina response better, the decision to approach the case 
from different theoretical angles should provide us with a better understanding 
as to what preparedness is and how it can be measured in organizations, how 
organizations go about preparing, what they are likely to prepare for, and just 
how prepared they in fact become as a result of their efforts.
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This study seeks to make contributions to the fields of preparedness, emer-
gency management, crisis studies, political science, public administration, and 
neo-institutionalism. Furthermore, certain outcomes are likely to have practical 
implications for both policy elites and senior administrators who are charged 
with overseeing and leading those government bureaucracies that look for, 
prepare ahead of and then manage disruptive events of different kinds. At the 
conclusion of the study, a draft diagnostic model for gauging organizational 
preparedness is presented.
An institutional perspective on preparedness
In order to answer the research question stated above, I have developed what I 
refer to as an institutional perspective on preparedness that draws on insights 
from the literature on preparedness, emergency management, crisis studies, 
political science, public administration and neo-institutionalism. Using this 
perspective, we should be able to contextualize the environment in which pol-
icymakers and practitioners engage in different processes aimed at identifying, 
prioritizing and then preparing for different threats. This institutional perspec-
tive consists of four central components, the first of which aims to define and 
situate foreseeable complex problems in relation to other terms that regularly 
appear in the preparedness and emergency management literature in particular 
(disaster, emergency, catastrophe, crisis and, most recently, mega-crisis, to name 
a few). This is followed by a brief discussion on the nature of preparedness, how 
organizations typically prepare, and the different roles that policymakers and 
practitioners play in this regard.
One of the central themes of this study is that complex systems of govern-
ment (like the federal system in the United States) entail interdependencies 
between actors on both a multi-level and an interagency basis. Among other 
things, the second component of the institutional perspective seeks to illustrate 
these complexities insofar as they relate to preparedness. Using the shared gov-
ernance model developed by Saundra K. Schneider, we shall see the process by 
which determinations are made in federal systems concerning how and for what 
bureaucracies operating at different levels of government prepare. We then decon-
struct the notion of preparedness into what I argue are two separate and distinct 
dimensions, one political-administrative and the other technical. Whereas the 
political-administrative dimension of preparedness is a space inhabited by policy 
elites and senior administrators charged with making determinations of different 
kinds concerning what the relevant government bureaucracies should expend 
their finite resources preparing for, the technical dimension primarily involves 
the work that practitioners carry out aimed at implementing elite policy insofar 
as it relates to preparedness. This component also includes a brief discusson on 
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the nature of organizations, bureaucracies, and the unique subset of organiza-
tional bureaucracies tasked with preparing for and managing disruptive events 
(emergency preparedness and management agencies (EPMAs).
The third component sets out three primary indicators of preparedness that 
can be used to reveal just how prepared organizations are for different eventuali-
ties. These indicators include inter-organizational relations, threat identification/
prioritization, and routines and protocols. Assuming their relevance is borne out 
by the case, these indicators will be used as a foundation for the draft diagnostic 
model for gauging organizational preparedness that is presented at the end of 
the study.
The different streams of neo-institutionalism that are applied in this study 
– normative institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and rational choice 
institutionalism – are introduced in the final component of the institutional 
perspective on preparedness. Each stream offers a different perspective on the 
nature of the mechanisms that serve to constrain and enable the behaviour of 
actors. Taken together, the three streams provide a basis for a number of research 
hypotheses regarding the relationship between major institutional change and 
preparedness, each of which will be tested in this study.
Investigating the case using process tracing
In this study, we shall examine FEMA’s work from its inception in 1979 to August 
2005 (when Katrina made landfall) in preparing for a single type of foreseeable 
complex problem, namely a major hurricane. To this end, we are particularly 
interested in the behaviour of the agency’s core senior leadership group consist-
ing of a small number of political appointees and civil servants charged with 
contributing in different ways to the policy formation process and then ensuring 
that it is implemented as intended. Besides being able to accommodate complex, 
empirically dense cases like this one, the single-case case study methodology 
that is used in this study permits us to approach the case at hand from several 
different theoretical angles informed by the three streams of neo-institutionalism 
described above. Using an adapted version of process tracing, we should be able 
to confirm the existence of any causal mechanisms that might exist between the 
independent variable – change in the institutional environment in which FEMA 
operated – and the dependent variable – the agency’s preparedness in managing 
the complex and foreseeable hurricane threat. The different streams of neo-in-
stitutionalism offer different predictions as to how such change might affect the 
agency’s preparedness. The conditions necessary to confirm the different research 
hypotheses are set out and discussed at this stage in the study.
A wide variety of sources have been used in order to piece together the case. 
These include media reports; popular historical accounts; government reports 
and reports published by think tanks, interest groups, and private companies; 
academic works; and personal interviews.
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Analyzing FEMA’s hurricane preparedness from 1979 to 2005
The description of FEMA’s work on hurricane preparedness from 1979 to 2005 
is divided into three distinct periods – one from 1979 to Hurricane Andrew in 
1992, one from Andrew to 9/11, and, finally, from 9/11 to Katrina. Dissecting 
the case in this way allows us to see that the 9/11 attacks, and not Andrew or 
some other event in FEMA’s history, prompted major institutional change within 
the field of emergency management/homeland security during the time period 
under study. By confidently identifying a single instance of major institutional 
change, we are then able to establish the validity of the independent variable 
set out in this case (change in FEMA’s institutional environment), demonstrate 
that various potential errors in inference have been addressed, and, perhaps most 
importantly, evaluate the different research hypotheses.
The agency’s work in preparing for hurricanes before and then after the 9/11 
attacks is analysed using three different analytical angles (inter-organizational 
relations, threat identification/prioritization, and routines and protocols) that 
stem from the primary indicators of preparedness that make up one component 
of the institutional perspective on preparedness. By approaching the case in this 
way, we should be able to see the effects that major institutional change after 
the 9/11 attacks had on FEMA’s preparedness for different types of threats, not 
least hurricanes, but also just how useful each primary indicator is to the task of 
gauging organizational preparedness more generally.
The analysis of the case concludes with a discussion of the various research 
hypotheses related to the different streams of neo-institutionalism, the aim 
being to establish which streams are borne out by the case and which are not. 
We see here that the central claims of normative institutionalism and historical 
institutionalism are supported by the available empirical data. Meanwhile, the 
notion that actors behave as ‘good agents’ as proposed by proponents of rational 
choice institutionalism is confirmed, but only on the basis of a relatively small 
amount of supporting data. On the other hand, I was unable to either confirm 
or reject the second set of claims inspired by rational choice institutionalism, 
namely that individual leaders can be assigned so-called professional profiles 
and that these can be used to predict future behaviour. As it was, the proposed 
professional profiles were shown to be insufficiently specified, making it difficult 
to confidently assign them to individual leaders, let alone predict how individuals 
are likely to behave in the face of major institutional change.
Answering the research question
What then were the conditions that promoted change in FEMA so as to gen-
erate (or prevent the generation of ) high levels of preparedness in managing 
hurricanes? Seeing the case at hand through different neo-institutional lenses has 
been helpful in revealing the presence of different kinds of institutional forces 
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that influenced FEMA’s behaviour in ways that left the agency well-prepared to 
manage some complex problems and less so others. Though many disruptive 
events have occurred over the course of FEMA’s history, the 2001 terror attacks 
alone prompted reforms on such a scale so as to dramatically alter the institutional 
landscape in which threats were identified, prioritized, planned for and managed. 
The different streams of neo-institutionalism demonstrate the role that norms, 
rules, routines and values, but also the interests of the individuals that populated 
FEMA, played in determining how the agency responded to this institutional 
change and how prepared it left the agency to manage different eventualities, not 
least hurricanes. While the popular narrative suggests that FEMA was preoccupied 
with terrorism in the lead-up to Katrina, viewing the case through a neo-insti-
tutional lens reveals the truth to be at least somewhat more complicated. While 
FEMA was certainly ‘distracted’ (like so many other agencies of government at 
the time) by the 9/11 attacks and the newfound attention that they brought to 
terrorism writ large, we also see that the FEMA organization was highly resistant 
to change. All indications are that the agency and its members, including key 
members of the agency leadership, expended a considerable amount of time, 
energy and political capital opposing the post-9/11 changes, but particularly 
the new terror tasking, limitations inherent in the new DHS framework, and 
the DHS secretary’s decision to remove responsibility for preparedness and mit-
igation from the agency. In other words, the apparent deterioration of FEMA’s 
preparedness for hurricanes in particular in the years leading up to Katrina was 
as much a result of shifting elite priorities and strategic-level decision-making as 
it was the agency’s own ultimately unsuccessful efforts to stave off these changes. 
Among other things, these efforts proved a drain on FEMA’s resources and at 
the same time hurt the agency’s working relations with other key players within 
the Federal Government, not least within DHS.
Reflections on neo-institutionalism
This study demonstrates that neo-institutionalism clearly has the potential to 
contribute to our understanding of the sometimes highly complex environment 
in which actors operate and respond to change, but also how preparedness is 
achieved in organizations. That being said, certain refinements to the body of 
theory are in order. Of the three streams of neo-institutionalism that have been 
considered in this study, normative institutionalism provides a particularly com-
pelling explanation as to why major institutional change occurred in the wake 
of the 9/11 attacks and not at any other point in FEMA’s history. When viewed 
from the normative institutionalists’ perspective, FEMA’s subsequent opposition 
to changes in policy can be understood to stem from the belief among many of 
its members that the agency’s way of doing things – the all-hazards approach – 
remained the most ‘correct’ approach to managing disruptive events around the 
country. That being said, the notion of appropriateness and how it manifests itself 
in organizations remains elusive. Furthermore, given the centrality of the idea to 
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normative institutionalism, additional guidance and practical tools are needed 
in order to better gauge the commitment of individuals to organizational goals.
Meanwhile, historical institutionalism supposes that major institutional change 
is most likely in the wake of focusing events capable of overcoming persisting, 
historically determined patterns of behaviour. Given the centrality of focusing 
events to this stream of thought, more work is needed in order to better under-
stand and predict under what circumstances focusing events are likely to occur, 
what mechanisms are at play in compelling institutions to deviate from their 
historically determined paths, and who/which interests such events are likely to 
mobilize. Researchers might also explore the possibility that different kinds of 
focusing events exist. Besides ‘traditional’ focusing events – those that serve to 
bring attention to a given issue – there is a case to be made for what I refer to as 
‘defocusing events’ – events that serve to deemphasize threats or problems around 
which there exists relative consensus, thereby effectively opening up space for 
debate over which other threats deserve attention. Such was arguably the case 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union, for instance.
Unlike the other two streams of neo-institutionalism considered here, rational 
choice institutionalism is intentionalist insofar as it portrays individuals as seeking 
control of the process of creating and then running organizations in ways that 
optimize their chances of achieving their aims. At the same time, though, they 
are forced to contend with organizational norms, rules, routines and values that 
serve as checks on their otherwise unbounded behaviour. Of the three streams, 
rational choice institutionalism certainly goes furthest in acknowledging the role 
that institutional forces and individual interests play in constraining and enabling 
behaviour. That being said, the theory contained in this stream of thought stops 
short of making any claims concerning the primacy of one type of force over any 
of the others. While my own view is that the relationship between institutional 
forces and interests will vary from situation to situation, this question certainly 
deserves more attention.
The centrality of individual interests to rational choice institutionalism 
inspired the idea in this study that individuals possess and can be assigned 
different professional profiles that can be used to predict how they will behave 
in different situations, not least in the event of major institutional change. As 
noted earlier, however, this notion requires further fleshing-out, for instance by 
specifying which types of education, training and/or professional experience are 
most closely associated with the political-administrative and technical profiles.
Finally, the idea that every actor operates within its own unique institutional 
environment has proven useful in conceptualizing the institutional forces that were 
at play in influencing FEMA’s behaviour over time. That being said, this study 
demonstrates the possible benefits of thoroughly mapping out the intra-organiza-
tional environment before proceeding to define the actor’s relations with others. 
In so doing, the researcher should be able to see which organizational norms, 
rules, routines and values are at play in guiding the organization’s behaviour in 
its interactions with other actors.
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Foreseeable complex problems
The notion of foreseeable complex problems has proven particularly useful insofar 
as it emphasizes those interdependencies that exist on a multi-level interagency 
basis, but also how they both enable and hamper effective coordination in dealing 
with disruptive events. Perhaps the single most obvious weakness inherent to 
the term, however, is its emphasis on foreseeability. Insights from the warning 
response literature and cognitive-institutionalism demonstrate how a combination 
of cognitive, bureau-organizational and agenda-political factors creates situations 
where individuals and organizations alike fail to detect problems that are techni-
cally foreseeable. For this reason, it may be more useful to study organizational 
preparedness ahead of foreseen problems instead.
Preparedness
The outcomes of this study suggest that organizational preparedness can be gauged 
by examining prevailing conditions within not three but fully five specific thematic 
areas, namely: inter-organizational relations; threat identification/prioritization; 
routines and protocols; intra-agency relations; and individual leadership qualities. 
Furthermore, there are signs that a dependent relationship exists between these 
indicators, with inter-organizational relations seemingly dominant over most if 
not all of the remaining four. Additionally, states of organizational preparedness 
would appear to be influenced by developments within two distinct dimensions, 
one technical and the other political-administrative. Conceiving of prepared-
ness as something that stems from conditions in two distinct spheres involving 
different kinds of actors and different types of activities helps us gain a better 
understanding of what is otherwise an elusive quality in organizations. Future 
studies of organizational preparedness would arguably benefit where they dis-
tinguish between these two dimensions and then consider the implications that 
developments in either dimension have on the other, but also on organizational 
preparedness writ large.
Emergency preparedness and management agencies (EPMAs)
While EPMAs are structured and operate in much the same way as other gov-
ernment bureaucracies, we see that they have certain defining characteristics 
that nevertheless set them apart in important ways. First of all, EPMAs have a 
central role to play in facilitating multi-level interagency coordination of effort 
prior to, at the onset of and after disruptive events. Second, EPMAs are apt to 
encounter resistance to being coordinated from larger, better resourced actors. 
In order to successfully coordinate the efforts of such actors, EPMAs need to 
acknowledge their interests and motivations, while at the same time maintaining 
close ties with policy elites that can conceivably support them if/when interagency 
conflict arises. Furthermore, there are strong indications that how organizations 
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are organized in relation to one another plays a significant role in determining 
who they have regular contact with, in which situations these contacts occur, the 
nature of the norms, rules, routines and values that emerge as a result and that 
constrain and enable their behaviour, but also their effectiveness in carrying out 
their responsibilities. Additional research is needed if we are to make any definitive 
recommendations on this last point in particular, though it is clear that certain 
elements of the ‘old’ institutionalism may be useful to this end. Furthermore, this 
study suggests that policymakers would do well to assign EPMAs with overarching 
responsibility for the entirety of the emergency management cycle, and not just 
for responding to disruptive events. Finally, it would appear that EPMAs (and 
all bureaucracies for that matter) are best served by senior administrators who 
have an understanding for and possess the ability to effectively work with policy 
elites responsible for handing down policy.
A programme for further research 
While the institutional perspective on preparedness goes a good way in helping 
us understand how organizations prepare for foreseeable complex problems, a 
number of questions still remain or have emerged over the course of the study. For 
this reason, I propose a modest programme for further research that is intended 
to enhance our understanding of how organizations prepare for and manage 
complex problems like hurricanes. First of all, the programme calls for additional 
work aimed at refining certain key tenets of normative institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism. Furthermore, this study 
raises certain questions concerning the applicability of neo-institutional theory in 
its current form to different kinds of organizations operating in the private and 
non-governmental spheres, let alone public sector organizations that increasingly 
rely on private companies and contractors to carry out their missions. This trend 
would appear to alter the traditional dynamics by which common organizational 
norms, rules, routines and values emerge within organizations. Finally, we need 
to explore whether neo-institutionalism in its current state is able to account 
for the increasing decentralization of organizations, many of which allow their 
employees to work outside the confines of an office.
The second area of focus pertains to the notion of foreseeable complex prob-
lems, which should be applied to additional cases where organizations work to 
prepare for and manage problems. Among other things, we should gain additional 
insights on the notion of foreseeability, the nature of preparedness, the idea 
that there exist two distinct but interrelated dimensions of preparedness, and 
the revised set of primary indicators of preparedness that was presented earlier.
In this study, we see that politics dramatically influences both the conditions 
under which EPMAs operate and their behaviour in different situations. The 
final component of the research programme is concerned with whether the 
existing theory adequately accounts for the politicized environment in which 
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emergency management/homeland security work is carried out. The question 
of where EPMAs are best situated in the organizational bureaucracy should also 
be examined more closely here.
Practical recommendations to policymakers and senior administrators
The study has generated a number of insights that can be translated into practical 
recommendations to policymakers and senior administrators involved in one 
way or another in the process whereby elite policy is developed and then handed 
down to the bureaucracy to be implemented. Some of these recommendations 
are general in nature, while others pertain to preparedness specifically.
A diagnostic model for gauging organizational preparedness
The task of accurately measuring organizational preparedness has long vexed 
researchers working in the fields of emergency management, crisis management 
and preparedness. The results of this study arguably bring us at least a little closer 
in this regard. By drawing on the outcomes of this study and insights from the 
literature on emergency management, organizational theory, governmental politics 
and neo-institutionalism, I have developed a draft diagnostic model consisting 
of 15 indicators that is intended to be used to quickly and inexpensively gauge 
organizational preparedness in bureaucratic organizations. The model is intended 
to be used either as a stand-alone tool or as a complement to other, more costly 
validation activities that bureaucracies tend to use to test preparedness and to 
identify organizational capability gaps (full-scale exercises, for instance). In its 
current form, the model is intended for application to all types of government 
bureaucracies, including EPMAs, operating in federal and non-federal settings alike.
Key words: crisis management, emergency management, homeland security, 
hurricanes, inter-governmental relations, leadership, natural disasters, neo-in-
stitutionalism, organizations, preparedness.
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Waarom slagen organisaties er soms niet in om te voorziene problemen 
op te vangen?
De orkaan Katrina veroorzaakte in augustus 2005 voor miljarden dollars aan 
schade, overstroomde een grote Amerikaanse stad en maakte 1.800 slachtoffers 
aan de Golfkust. De reactie van de overheid, gecoördineerd door de Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), was traag en slecht gecoördineerd, 
ondanks grote hervormingen op het gebied van binnenlandse veiligheid na de 
aanslagen van 11 september 2001, zoals de oprichting van het Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), dat meer dan twintig bestaande federale organisaties 
omvatte, waaronder de FEMA. Voorstanders beweerden dat deze verandering 
de capaciteit van de federale overheid om allerlei soorten dreigingen effectief te 
beheersen zou verbeteren, zoals toekomstige terroristische aanslagen en natuur-
rampen. Katrina was een van de eerste situaties waarin deze beweringen op de 
proef gesteld zouden worden. Hoewel ambtenaren op staats- en federaal niveau 
verantwoordelijk waren voor een aantal beslissingen waardoor honderdduizenden 
mensen gestrand raakten in New Orleans voordat Katrina aan land kwam, bleek 
dat de FEMA op zijn beurt niet in staat was om de hulp aan overweldigde staats- 
en lokale autoriteiten op effectieve wijze te coördineren naarmate de omvang van 
de ramp begon toe te nemen. De reactie op Katrina leek te suggereren dat de 
mogelijkheden van de federale overheid om de dreiging van orkanen te beheersen 
sinds 11 september niet verbeterd waren. Sterker nog, er waren indicaties dat ze 
juist verslechterd waren.
Volgens Donald Kettl bereiden democratieën zich niet goed voor op zaken 
die nog nooit gebeurd zijn.1 Dit impliceert dat ze beter geschikt zijn om 
1 Kettl, 2007: 100.
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voorspelbare, vaak voorkomende gebeurtenissen te beheren, of wat ik in dit 
onderzoek te voorziene complexe problemen noem. Orkanen zijn een voorbeeld 
van dit type probleem. De federale overheid, ooit een terughoudende speler in 
rampenbestrijding, is een centrale speler geworden in een zeer gestandaardiseerd 
rampenbestrijdingssysteem dat uit meerdere niveaus en instanties bestaat en 
dat gestuurd wordt door grondig ontwikkelde plannen, routines en protocollen 
die ervoor moeten zorgen dat ontwrichtende gebeurtenissen op dezelfde wijze 
beheerst worden, waar in het land ze ook plaatsvinden. Daarom verwachten we 
dat de FEMA bijzonder geschikt is om met name die dreigingen te beheren die 
voorspelbaar zijn en regelmatig voorkomen. Hierin ligt het vraagstuk dat de 
drijfveer vormt voor dit onderzoek. Ervan uitgaande dat de orkaan Katrina een 
te voorziene complexe dreiging was waarvoor de federale overheid gestandaardi-
seerde routines had opgesteld en dat binnenlandse veiligheid een prioriteit was 
na 11 september, waarom waren zo veel elementen van de reactie van de FEMA 
op Katrina dan ondermaats?
Als we een stap terug nemen, dan zien we dat de situatie rond Katrina niet 
uniek is. Overheden op elk niveau en over de hele wereld reageren regelmatig niet 
op terugkerende problemen op manieren die aansluiten bij de verwachtingen van 
de relevante belanghebbenden. Dit proefschrift, dat de Amerikaanse voorbereiding 
op een grote orkaan als achtergrond gebruikt, heeft tot doel om ons beter inzicht 
te geven in waarom dit het geval is. Hoewel de bestaande literatuur over Katrina 
al diep ingaat op het verklaren van de falende reactie van de FEMA, wordt maar 
beperkt ingegaan op de unieke institutionele omgeving waarin de FEMA ope-
reerde in de jaren voorafgaand aan de storm. Door relevante elementen van de 
institutionele omgeving van de instantie te identificeren heeft dit onderzoek tot 
doel om het spectrum van krachten/druk te identificeren dat de FEMA en zijn 
partners ertoe dwong om op bepaalde manieren te handelen, en vervolgens welke 
eventuele invloed dergelijke handelingen hebben gehad op hun mogelijkheid 
om verschillende dreigingen, niet in de laatste plaats orkanen, te beheersen. Dit 
onderzoek probeert de volgende onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden:
Wat zijn de omstandigheden die ten grondslag lagen aan de verandering binnen de 
FEMA die geleid heeft tot (of niet geleid heeft tot) een hoog paraatheidsniveau voor 
het beheersen van orkanen?
Neo-institutionalisme vormt het theoretisch kader vereist om deze vraag te 
beantwoorden. Hoewel verschillende stromingen binnen het neo-institution-
alisme verschillende theoretische achtergronden hebben, delen ze allemaal het 
inzicht dat normen, regels, routines en waarden op enigerlei wijze het gedrag 
van spelers beperken of faciliteren in alles wat zij doen. Hoewel het neo-insti-
tutionalisme veel gebruikt is om de reacties op crises/noodsituaties/rampen te 
bestuderen, is het niet vaak gebruikt om gevallen van organisatorische paraatheid 
te bestuderen. In dit onderzoek bekijken we de voorbereiding op orkanen van 
de federale overheid in de jaren voorafgaand aan de orkaan Katrina aan de hand 
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van drie neo-institutionele perspectieven, namelijk normatief institutionalisme, 
historisch institutionalisme en rationele-keuze-institutionalisme. Naast het feit 
dat dit bijdraagt aan het begrijpen van de reactie op Katrina, draagt de beslissing 
om de casus uit verschillende theoretische perspectieven te benaderen bij aan 
een beter begrip van wat paraatheid is en hoe dit concept gemeten kan worden 
in organisaties, hoe organisaties zich voorbereiden, waar ze zich waarschijnlijk 
op zullen voorbereiden en hoe paraat ze daadwerkelijk worden.
Dit onderzoek heeft tot doel bij te dragen aan de onderzoeksgebieden orga-
nisatorische paraatheid, rampenbestrijding, crisisonderzoek, politicologie, 
bestuurskunde en neo-institutionalisme. Bepaalde uitkomsten hebben mogelijk 
praktische implicaties voor zowel politici en bestuurders die verantwoordelijk zijn 
voor het overzien en leiden van deze bureaucratische overheidsorganisaties, die 
op zoek zijn naar en zich voorbereiden op verschillende soorten ontwrichtende 
gebeurtenissen om ze vervolgens te beheersen. Aan het einde van het onderzoek 
wordt een concept van een diagnostisch model gepresenteerd voor het meten 
van organisatorische paraatheid.
Een institutioneel perspectief op paraatheid
Om de hierboven gestelde onderzoeksvraag te beantwoorden, heb ik een wat ik 
een institutioneel perspectief op paraatheid noem ontwikkeld, dat gebaseerd is 
op inzichten uit de literatuur over paraatheid, rampenbestrijding, crisisonder-
zoek, policologie bestuurskunde en neo-institutionalisme. Met behulp van dit 
perspectief zou het mogelijk moeten zijn om de omgeving waarin beleidsmakers 
en uitvoerders processen uitvoeren gericht op het identificeren, prioriteren en 
voorbereiden op verschillende dreigingen in de context te plaatsen. Dit institu-
tionele perspectief bestaat uit vier centrale componenten. De eerste component 
heeft tot doel om te voorziene complexe problemen te definiëren en in te kaderen 
in relatie tot andere termen die regelmatig voorkomen in met name de literatuur 
over paraatheid en rampenbestrijding (ramp, noodsituatie, catastrofe, crisis en 
recentelijk, megacrisis, om er maar een paar op te noemen). Dit wordt gevolgd 
door een korte discussie over de aard van paraatheid, hoe organisaties zich over 
het algemeen voorbereiden en de verschillende rollen die beleidsmakers en uit-
voerders in deze context op zich nemen.
Een van de centrale thema’s van dit onderzoek is dat complexe overheids-
systemen (zoals het federale systeem in de Verenigde Staten) onderlinge afhan-
kelijkheden met zich meebrengen tussen spelers, zowel tussen verschillende 
niveaus als tussen instellingen. De tweede component van het institutionele 
perspectief probeert onder andere deze complexiteiten te illustreren voor zover 
deze gerelateerd zijn aan paraatheid. Met behulp van het shared governance model, 
ontwikkeld door Saundra K. Schneider, zien we de processen op basis waarvan 
in federale systemen wordt vastgesteld hoe bureaucratieën die op verschillende 
overheidsniveaus opereren zich voorbereiden en waarop ze zich voorbereiden. 
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Vervolgens ontleden we het begrip paraatheid tot wat naar mijn mening twee 
aparte en gescheiden dimensies zijn: een politiek-administratieve dimensie en een 
technische dimensie. Waar de politiek-administratieve dimensie van paraatheid 
het terrein is van politici en bestuurders die verschillende soorten beslissingen 
moeten nemen over waar de relevante overheidsinstanties met beperkte middelen 
zich op moeten voorbereiden, gaat de technische dimensie over het werk dat 
uitvoerders doen om het beleid uit te voeren voor zover dit gerelateerd is aan 
paraatheid. Deze component bevat ook een korte discussie over de aard van orga-
nisaties, bureaucratieën en de unieke subset van organisatorische bureaucratieën, 
belast met de voorbereiding op en beheersing van ontwrichtende gebeurtenissen 
(rampenbestrijding en hulpdiensten).
De derde component behelst drie primaire indicatoren van paraatheid die 
gebruikt kunnen worden om te ontdekken in welke mate organisaties voorbereid 
zijn op verschillende mogelijke gebeurtenissen. Deze indicatoren omvatten relaties 
tussen organisaties, het vaststellen/prioriteren van dreigingen, en routines en 
protocollen. Ervan uitgaande dat deze indicatoren relevant zijn voor deze casus, 
worden ze gebruikt als basis voor het concept van het diagnostische model voor 
het meten van organisatorische paraatheid dat aan het einde van dit onderzoek 
gepresenteerd wordt.
De verschillende stromingen binnen het neo-institutionalisme die toegepast 
worden in dit onderzoek – normatief institutionalisme, historisch institutiona-
lisme en rationele-keuze-institutionalisme – worden geïntroduceerd in de laatste 
component van het institutionele perspectief op paraatheid. Elke stroming biedt 
een ander perspectief op de aard van de mechanismen die het gedrag van spelers 
beperken of faciliteren. Tezamen vormen de drie stromingen een basis voor een 
aantal onderzoekshypothesen omtrent de relatie tussen grote institutionele ver-
andering en paraatheid die getest worden in dit onderzoek.
De casus onderzoeken met behulp van process tracing
In dit onderzoek bestuderen we het werk van de FEMA sinds zijn oprichting in 
1979 tot augustus 2005 (toen Katrina aan land kwam) voor de voorbereiding op 
één type te voorzien complex probleem, namelijk een grote orkaan. We zijn vooral 
geïnteresseerd in het gedrag van de groep belangrijkste senior leidinggevenden van 
de instantie, bestaande uit een klein aantal door de politiek aangestelde personen 
en ambtenaren die belast zijn met het op verschillende manieren bijdragen aan 
het beleidsvormingsproces en de daadwerkelijke implementatie van het opgestelde 
beleid. Naast dat het geschikt is voor complexe, empirisch compacte casus zoals 
deze, is het mogelijk om met de in dit onderzoek gebruikte onderzoeksmethodol-
ogie de casus in kwestie vanuit meerdere theoretische perspectieven te benaderen 
op basis van de drie hierboven benoemde stromingen binnen het neo-institu-
tionalisme. Met behulp van een aangepaste versie van process tracing zouden 
we het bestaan moeten kunnen bevestigen van mogelijke causale mechanismen 
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tussen de onafhankelijke variabele – verandering in de institutionele omgeving 
waarin de FEMA opereerde – en de afhankelijke variabele – de paraatheid van 
de instantie omtrent het beheersen van de complexe en te voorziene orkaan-
dreiging. De verschillende stromingen binnen het neo-institutionalisme bieden 
verschillende voorspellingen over hoe een dergelijke verandering van invloed kan 
zijn op de paraatheid van de instantie. De omstandigheden die nodig zijn om 
de verschillende onderzoekshypothesen te bevestigen, worden in deze fase van 
het onderzoek uiteengezet en besproken.
Er is een groot aantal bronnen gebruikt om een goed beeld te krijgen van de 
casus. Dit omvat berichten uit de media, historische verslagen, overheidsrappor-
ten en rapporten van denktanks, belangenorganisaties en particuliere bedrijven, 
academische studies en interviews met betrokkenen.
Analyse van de paraatheid van de FEMA voor orkanen van 1979 tot 2005
De omschrijving van het werk van de FEMA omtrent voorbereiding op orkanen 
tussen 1979 en 2005 is verdeeld in drie aparte periodes: van 1979 tot orkaan 
Andrew (1992), van Andrew tot 11 september 2001 en van 11 september tot 
Katrina. Door de casus op deze manier te ontrafelen, kunnen we vaststellen dat 
de aanslagen van 11 september, en niet Andrew of een andere gebeurtenis in de 
geschiedenis van de FEMA, een grote institutionele verandering teweegbracht 
op het gebied van rampenbestrijding/binnenlandse veiligheid in de onderzochte 
periode. Door één duidelijk geval van grote institutionele verandering te iden-
tificeren, kunnen we vervolgens de validiteit bepalen van de onafhankelijke 
variabele binnen deze casus (verandering in de institutionele omgeving van de 
FEMA), aantonen dat verscheidene mogelijke meetproblemen opgevangen zijn, 
en, misschien nog wel het belangrijkst, de verschillende onderzoekshypothesen 
evalueren.
De voorbereiding van de instantie op orkanen voor en na de aanslagen 
van 11 september is geanalyseerd vanuit drie verschillende analytische hoeken 
(relaties tussen organisaties, vaststellen/prioriteren van dreigingen, en routines 
en protocollen), die voortkomen uit de primaire indicatoren van paraatheid die 
samen een van de componenten van het institutionele perspectief op paraatheid 
vormen. Door de casus op deze manier te benaderen, zouden we de belangrijkste 
effecten die de grote institutionele verandering na de aanslagen van 11 september 
had op de paraatheid van de FEMA omtrent verschillende soorten dreigingen, 
niet in de laatste plaats orkanen, moeten kunnen zien, en ook hoe geschikt elke 
primaire indicator is voor het meten van organisatorische paraatheid meer in 
het algemeen.
De analyse van de casus sluit af met een discussie over de verscheidene 
onderzoekshypotheses gerelateerd aan de verschillende stromingen binnen het 
neo-institutionalisme, met als doel om te bepalen welke stromingen uit de casus 
naar voren komen en welke niet. We zien hier dat de centrale stellingen van 
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normatief institutionalisme en historisch institutionalisme ondersteund worden 
door de beschikbare empirische data. Het idee dat spelers zich gedragen als 
‘goede spelers’, zoals gesteld door voorstanders van rationele-keuze-institutiona-
lisme, wordt bevestigd, maar slechts op basis van een relatief kleine hoeveelheid 
ondersteunende data. De tweede set beweringen voortkomend uit rationele-keu-
ze-institutionalisme, namelijk dat individuele leiders zogenaamde professionele 
profielen toegewezen kunnen worden en dat deze gebruikt kunnen worden om 
toekomstig gedrag te voorspellen, kon ik echter bevestigen noch verwerpen. 
De voorgestelde professionele profielen waren niet voldoende gespecificeerd, 
waardoor het moeilijk was om ze toe te wijzen aan individuele leiders, laat staan 
om te voorspellen hoe mensen zich waarschijnlijk gaan gedragen tijdens grote 
institutionele veranderingen.
De onderzoeksvraag beantwoorden
Wat waren dan de omstandigheden die ten grondslag lagen aan de verandering 
binnen de FEMA die geleid heeft tot (of niet geleid heeft tot) een hoog paraat-
heidsniveau voor het beheersen van orkanen? Door deze casus vanuit verschillende 
neo-institutionele perspectieven te bekijken, zijn er verschillende institutionele 
krachten ontdekt die van invloed zijn geweest op het gedrag van de FEMA, 
waardoor de instantie goed voorbereid was op sommige complexe problemen, 
maar niet op andere. Hoewel er veel ontwrichtende gebeurtenissen hebben plaats-
gevonden in de geschiedenis van de FEMA, hebben de terroristische aanslagen 
van 11 september tot hervormingen op een dergelijk grote schaal geleid dat het 
institutionele landschap waarin dreigingen werden geïdentificeerd, geprioriteerd, 
opgevangen en beheerst, dramatisch veranderde. De verschillende stromingen 
binnen het neo-institutionalisme onderstrepen de rol die normen, regels, rou-
tines en waarden, maar ook de belangen van de mensen binnen de FEMA, 
speelden bij het bepalen van de reactie van de instantie op deze institutionele 
verandering, en in welke mate de instantie voorbereid was op de verschillende 
mogelijke gebeurtenissen, niet in de laatste plaats orkanen. Hoewel vaak het 
beeld wordt geschetst dat de FEMA in de aanloop naar Katrina te druk bezig 
was met terrorisme, blijkt de werkelijheid iets gecompliceerder te zijn als we de 
casus vanuit een neo-institutioneel perspectief bekijken. Hoewel de FEMA wel 
degelijk ‘afgeleid’ was (net als veel andere overheidsinstanties in die tijd) door 
de aanslagen van 11 september 2001 en de hernieuwde aandacht voor terror-
isme in brede zin, zien we ook dat de FEMA niet openstond voor verandering. 
Alles wijst erop dat de organisatieen zijn leden, onder wie belangrijke leden van 
het management, uitzonderlijk veel tijd, energie en politieke wil staken in het 
tegenwerken van veranderingen als gevolg van 11 september, en dan vooral de 
nieuwe verantwoordelijkheid voor terrorismebestrijding, de beperkingen inherent 
in het nieuwe DHS-raamwerk en de beslissing van de secretaris van de DHS om 
de verantwoordelijkheid voor paraatheid en bestrijding weg te nemen van de 
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instantie. Met andere woorden, de ogenschijnlijke afname van de paraatheid van 
FEMA voor orkanen, vooral in de jaren voorafgaand aan Katrina, was evenzeer 
het gevolg van verschuivende prioriteiten en strategische beslissingen als van de 
uiteindelijk mislukte pogingen van de instantie zelf om deze veranderingen tegen 
te gaan. Deze pogingen bleken onder andere een aanslag te zijn op de middelen 
van de FEMA enerzijds en de werkrelaties met andere belangrijke spelers binnen 
de federale overheid anderzijds, niet in de laatste plaats de DHS.
Beschouwingen over neo-institutionalisme
Dit onderzoek toont aan dat neo-institutionalisme duidelijk de potentie heeft 
om bij te dragen aan ons begrip van de soms zeer complexe omgeving waarin 
spelers opereren en reageren op veranderingen, maar ook aan ons begrip van 
hoe organisaties paraatheid trachten te. De bestaande theorie moet echter op 
meerdere vlakken worden bijgeschaafd. Van de drie stromingen binnen het 
neo-institutionalisme die in dit onderzoek gebruikt zijn, biedt normatief insti-
tutionalisme een bijzonder overtuigende verklaring voor waarom er net in de 
nasleep van de aanslagen van 11 september een grote institutionele verandering 
plaatsvond en niet op een ander momentin de geschiedenis van de FEMA. 
Bekeken vanuit het perspectief van normatief institutionalisme wordt duidelijk 
dat de daaropvolgende weerstand van de FEMA tegen de beleidsveranderingen 
voortkwam uit de overtuiging onder veel leden dat de manier van werken van 
de instantie – de “all-hazards approach” – de correcte benadering bleef voor het 
beheersen van ontwrichtende gebeurtenissen in het land. Het begrip gepastheid 
en hoe dit tot uiting komt in organisaties blijft echter ongrijpbaar. Gezien de 
centrale rol van het idee achter normatief institutionalisme zijn verdere begeleiding 
en praktische tools vereist om de toewijding van mensen aan organisatorische 
doelen beter te meten.
Historisch institutionalisme veronderstelt dat grote institutionele veranderin-
gen meestal plaatsvinden in de nasleep van ‘focusing events’ die aanhoudende, 
historisch bepaalde gedragspatronen doorbreken. Gegeven de centrale plaats 
die focusing events innemen in deze gedachtegang, is meer onderzoek vereist 
om beter te begrijpen en voorspellen onder welke omstandigheden focusing 
events waarschijnlijk plaatsvinden, welke mechanismen een rol spelen bij het 
aanmoedigen van instanties om af te wijken van hun historisch bepaalde paden, 
en welke belangen dergelijke events waarschijnlijk mobiliseren. Onderzoekers 
kunnen ook de mogelijkheid onderzoeken dat er verschillende soorten focusing 
events bestaan. Naast ‘traditionele’ focusing events – die de aandacht richten op 
een bepaald issue – valt er wat te zeggen voor wat ik ‘defocusing events’ noem: 
events die tot doel hebben om dreigingen of problemen weg te nemen waar 
relatieve consensus over bestaat, wat ruimte vrijmaakt voor discussie over andere 
dreigingen die aandacht verdienen. Dit was waarschijnlijk het geval na de val 
van de Sovjet-Unie.
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In tegenstelling tot de andere twee hier besproken stromingen binnen het 
neo-institutionalisme, is rationele-keuze-institutionalisme intentionalistisch 
voor zover het stelt dat mensen proberen controle te krijgen over het proces 
van het oprichten en runnen van organisaties op manieren die hun kans van 
slagen vergroten. Ze zijn tegelijkertijd echter gedwongen om om te gaan met 
organisatorische normen, regels, routines en waarden die fungeren als remmen 
op hun anders ongebreidelde gedrag. Van de drie stromingen gaat rationele-ke-
uze-institutionalisme zeker het verst in het erkennen van de rol die institutionele 
krachten en individuele belangen spelen in het beperken of faciliteren van gedrag. 
De theorie binnen deze gedachtegang doet echter geen uitspraken over welke 
van deze twee soorten krachten het belangrijkst is. Hoewel naar mijn mening 
de relatie tussen institutionele krachten en belangen per situatie zal verschillen, 
verdient deze vraag zeker meer aandacht.
Uit de centrale rol die individuele belangen spelen in rationele-keuze-institu-
tionalisme kwam in dit onderzoek het idee naar voren dat mensen verschillende 
professionele profielen hebben en toegewezen kunnen krijgen, die gebruikt 
kunnen worden om te voorspellen hoe zij zich in verschillende situaties zullen 
gedragen, niet in de laatste plaats gedurende grote institutionele verandering. Zoals 
eerder echter al opgemerkt vereist dit idee meer onderzoek, bijvoorbeeld door te 
specificeren welke soorten onderwijs, training en/of professionele ervaring het 
meest geassocieerd zijn met de politiek-administratieve en technische profielen.
Tot slot, het idee dat elke speler opereert binnen zijn eigen unieke insti-
tutionele omgeving bleek van pas te komen bij het conceptualiseren van de 
institutionele krachten die het gedrag van de FEMA beïnvloedden. Dat gezegd 
hebbende toont dit onderzoek de mogelijke voordelen van het grondig in kaart 
brengen van de omgeving binnen organisaties voordat de relaties van de spelers 
met anderen worden gedefinieerd. Op deze manier zou de onderzoeker moeten 
kunnen zien welke organisatorische normen, regels, routines en waarden een rol 
spelen bij het richting geven aan het gedrag van de organisaties in zijn omgang 
met andere spelers.
Te voorziene complexe problemen
Het begrip te voorziene complexe problemen bleek bijzonder nuttig voor zover 
het onderlinge afhankelijkheden benadrukt die op meerdere niveaus bestaan 
tussen instanties, en hoe deze effectieve coördinatie mogelijk maken, maar ook 
verhinderen, tijdens het beheersen van ontwrichtende gebeurtenissen. Misschien 
wel zijn grootste zwakte is echter de nadruk die de term legt op voorspelbaar-
heid. Inzichten uit de literatuur over reacties op waarschuwingen en cognitief 
institutionalisme tonen aan hoe een combinatie van cognitieve, bureau-organi-
satorische en agenda-politieke factoren situaties creëren waarin zowel mensen als 
organisaties voorspelbare problemen niet herkennen. Het is daarom misschien 
nuttiger om organisatorische paraatheid te onderzoeken in relatie tot problemen 
die daadwerkelijk voorzien zijn.
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Paraatheid
De uitkomsten van dit onderzoek suggereren dat organisatorische paraatheid 
gemeten kan worden door heersende omstandigheden te onderzoeken binnen 
niet drie maar vijf thematische gebieden: relaties tussen organisaties, vaststellen/
prioriteren van dreigingen, routines en protocollen, relaties binnen instanties 
en individuele leiderschapskwaliteiten. Verder zijn er aanwijzingen dat er een 
afhankelijke relatie bestaat tussen deze indicatoren; relaties tussen organisaties 
lijkt te domineren over de meeste of alle andere indicatoren. De mate van organ-
isatorische paraatheid lijkt beïnvloed te worden door ontwikkelingen binnen 
twee aparte dimensies: een politiek-administratieve dimensie en een technische 
dimensie. Door paraatheid te zien als iets wat voortkomt uit omstandigheden in 
twee aparte dimensies met verschillende soorten spelers en verschillende soorten 
activiteiten, krijgen we meer inzicht in iets wat anders een ongrijpbare eigenschap 
van organisaties blijft. Toekomstig onderzoek naar organisatorische paraatheid 
zou erbij gebaat zijn om onderscheid te maken tussen deze twee dimensies en 
vervolgens rekening te houden met de gevolgen die ontwikkelingen in de ene 
dimensie hebben voor de andere, maar ook voor organisatorische paraatheid in 
brede zin.
Rampenbestrijding en hulpdiensten
Hoewel hulpdiensten op dezelfde manier opgebouwd zijn en op dezelfde manier 
opereren als andere overheidsinstanties, beschikken zij over enkele kenmerkende 
eigenschappen die hen uniek maken. Ten eerste spelen hulpdiensten een cen-
trale rol in het faciliteren van de coördinatie van activiteiten tussen instanties 
op meerdere niveaus voorafgaand aan, tijdens en na ontwrichtende gebeurt-
enissen. Ten tweede zullen hulpdiensten waarschijnlijk op weerstand stuiten 
tegen coordinatie door grotere spelers met meer middelen. Om de activiteiten 
van dergelijke spelers op juiste wijze te coördineren, dienen hulpdiensten hun 
belangen en motivaties te erkennen en tegelijkertijd nauwe banden te onder-
houden met beleidsmakers die hen kunnen ondersteunen indien en wanneer er 
conflicten optreden tussen instanties. Verder zijn er sterke aanwijzingen dat de 
wijze waarop de organisaties onderling met elkaar in verband staan een signifi-
cante rol speelt in het bepalen met wie zij regelmatig contact onderhouden, in 
welke situaties dit contact plaatsvindt, de aard van de normen, regels, routines 
en waarden die hieruit voortkomen en die hun gedrag beperken en faciliteren, 
maar ook de mate van effectiviteit waarmee zij hun activiteiten uitvoeren. Verder 
onderzoek is nodig als we definitieve aanbevelingen willen doen over dit laatste 
punt. Het is echter duidelijk dat bepaalde elementen van het ‘oude’ institu-
tionalisme hierbij van pas kunnen komen. Verder suggereert dit onderzoek dat 
beleidsmakers hulpdiensten maar beter de verantwoordelijkheid kunnen geven 
over de gehele cyclus van rampenbestrijding en niet alleen over het reageren op 
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ontwrichtende gebeurtenissen. Tot slot lijkt het zo te zijn dat hulpdiensten (en 
alle andere bureaucratieën) het meeste baat hebben bij senior bestuurders die 
verstand hebben van en de mogelijkheid hebben om effectief samen te werken 
met beleidsmakers die verantwoordelijk zijn voor het opstellen van het beleid.
Programma voor verder onderzoek 
Hoewel het institutionele perspectief op paraatheid ons goed helpt bij het 
begrijpen van hoe organisaties zich voorbereiden op te voorziene complexe 
problemen, zijn sommige vragen nog niet beantwoord en zijn er nieuwe vragen 
ontstaan gedurende dit onderzoek. Daarom stel ik een bescheiden programma 
voor verder onderzoek voor, dat bedoeld is om ons begrip te vergroten over hoe 
organisaties zich voorbereiden op te voorziene complexe problemen zoals orkanen 
en hoe ze deze beheersen. Ten eerste pleit het programma voor verder onderzoek 
om bepaalde belangrijke principes van normatief institutionalisme, historisch 
institutionalisme en rationele-keuze-institutionalisme verder te verfijnen. Ook 
roept dit onderzoek bepaalde vragen op over de toepasbaarheid van de neo-in-
stitutionele theorie in zijn huidige vorm op verschillende soorten organisaties 
die actief zijn in de particuliere en niet-gouvernementele ruimtes, maar ook over 
organisaties in de publieke sector, die steeds vaker aangewezen zijn op particuliere 
bedrijven en aannemers voor de uitvoering van hun taken. Deze trend wijzigt de 
traditionele dynamiek van het ontstaan van gedeelde organisatorische normen, 
regels, routines en waarden binnen organisaties. Tot slot dienen we te onderzo-
eken of neo-institutionalisme in zijn huidige vorm een verklaring kan bieden 
voor de toenemende decentralisatie van organisaties, die hun werknemers vaak 
de mogelijkheid bieden om buiten het kantoor te werken.
Het tweede aandachtsgebied gaat over het begrip ‘te voorziene complexe 
problemen’, dat toegepast dient te worden op meer casus van organisaties die 
zich voorbereiden op problemen en deze beheersen. We hebben onder andere 
meer inzicht nodig in het begrip voorspelbaarheid, de aard van paraatheid, het 
idee dat er twee aparte maar gerelateerde dimensies van paraatheid bestaan, en de 
aangepaste primaire indicatoren van paraatheid die eerder ter sprake zijn gekomen.
In dit onderzoek zien we dat de politiek een grote invloed heeft op zowel de 
omstandigheden waarin hulpdiensten opereren als hun gedrag in verschillende 
situaties. De laatste component van het onderzoeksprogramma houdt zich 
bezig met de vraag of de bestaande theorie voldoende verklaring biedt voor de 
gepolitiseerde omgeving waarin de activiteiten van rampenbestrijding/binnen-
landse veiligheid worden uitgevoerd. De vraag waar hulpdiensten zich zouden 
moeten bevinden binnen de organisatorische bureaucratie zou hierbij ook aan 
bod moeten komen.
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Praktische aanbevelingen aan politici en bestuurders
Het onderzoek heeft geleid tot een aantal inzichten die vertaald kunnen worden 
naar praktische aanbevelingen aan politici en bestuurders die op enigerlei 
betrokken zijn bij het opstellen en opleggen van beleid. Sommige van deze aan-
bevelingen zijn algemeen van aard, terwijl andere specifiek over paraatheid gaan.
Een diagnostisch model voor het meten van organisatorische paraatheid
Het nauwkeurig meten van organisatorische paraatheid is lang een lastige taak 
geweest voor onderzoekers die actief zijn op het gebied van rampenbestrijding, 
crisisbeheer en paraatheid. De resultaten van dit onderzoek bieden enige duideli-
jkheid op dit gebied. Aan de hand van de uitkomsten van dit onderzoek en 
inzichten uit de literatuur over rampenbestrijding, organisatietheorie, overheids-
beleid en neo-institutionalisme heb ik een concept van een diagnostisch model 
ontwikkeld bestaande uit vijftien indicatoren, dat bedoeld is om de organisa-
torische paraatheid van bureaucratische organisaties snel en goedkoop te meten. 
Het model is bedoeld om gebruikt te worden als een op zichzelf staande tool of 
als een aanvulling op andere, duurdere validatieactiviteiten die bureaucratieën 
vaak gebruiken om paraatheid te testen en organisatorische tekortkomingen te 
identificeren (grootschalige oefeningen, bijvoorbeeld). In zijn huidige vorm is 
het model bedoeld om toegepast te worden op allerlei soorten overheidsbureau-
cratieën, waaronder hulpdiensten, die actief zijn in zowel federale als niet-federale 
contexten.
Sleutelwoorden: crisismanagement, rampenbestrijding, binnenlandse veiligheid, 
orkanen, relaties tussen overheden, leiderschap, natuurrampen, neo-institution-
alisme, organisaties, paraatheid.
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Abbreviations
CBP Customs and Border Protection
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear
CDA Civil Defense Act
CEMP Comprehensive Emergency Management Plan
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CoG continuity of government
DHS Department of Homeland Security
DNI Director of National Intelligence
DoD Department of Defense
DoE Department of Energy
DoJ Department of Justice
DoT Department of Transportation
EMERCOM Russian Ministry for Emergency Situations
EOC emergency operations centre
EPMA emergency preparedness and management agency
EP&R Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate
FAA Federal Aviation Administration
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
FCDA Federal Civil Defense Administration
FCO federal coordinating official
FDAA Federal Disaster Assistance Administration
FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency
FRP Federal Response Plan
GAO Government Accounting Office/Government  
Accountability Office
GSA General Services Administration
HHS Department of Health and Human Services
HRO high-reliability organizations
HSOC Homeland Security Operations Center
HSPD Homeland Security Presidential Directive
HUD Department of Housing and Urban Development
IEMS Integrated Emergency Management System
IRTPA Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004
LOHSEP Louisiana Office of Homeland Security and Emergency  
Preparedness
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NAPA National Academy of Public Administration
NCTC National Counterterrorism Center
NEMA National Emergency Management Association
NGO non-governmental organization
NHP National Hurricane Program
NHSA National Homeland Security Agency
NOAA National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
NP National Preparedness Directorate 
NRCC National Response Coordination Center
NRP National Response Plan
NRS National Response System
NWS National Weather Service
OCD Office of Civil Defense
OCDM Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization
ODM Office of Defense Mobilization
ODP Office of Domestic Preparedness
OEP Office of Emergency Planning
OHS Office of Homeland Security
OHSPS Office of Homeland Security and Public Safety
PFO Principal Federal Official
PKEMRA Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act
PPA/CA Performance Partnership Agreement/Cooperative Agreement
PSA public service announcement
SEDU Swedish Defence University
SEMA Swedish Emergency Management Agency
SLPS State and Local Preparedness and Support Directorate
SOP standard operating procedure
TSA Transportation Security Administration
USACE US Army Corps of Engineers 
USAID US Agency for International Development
USAR urban search and rescue
USCG US Coast Guard
USCIS Citizenship and Immigration Services
USFA US Fire Administration
USSS US Secret Service
WMD weapons of mass destruction
2SR Second-Stage Review
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History is rife with cases where governments fail to manage complex foreseeable 
problems to the satisfaction of stakeholders. While it might be easy to understand why 
they struggle to deal with the novel or unforeseen, it is much more puzzling where 
governments fail to meet widely recognized and deeply understood threats. This study, 
which examines the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s, FEMA’s, capacity to 
manage the very foreseeable hurricane threat using an institutional perspective on 
preparedness, aims to explain why this is so often the case.
This study shows that complex systems of government create deep interdependen-
cies that pose major challenges to multi-level interagency coordination in dealing with 
problems, even those that are foreseeable. When viewed through a neo-institutional 
lens, the case reveals the role that norms, rules, routines, values, and individual interests 
played in determining how FEMA responded to major change in the institutional 
environment and what implications this had for the agency’s preparedness for hurri-
canes. We also see that the apparent deterioration of FEMA’s preparedness ahead of 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005 was as much a result of elite over-attentiveness to terrorism 
as it was FEMA’s own resistance to change. This served to weaken the agency’s ability 
to garner political support and its readiness to partner with other stakeholders. More 
generally, this study provides insights concerning how and for what organizations 
prepare, but also how we might go about more accurately gauging organizational 
preparedness in future. 
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